Individual investors have an incentive to defer selling appreciated stock until it qualifies for tax‐favored, long‐term capital gains treatment. Shackelford and Verrecchia [2002] show that these incentives can affect equity trading around public disclosures. This article provides some empirical support for their theory with evidence of price increases and equity constrictions around announcements of quarterly earnings and additions to the S&P 500 index. We find share returns rise and trading volume falls with the incremental taxes saved by deferring the sale of appreciated property. The price increases, however, are temporary, reversing in subsequent trading days. The results are consistent with buyers believing the compensation to sell before long‐term qualification (through higher prices) is less costly than holding an inappropriately weighted portfolio. This finding—that personal capital gains taxes affect equity trading—adds to a growing literature that challenges longstanding assumptions that firm value is independent of shareholders and their taxes.

U.S. stock returns are large, predictable over time, and predictable across stocks. The average return on a diversified market portfolio has averaged 8 percent per year more than the return on a short-term treasury bill. The predictability of time variation in returns is modest at high frequencies (about 10 percent of the variation in returns one quarter ahead is predictable) and quite large over longer periods (just under half of the variation in returns over five-year periods is predictable). Finally, portfolios based on the intersection of quintiles of stocks ranked by market value and by the ratio of book value to market value have differences in average annual returns across stocks of several percent per year. The natural explanation for these variations in returns is risk. But variations in consumption risk have done a poor job of explaining these differences in expected returns (see e.g., Sanford J. Grossman and Robert J. Shiller, 1981; Shiller, 1982; Lars Peter Hansen and Kenneth J. Singleton, 1983; N. Gregory Mankiw and Mat

We present a detailed view of market quality in the presence of preferencing arrangements. A unique dataset provides the opportunity to measure trading costs of marketable orders and fill rates and ex post costs of limit orders across trading venues. For market orders, we find the primary exchange provides the lowest execution costs. However, the preferencing exchanges are no worse than, and in most cases better than, the nonpreferencing regional exchanges. For limit orders, the regionals execute limit orders more frequently than the primary market and with an ex post execution cost that is not very different from the primary market.

This study provides evidence regarding the effects of online trading on stock price and trading volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements. We test for differences in stock price and volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements between a period with a significant amount of online trading (1996‐99) and a period without online trading (1992‐95). We conjecture that online trading has increased the proportion of naive investors in the market. We predict that this will result in (1) a decrease in the average precision of investor information prior to earnings announcements leading to higher earnings response coefficients (ERCs), (2) an increase in differential interpretation of earnings leading to higher trading volume reactions that are unrelated to price change, and (3) a decrease in differential prior precision leading to a decrease in the association between trading volume and absolute price change. We find evidence consistent with all three predictions. Our findings are relevant for assessing the validity of concerns about online trading expressed by regulators and the validity of theoretical models of trade with asymmetrically informed investors.

The United States became a net exporter of manufactured goods around 1910 after a dramatic surge in iron and steel exports began in the mid-1890s. This paper argues that natural-resource abundance fueled the expansion of iron and steel exports in part by enabling a sharp reduction in the price of U.S. exports relative to other competitors. The commercial exploitation of the Mesabi iron ore range, for example, reduced domestic ore prices by 50% in the mid-1890s and was equivalent to over a decade's worth of industry productivity improvement in its effect on iron and steel export prices. The nontradability of American ore resulted in its distinctive impact on the pattern of U.S. trade. The results are consistent with Wright's (1990) finding that U.S. manufactured exports were natural-resource-intensive at this time.

This paper examines the degree of anonymity—the extent to which a trader is recognized as informed—on alternative market structures. We find evidence that is consistent with less anonymity on the NYSE specialist system compared to the NASDAQ dealer system. Specifically, when corporate insiders trade medium-sized quantities (500–9, 999 shares inclusive), NYSE listed stocks exhibit larger changes in proportional effective spreads than NASDAQ stocks. Taken together, these findings are consistent with Barclay and Warners (1993) contention that stealth (medium-sized) trades are more likely based on private information and insider trades are more transparent on the NYSE specialist system relative to the NASDAQ dealer system. The results support the hypothesis by Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) that the unique relationship between specialists and floor brokers on the NYSE leads to less anonymity.

Seasoned offers were underpriced by an average of 2.2 percent during the 1980s and 1990s, with the discount increasing substantially over time. The increase appears to be related to Rule 10b‐21 and to economic changes affecting both IPOs and SEOs. Consistent with temporary price pressure, underpricing is positively related to offer size especially for securities with relatively inelastic demand. Underpricing is also positively related to price uncertainty and, after Rule 10b‐21, to the magnitude of preoffer returns. Additionally, I find that underpricing is significantly related to underwriter pricing conventions such as price rounding and pricing relative to the bid quote.

This paper shows that the book-to-market (B/M) effect is greater for stocks with higher idiosyncratic return volatility, higher transaction costs, and lower investor sophistication, consistent with the market-mispricing explanation for the anomaly. The B/M effect for high volatility stocks exceeds that for the low volatility stocks in 20 of the 22 sample years. Also, volatility exhibits significant incremental power beyond transaction costs and investor sophistication measures in explaining cross-sectional variation in the B/M effect. These findings are consistent with the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) thesis that risk associated with the volatility of arbitrage returns deters arbitrage activity and is an important reason why the B/M effect exists.