While market prices can be useful tools for bank regulation, recent theoretical work argues that reliance on prices can be counterproductive when secondary markets are stressed and illiquid. Evidence from the financial crisis unearthed by Bhat et al. (in press) provides empirical validation of these arguments. Though Bhat et al. do not fully acknowledge it, their findings suggest that forcing banks to count liquidity-induced unrealized losses in securities holdings against regulatory capital destroys value and exposes bank creditors, including taxpayers, to more risk. Policy makers contemplating greater regulatory reliance on market prices ignore these findings at their peril

This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers. In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and loans granted. Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure and unaffected savings banks. The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected and nonaffected banks. More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks. This result is particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side effects

Why do some firms grow faster than others? Although various observed and unobserved aspects of firms have been suggested as potential drivers of firm heterogeneity, economists disagree sharply on the role of financial structure in influencing firm growth. In this paper, I use a sample of quoted and unquoted firms to show that the effect of financial structure on firm growth is statistically significant and quantitatively important. In the presence of external financing constraints, firms rely more on internal funds to finance growth, but the effect of internal financing on firm growth decreases with an increase in the firm’s access to an external bank credit facility. As the external financing constraint is alleviated, the firm relies less on internal funds and switches to external financing as the primary source of financing for its growth. This pattern of transition between internal and external financing is particularly pronounced in small unquoted firms (conditional on their survival). These results suggest a real effect of financial structure on growth via the channel of an external financing constraint

There is a burgeoning literature using non-parametric frontier methods to measure mutual fund performance. These articles measure the relationship between the various characteristics (mainly return information and some costs of ownership) of these specialized financial products to establish a ranking using some efficiency measure. We argue in favor of the use of the shortage function, which is compatible with general investor preferences, and question some of the often maintained hypotheses in this line of research. The empirical part employs a large database of US and European mutual funds to offer extensive tests of the underlying modeling assumptions using various frontier estimators

This study examines the cross-sectional impact of the 2008 short sale ban on the returns of US financial stocks. Motivated by the large cross-sectional variation in the extent to which banned stocks suffer an illiquidity shock, we hypothesize that stocks with larger liquidity declines are associated with poorer contemporaneous stock returns. The evidence supports this hypothesis and suggests that this effect is stronger for more liquid stocks, as predicted by Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Moreover, consistent with Miller’s (1977) model, we report a valuation reversal whereby stocks with higher abnormal returns at the onset of the ban have lower abnormal returns at its removal. Our findings are robust when we control for firms most affected by TARP, include non-banned matched firms, and compare banned firms’ stock returns with their bond returns. From a policy standpoint, the ban reduced valuations, ceteris paribus, of the stocks that were hardest hit by illiquidity

Estimates of ex-ante equity premia are important in planning investments in pension funds, life insurance pools, and for other long-term financial obligations or goals. However, while global cross-border investment positions and flows have been rising, there is little research on non-US ex-ante equity premia or on their determinants in a global setting. This paper uses data on a recent 8-year period from 33 countries and models simultaneously our estimate of the ex-ante equity premium as a dependent variable and our measure of financial architecture as an instrumental variable. We document that ex-ante equity premia are larger in countries that have a more bank-oriented financial architecture, are wealthier, and have better governance. These results are robust to alternative model specifications and estimation techniques. Given the importance of equity premia and financial architecture, these results should be of much interest to scholars, managers, regulators, and policy makers

Is there any need to clean up a banking system by closing some banks and forcing others to sell assets if the risk of a crisis becomes high? Impaired banks that may be forced to sell illiquid assets in the future have private incentives to hold, rather than sell, those assets Anticipating a potential fire sale, liquid buyers expect high returns, reducing their incentive to lend. Privately optimal trading decisions therefore lead to a worse fire sale and a larger drop in lending than is necessary. We discuss alternative ways of cleaning up the system and the associated costs and benefits

We study the decision to distribute funds as well as the choice of the payout channel (i.e. dividends, repurchases, or both). Our analysis of the payout policy of UK firms demonstrates that the importance of share repurchases is increasing, but dividends still constitute a vast proportion of the total payout. We document that there is a relation between the presence of blockholders and the choice of the payout channel. We find that payout decisions are influenced by directors’ liquidity needs but are not consistent with the agency theory of payout. We also reject the tax-clientele explanation for payout choices

Leveraged ETFs are a recent and very successful financial innovation. They provide daily returns that are in a multiple or a negative multiple of the daily returns on a market benchmark. In this paper, we examine the characteristics, trading statistics, pricing efficiency and tracking errors of a sample of leveraged ETFs. We find that these ETFs are traded mainly by retail traders with very short holding periods. Price deviations (from NAV) are small on average, but large premiums and discounts are prone to occur. More interestingly, the behavior of premiums is different between bull (i.e., those with a positive multiple) and bear ETFs (i.e., those with a negative multiple). Our findings are consistent with the argument that the end-of-day rebalancing of the funds’ exposures increases market volatility at the close of a trading day. As for tracking errors, they are small for holding periods of up to a week, but become increasingly larger for longer horizons

This paper studies an economy in which firms can operate either a mature or a new technology and lenders acquire information on the productive assets of the borrowing firms that are eligible as collateral. We demonstrate that when contracts are imperfectly enforceable informed lenders offer inexpensive funding for the mature technology but may choose not to finance the new one, seeking to preserve the value of their information on the mature assets. Using firm-level data from Italy, we find that banks that establish long-term relationships with firms promote technological progress on average. However, we find that relationship banks inhibit innovations that entail a large depreciation of existing technology-specific information such as radical innovations