This paper devises an empirical methodology for discriminating between the median voter model and the oligarchy choice model when applied to the collective provision of a public good. In particular, an empirical methodology is engineered so that a nested test procedure can evaluate competing models. The authors apply this methodology to examine the demand for military activities of ten members of the NATO alliance. A two-stage least squares procedure, corrected for autocorrelation, is used to estimate the demand equations. Test results vary: some allies abide by the median voter model, others by the oligarchy model, and still others by neither. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.

The authors examine differences in structural characteristics that lead firms of different sizes to react differently to the same economic news. They find that a small firm portfolio contains a large proportion of marginal firms–firms with low production efficiency and high financial leverage. The authors construct two size-matched indices designed to mimic the return behavior of marginal firms and find that these return indices are important in explaining the time-series return difference between small and large firms. Furthermore, risk exposures to these indices are as powerful as log(size) in explaining average returns of size-ranked portfolios.

This paper draws on Robert F. Engle's autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic modeling strategy to formulate a conditional capital asset pricing model with time-varying risk and expected returns. The model is estimated by generalized method of moments. A capital asset pricing model that allows mean excess returns to shift in January survives generalized method of moments specification tests for a number of omitted variables. However, a residual dividend yield component is found to remain in the excess returns of smaller firms. The authors find significant monthly and quarterly components in the risk premia and beta estimates.

This paper proposes an empirical framework for measuring the effects of entry in concentrated markets. Building on models of entry in atomistically competitive markets, we show how the number of producers in an oligopolistic market varies with changes in demand and market competition. These analytical results structure our empirical analysis of competition in five retail and professional industries. Using data on geographically isolated monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies, we study the relationship between the number of firms in a market, market size, and competition. Our empirical results suggest that competitive conduct changes quickly as the number of incumbents increases. In markets with five or fewer incumbents, almost all variation in competitive conduct occurs with the entry of the second or third firm. Surprisingly, once the market has between three and five firms, the next entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.

Cletus C. Coughlin, Joseph V. Terza, Vachira Arromdee, State Characteristics and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment within the United States, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 675-683

We consider a home government with political pressure to restrict trade. The foreign country is compensated with a portion of the tariff revenues or quota rents, but cannot directly observe the political pressure abroad. In this setting, the two countries negotiate over the volume of trade and transfer of rents, depending on the level of political pressure. We determine globally optimal, incentive-compatible trade policies, in which the home government has no incentive to overstate (or understate) the pressure for protection.

This paper evaluates alternative methods for classifying individual trades as market buy or market sell orders using intraday trade and quote data. The authors document two potential problems with quote-based methods of trade classification: quotes may be recorded ahead of trades that triggered them, and trades inside the spread are not readily classifiable. These problems are analyzed in the context of the interaction between exchange floor agents. The authors then propose and test relatively simple procedures for improving trade classifications.

Abstract The article relates processes of pattern recognition and hypotheses generation to auditors' quality of performance in an analytical task. Professional standards for analytical procedures call for auditors to hypothesize likely causes of unexpected patterns in financial statement balances and to develop plans to investigate. Therefore, audit efficiency and effectiveness depend on competency in recognizing patterns in financial data and in hypothesizing likely causes of those patterns to serve as a guide for further testing. In the article, researchers conducted a laboratory study in which 21 auditors were asked to think aloud while performing an analytical procedures task. The case contained a seeded error that caused a fairly complex pattern of discrepancies between projected and unaudited financial ratios and balances. Think-aloud verbal protocols provided a trace of subjects' reasoning processes, and the seeded error provided an outcome criterion to evaluate the hypotheses they generated. This design supplies evidence needed to evaluate pattern recognition and hypothesis generation processes that lead to correct and incorrect outcomes.