ABSTRACT Private equity funds pay particular attention to capital structure when executing leveraged buyouts, creating an interesting setting for examining capital structure theories. Using a large, international sample of buyouts from 1980 to 2008, we find that buyout leverage is unrelated to the cross‐sectional factors, suggested by traditional capital structure theories, that drive public firm leverage. Instead, variation in economy‐wide credit conditions is the main determinant of leverage in buyouts. Higher deal leverage is associated with higher transaction prices and lower buyout fund returns, suggesting that acquirers overpay when access to credit is easier.

Public firms that place equity privately experience positive announcements effects, with negative post‐announcement stock‐price performance. This finding is inconsistent with the underreaction hypothesis. Instead, it suggests that investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of firms issuing equity, regardless of the method of issuance. Further, in contrast to public offerings, private issues follow periods of relatively poor operating performance. Thus, investor overoptimism at the time of private issues is not due to the behavioral tendency to overweight recent experience at the expense of long‐term averages.

Richard W. Baker, Jr., Leon T. Kendall, Walter C. Nelson, J. Charles Partee, David Fritz, Harry S. Schwartz, Changing Character of the Real Estate Mortgage Markets: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 19, No. 2, Part 1: Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, Boston, Massachusetts, December 27-29, 1963 (May, 1964), pp. 321-333

ABSTRACT We investigate the audit fee response to CEO behavioral integrity (BI). BI refers to the perceived congruence between an individual's words and deeds (Simons 2002). Because low word-deed congruence should result in more explanations when communicating, we use variation in explanations beyond firm fundamentals and CEO-specific characteristics in more than 30,000 shareholder letters to serve as a linguistic-based proxy for CEO BI. We find that audit fees increase as BI decreases, but BI is not associated with financial misstatement or litigation. These findings are potentially consistent with auditors undertaking additional work in response to low BI, which, in turn, mitigates the risk of restatements and lawsuits. The likelihood of option backdating increases as BI decreases, consistent with the contention that auditors lacked incentives to prevent backdating. Finally, BI is increasing in future performance, which suggests that CEOs partially underpin the returns to high-integrity corporate cultures. JEL Classifications: J24; L25; M14; M41; M42. Data Availability: Proprietary data from KRW International cannot be shared because of the terms of a confidentiality agreement. All other data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

ABSTRACT An extensive literature examines the causes and effects of financial misconduct based on samples drawn from four popular databases that identify restatements, securities class action lawsuits, and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). We show that the results from empirical tests can depend on which database is accessed. To examine the causes of such discrepancies, we compare the information in each database to a detailed sample of 1,243 case histories in which regulators brought enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation. These comparisons allow us to identify, measure, and estimate the economic importance of four features of each database that affect inferences from empirical tests. We show the extent to which each database is subject to these concerns and offer suggestions for researchers using these databases. JEL Classifications: G38; K22; K42; M41.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the impact of hedge fund activism on corporate tax avoidance. We find that relative to matched control firms, businesses targeted by hedge fund activists exhibit lower tax avoidance levels prior to hedge fund intervention, but experience increases in tax avoidance after the intervention. Moreover, findings suggest that the increase in tax avoidance is greater when activists have a successful track record of implementing tax changes and possess tax interest or knowledge as indicated by their Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 13D filings. We also find that these greater tax savings do not appear to result from an increased use of high-risk and potentially illegal tax strategies, such as sheltering. Taken together, the results suggest that shareholder monitoring of firms, in the form of hedge fund activism, improves tax efficiency. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; H26. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

ABSTRACT: We examine a potential benefit associated with the initiation of voluntary disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities: a reduction in firms’ cost of equity capital. We find that firms with a high cost of equity capital in the previous year tend to initiate disclosure of CSR activities in the current year and that initiating firms with superior social responsibility performance enjoy a subsequent reduction in the cost of equity capital. Further, initiating firms with superior social responsibility performance attract dedicated institutional investors and analyst coverage. Moreover, these analysts achieve lower absolute forecast errors and dispersion. Finally, we find that firms exploit the benefit of a lower cost of equity capital associated with the initiation of CSR disclosure. Initiating firms are more likely than non-initiating firms to raise equity capital following the initiations; among firms raising equity capital, initiating firms raise a significantly larger amount than do non-initiating firms.

The article presents devices and techniques developed by the member of accounting profession for the presentation of the knotty aspects of accounting. The first method presented focuses on the accounting problems related to business income and the cash basis. Money profits are basic to the management of a business. The cash basis, where properly applied, involves considerably more than receipts and disbursements. Accounting on the cash basis means that net income is determined by including income and gains actually or constructively received and deducting those expenses actually or constructively paid, losses sustained, and allowable depreciation or amortization for the period. Cash includes not only money but also commercial paper redeemable in money on demand such as money orders, bank drafts or checks. It does not include notes or similar promises to pay money at some future time. The general rule is that a bank check received constitutes an actual or conditional receipt, even though the holder refrains from depositing or cashing the check until a later date. Transactions near the end of the year call for decision as to the exact time receipt occurs.

This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the persistent use of alphabetical name ordering on academic papers in economics. In a context in which market participants are interested in evaluating the relative individual contribution of authors, it is an equilibrium for papers to use alphabetical ordering. Moreover, it is never an equilibrium for authors always to be listed in order of relative contribution. In fact, we show via an example that the alphabetical name ordering norm may be the unique equilibrium, althoug multiple equilibria are also possible. Finally, we charaterize the welfare properties of the noncooperative equilibrium and show it to produce research of lower quality than is optimal and than would be achieved if coauthors were forced to use name ordering to signal relative contribution.