We analyze capital allocation in a conglomerate where divisional managers with uncertain abilities compete for promotion to CEO. A manager can sometimes gain by unobservably adding variance to divisional performance. Capital rationing can limit this distortion, increase productive efficiency, and allow the owner to make more accurate promotion decisions. Firms for which CEO talent is more important for firm performance are more likely to ration capital. A rationed manager is more likely to be promoted even though all managers are identical ex ante. When the tournament payoff is relatively small, offering an incentive wage can be more efficient than rationing capital; however, when tournament incentives are paramount, rationing is more efficient.

We argue that information about firm activities can vary substantially in the presence of founder or heir ownership, thereby influencing the risks borne by minority investors. We explore two hypotheses with regard to these controlling shareholders and corporate transparency, focusing on their role as monitor in-place and their potential to exploit firm opacity to accrue private benefits of control. To test these notions, we create an opacity index that ranks the relative transparency of the two thousand largest industrial US firms and find founder and heir ownership in 22% and 25% of these firms, respectively. Our analysis indicates that, in large, publicly traded companies, both founder and heir firms are significantly more opaque than diffuse shareholder firms. We also find that founder and heir-controlled firms exhibit a negative relation to performance in all but the most transparent firms. Surprisingly, additional tests reveal that concerns about divergences in ownership versus control (management type, dual class shares, and board influence) appear to be substantially less important than corporate opacity in explaining the performance impacts of founder and heir control. Finally, we decompose corporate opacity into disclosure and market scrutiny components, finding that the disclosure quality component appears to be of greater importance to investors. However, irrespective of whether these controlling shareholders create or stay in the firm because of corporate opacity, our analysis suggests that founders and heirs in large, publicly traded firms exploit opacity to extract private benefits at the expense of minority investors.

Abstract What drives the compensation demanded by investors in risky bonds? Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) predict that one key factor is the time-varying negative correlation between interest rates and the yield spreads on corporate bonds. However, the effects of callability and taxes also need to be considered in empirical analyses. Canadian bonds have no tax effects, yet, after controlling for callability, the correlation between riskless interest rates and corporate bond spreads remains negligible. Our results provide support for reduced-form models that explicitly define a default hazard process and untie the relation between the firm’s asset value and default probability.

Previous work has addressed the relative vulnerability of different auction schemes to collusive bidding. The common wisdom is that ascending-bid and second-price auctions are highly susceptible to collusion. We show that the details of ascending-bid and second-price auctions, including bidder registration procedures and procedures for information revelation during the auction, can be designed to completely inhibit, or unintentionally facilitate, certain types of collusion. If auctions are designed without acknowledging the possibility of collusion then the design will ignore key features that impact the potential success of colluding bidders.

ABSTRACT I identify three option exercise strategies executives engage in, including (i) exercising with cash and immediately selling the shares, (ii) exercising with cash and holding the shares, and (iii) delivering some shares to the company to cover the exercise costs and holding the remaining shares. Stock price patterns suggest executives manipulate option exercises. They use private information to increase the profitability of all three strategies, and likely backdated some exercise dates in the pre‐Sarbanes‐Oxley period to enhance the profitability of the latter two strategies, where the executive's company is the only counterparty. Backdating is associated with reporting of internal control weaknesses.

Nonparametric estimation of a structural cointegrating regression model is studied. As in the standard linear cointegrating regression model, the regressor and the dependent variable are jointly dependent and contemporaneously correlated. In nonparametric estimation problems, joint dependence is known to be a major complication that affects identification, induces bias in conventional kernel estimates, and frequently leads to ill-posed inverse problems. In functional cointegrating regressions where the regressor is an integrated time series, it is shown here that inverse and ill-posed inverse problems do not arise. Remarkably, nonparametric kernel estimation of a structural nonparametric cointegrating regression is consistent and the limit distribution theory is mixed normal, giving simple useable asymptotics in practical work. The results provide a convenient basis for inference in structural nonparametric regression with nonstationary time series. The methods may be applied to a wide range of empirical models where functional estimation of cointegrating relations is required.

We examine the impact of CEO turnover announcements on bondholder wealth, stockholder wealth, and overall firm value. Using publicly traded data for the period from 1973 to 2000, we find evidence consistent with both the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses. Specifically, we find that CEO turnover events are associated with lower bondholder values, higher stockholder values, and that net changes in firm value are a function of turnover type (forced vs voluntary and outside vs inside firm replacements) and the riskiness of the firm’s debt (investment vs non-investment grade). Overall, the results contribute to the understanding of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, of which CEO turnover is an extreme form, on bondholders.

This paper examines the determinants of financial dollarization in transition economies from a short-run perspective. Using aggregate monthly data of deposit and loan dollarization we study the drivers of short-term fluctuations in dollarization and test their importance at different levels of dollarization. The results provide evidence that (a) the positive (negative) short-run effects of depreciation (monetary expansion) on deposit dollarization are exacerbated in high-dollarization countries; (b) short-run loan dollarization is mainly driven by banks matching of domestic loans and deposits, currency matching of assets and liabilities, international financial integration, and institutional quality; and (c) both types of short-run dollarization are affected by interest rate differentials and deviations from desired dollarization.

The study of the investment-cash flow (ICF) sensitivity constitutes one of the largest literatures in corporate finance, yet little is known about changes in the ICF relationship over time, and the literature has largely ignored how rising R&D investment and developments in equity markets have impacted ICF sensitivity estimates. We show that for the time period 1970–2006, the ICF sensitivity: (i) largely disappears for physical investment, (ii) remains comparatively strong for R&D, and (iii) declines, but does not disappear, for total investment. We argue that these findings can largely be explained by the changing composition of investment and the rising importance of public equity as a source of funds, particularly for firms with persistent negative cash flows.

We reexamine long-term abnormal returns for portfolios sorted on governance characteristics. Firms with strong shareholder rights and firms with weak shareholder rights differ from the population of firms and from each other in how they cluster across industries. Using well-specified tests under this industry clustering, we find statistically zero long-term abnormal returns for portfolios sorted on governance. Our results have important implications for interpreting studies that link governance to firm value and stock returns, demonstrate the importance of the coarseness of industry definitions in financial research, and shed light on addressing statistical problems created by industry clustering in samples.