This article investigates market reactions to initiations and omissions of cash dividend payments. Consistent with prior literature we find that the magnitude of short-run price reactions to omissions are greater than for initiations. In the year following the announcements, prices continue to drift in the same direction, though the drift following omissions is stronger and more robust. This post-dividend initiation/omission price drift is distinct from and more pronounced than that following earnings surprises. A trading rule employing both samples earns positive returns in 22 out of 25 years. We find little evidence for clientele shifts in either sample.

This article investigates market reactions to initiations and omissions of cash dividend payments. Consistent with prior literature we find that the magnitude of short‐run price reactions to omissions are greater than for initiations. In the year following the announcements, prices continue to drift in the same direction, though the drift following omissions is stronger and more robust. This post‐dividend initiation/omission price drift is distinct from and more pronounced than that following earnings surprises. A trading rule employing both samples earns positive returns in 22 out of 25 years. We find little evidence for clientele shifts in either sample.

Much of the research on corporate restructuring has examined the causes and aftermath of extreme changes in corporate governance such as takeovers and bankruptcy. In contrast, we study restructurings initiated in response to product market pressures by “normal” corporate governance mechanisms. Such “voluntary” restructurings, motivated by the discipline of the product market and internal corporate controls, will play a relatively more important role in the 1990s due to a weakening in the discipline of the takeover market. Our data suggest that the firms retrenched quickly and, on average, increased their focus. There is no evidence of abnormally high levels of forced turnover in top managers. There is, however, a significant and rapid cut of 5% in the labor force. Further, the cost of goods sold to sales and labor costs to sales ratios both decline rapidly, more than 5% in the first two years after the negative earnings. The firms cut research and development, increased investment, and also reduced their debt/asset level by over 8% in the first year after the negative earnings. We also document the reasons management and analysis reported for the negative earnings. Overwhelmingly the firms blame bad economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, foreign competition.

We consider the dynamics of analyst inattention by investigating how analysts allocate their attention when a firm in their portfolio experiences CEO turnover. Our analysis shows that analysts tend to divert their attention toward firms that experience such events, resulting in less attention and a corresponding reduction in forecasting accuracy for nonevent firms. Furthermore, this reduction in accuracy varies with factors related to the costs and benefits of rationally allocating attention to firms that have experienced CEO turnover. Collectively, our analysis responds to the call for research on rational inattention among analysts and illustrates the specific intraportfolio events that alter attention allocation and information.

There is limited evidence on the construct validity of the dependent measures commonly used in the literature on nonprofessional investor judgments. In this paper, we first survey the literature to understand the types of dependent measures typically used by researchers. We then conduct factor analyses to uncover linkages between dependent measures and the constructs underlying these nonprofessional investor judgments. Our results suggest that, while the wide variety of dependent measures can appear on their face to represent many nuanced economic constructs, these measures capture three distinct factors. These factors relate to nonprofessional investors’ (1) expectations regarding future firm performance and value, (2) holistic perceptions of the firm, and (3) evaluations of the risk associated with investing in the firm. Next, we provide recommendations for selecting, analyzing, and reporting dependent measures in future research. Finally, we provide directions for future research to further our understanding of the judgments made by investors.

We examine whether tone at the top emphasizing firm-level commercial, audit quality, or both goals (balanced) can nonconsciously affect auditors' engagement-level tendency to accept management's estimates, and whether the effects differ if management engages a specialist. This study is motivated by academics' and regulators' increasing attention on firm-level tone at the top and concerns about management bias in audited estimates, especially when the evidence is prepared by management's specialist. We find firm-level goals can be pursued nonconsciously by auditors when performing a complex task. When management's specialist is absent, a balanced approach reduces auditors' tendency to agree with management's estimate compared to a commercial approach; however, it is less effective when management's specialist is present. We find an audit quality approach reduces auditors' tendency to accept management's estimate compared to a commercial approach, regardless of the absence/presence of a specialist. Our results have important implications for regulators and audit firms. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

Using the shadow insurance setting, we study the interplay between tax and nontax incentives in income shifting. Shadow insurance involves intercompany transactions designed to help firms meet regulatory capital requirements. However, prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), foreign-owned life insurance firms could save taxes by using shadow insurance to shift U.S. profits to tax havens. Consistent with expectations, we find that while nontax incentives appear to be the dominant factor behind firms' use of shadow insurance, tax considerations also played a role for certain firms. We also find that shadow insurance is associated with lower liquid asset holdings and increased credit risk. Overall, our results suggest that taxes were an important incentive for foreign-owned life insurance firms to use shadow insurance pre-TCJA. Moreover, in this setting, nontax considerations appeared to have motivated U.S.-owned firms' use of tax havens.