This study examines the motivations for failing firms to change auditors. Some of the factors that could influence auditor switching include audit qualifications, reporting disputes, management changes, audit fees, and insurance needs. Annual reports, 10-Ks, and proxy statements were used to gather data for a sample of 132 failing (bankrupt) firms and a matched-pair sample of nonfailing firms. The investigation's findings strongly supported our prior expectations that failing firms have a greater tendency to switch auditors than do healthier firms. Other findings revealed that neither audit qualifications nor management changes were statistically associated with auditor displacement in failing firms. Failing firms that changed auditors did display a preference to move to a different class of CPA firms. Also, size did not appear to matter with respect to the observed auditor switching among the failing firms, although it appeared to have some effect among control firms. Overall, our study's major findings suggest a definite need to control for the presence of financial distress in studies on auditor switching.

Reviews the book "Accounting: Concepts and Applications," by Paul R. Berney and Stanley J. Garstka.

History suggests the following stylized facts about default on sovereign debt:(1) Defaults are associated with identifiably bad states of the world. (2) Defaults are usually partial, rather than complete.(3) Sovereign states usually are able to borrow again soon after a default. Motivated by these facts, this paper analyses a reputational equilibrium in a model that interprets sovereign debts as contingent claims that both finance investments and facilitate risk shifting. Loans are a useful device to facilitate risk shifting because they permit the prepayment of indemnities. Nevertheless, because the power to abrogate commitments without having to answer to a higher enforcement authority is an essential aspect of sovereignty, a decision by a sovereign to validate lender expectations about debt servicing depends on the sovereign's concern for its trust worthy reputation. A trustworthy reputationis valuable because it provides continued access to loans. A key aspect of the analysis is that lenders differentiate excusable default, which is associated with implicitly understood contingencies, from unjustifiable repudiation. In the reputational equilibrium, the short-run benefits from repudiation are smaller than the long-run costs from loss of a trustworthy reputation. Thus, although sovereigns sometimes excusably default, they never repudiate their debts. The reputational equilibrium can involve efficient risk shifting and efficient investment or it can involve a binding lending ceiling that limits risk shifting and can also restrict investment. The factors that tend to produce a binding lending ceiling include a high time discount rate for the sovereign, low-risk aversion forthe sovereign, and a low net return from the sovereign's investments.

[Auditors are charged with the responsibility of evaluating internal control systems. Recent advances in decision support systems indicate that the speed, accuracy, and memory capacity of computers may be used to aid auditors in this task. To test this proposition, a computer-assisted method of designing, analyzing, and evaluating internal control systems, called The Internal Control Model or TICOM, was designed and implemented. The technical manual and the TICOM software are available from the authors. This paper presents the results and conclusions of that project. TICOM is a computer-based analytic tool that aids the auditor first to model the internal control system and then to query the model in order to aid the auditor in evaluating the internal control system. TICOM is based on concepts in artificial intelligence such as knowledge representation and graph simplification. It serves (1) to describe office information systems while emphasizing internal accounting controls and (2) as an aid in control evaluation. It was found that the advantages of TICOM over traditional evaluation methods are that (1) the evaluation can be more rigorous and exhaustive, (2) the documentation of the system can be more thorough because of automated completeness and consistency tests, and (3) the modeler may probe and test controls by using the query-processing portion of TICOM.]

Auditors are charged with the responsibility of evaluating internal control systems. Recent advances in decision support systems indicate that the speed, accuracy, and memory capacity of computers may be used to aid auditors in this task. To test this proposition, a computer-assisted method of designing, analyzing, and evaluating internal control systems, called The Internal Control Model or TICOM, was designed and implemented. The technical manual and the TICOM software are available from the authors. This paper presents the results and conclusions of that project. TICOM is a computer-based analytic tool that aids the auditor first to model the internal control system and then to query the model in order to aid the auditor in evaluating the internal control system. TICOM is based on concepts in artificial intelligence such as knowledge representation and graph simplification. It serves (1) to describe office information systems while emphasizing internal accounting controls and (2) as an aid in control evaluation. It was found that the advantages of TICOM over traditional evaluation methods are that (1) the evaluation can be more rigorous and exhaustive, (2) the documentation of the system can be more thorough because of automated completeness and consistency tests, and (3) the modeler may probe and test controls by using the query-processing portion of TICOM.