We develop and test the hypothesis that stock price informativeness affects the structure of corporate boards. We find a negative relation between price informativeness and board independence. This finding is robust to the inclusion of many firm-level controls, including firm fixed effects, and to the choice of the measure of price informativeness. Consistent with the hypothesis that price informativeness and board monitoring are substitutes, this relation is particularly strong for firms more exposed to both external and internal governance mechanisms and for firms in which firm-specific knowledge is relatively unimportant. Our results suggest that firms with more informative stock prices have less demanding board structures.

U.S. credit unions serve 93 million members, hold 10% of U.S. savings deposits, and make 13.2% of all nonrevolving consumer loans. Since 1985, the share of U.S. depository institution assets held by credit unions has nearly doubled, and the average (inflation-adjusted) size of credit unions has increased over 600%. We use a local-linear estimator, dimesion-reduction techniques, and bootstrap methods to estimate and make inference about ray scale and expansion-path scale economies. We find substantial evidence of increasing returns to scale among credit unions of all sizes, suggesting that further consolidation and growth among credit unions are likely.

Abstract We examine the association of a venture capital (VC) firm’s reputation with the post-initial public offering (IPO) long-run performance of its portfolio firms. We find that VC reputation, measured by the past market share of VC-backed IPOs, has significant positive associations with long-run firm performance measures. While more reputable VCs initially select better-quality firms, more reputable VCs continue to be associated with superior long-run performance, even after controlling for VC selectivity. We find that more reputable VCs exhibit more active post-IPO involvement in the corporate governance of their portfolio firms, and this continued VC involvement positively influences post-IPO firm performance.

We identify employees at seven companies whose 401(k) investment choices are dominated because they are contributing less than the employer matching contribution threshold despite being vested in their match and being able to make penalty-free 401(k) withdrawals for any reason because they are older than 59½. At the average firm, 36% of match-eligible employees over 59½ forego arbitrage profits that average 1.6% of their annual pay, or $507. A survey educating employees about the free lunch they are foregoing raised contribution rates by a statistically insignificant 0.67 percent of income among those completing the survey.

This paper examines how labor market fluctuations around the time of retirement affect the labor force status and Social Security receipt of individuals ages 55 to 69 and the income of retirees in their 70s, using data from the March Current Population Survey, Census, and American Community Surveys. We find that workers are more likely to leave the labor force, to collect Social Security earlier, and to have lower Social Security income when they face a recession near retirement. The impact is greatest for the less-educated, who are more susceptible to job loss and rely more heavily on Social Security.

The hedonic model, which has been used extensively in the Environmental, Urban, and Real Estate literatures, allows for the estimation of the implicit prices of housing and neighborhood attributes, as well as households' demand for these non-marketed amenities. A recognized drawback of the existing hedonic literature is that the models assume a myopic decision-maker. In this paper, we estimate a dynamic hedonic model and find that the average household is willing to pay $472 per year for a ten percent reduction in violent crime. In addition, we find that the traditional, myopic model suffers from a 21 percent negative bias.

This paper investigates the dynamics of individuals’ investments leading up to their decision to make the first investment abroad. We show that investors first invest in domestic securities and only some time later they invest abroad in foreign securities. We also show that investors who trade more often in the domestic market start to invest abroad earlier. Our findings suggest that the experience investors acquire while they trade in the domestic market is a key reason why active investors enter the foreign market earlier. A reason is that highly educated investors as well as investors with more financial knowledge, arguably those for whom learning by trading is the least important, do not need to trade as much in the domestic market before they start investing in foreign securities. Another reason is that investors who start investing in foreign securities are able to improve on their performance afterwards. This improvement in performance constitutes further evidence that the home country bias is costly.

ABSTRACT We examine how subjective performance evaluations are influenced by the level and controllability of an accompanying measure of a separate performance dimension. In our experiment, supervisors evaluate the office administration performance of a hypothetical subordinate. We find that supervisors' subjective evaluations are directionally influenced by an accompanying objective measure of sales performance, even after excluding participants who perceive informativeness across measures. Consistent with concerns for fairness and motivation, we also find an asymmetric uncontrollability effect—supervisors' evaluations are higher when an uncontrollable factor decreases the subordinate's sales (i.e., they compensate for bad luck), but are not lower when the uncontrollable factor increases the subordinate's sales (i.e., they do not punish for good luck). This evidence suggests that supervisors use discretion provided to evaluate performance on one task to adjust for perceived deficiencies in the evaluation of performance on other tasks. Our study integrates theories of cognitive bias and motivation, highlighting the need to consider the potentially interactive effects of different performance measures in multi-task settings.

People pay attention to the appearance of others, and personal characteristics can affect many types of decisions. We ask, is there informational value in a face in a situation where trust and reciprocity can increase earnings? We use a laboratory trust game experiment where subjects are unable to observe a counterpart, must observe a counterpart, or can pay to reveal a counterpart's photograph. Both senders and responders are willing to pay to observe the photos, and we show that behavior, earnings, and efficiency are affected. When subjects are “face to face,” efficiency is enhanced, and senders have higher earnings. (JEL D12, D83, Z13)

ABSTRACT: Dichev and Tang (2008) document a dramatic decrease over the last 40 years in the contemporaneous correlation between revenue and expense, along with an associated increase in earnings volatility and a decline in earnings persistence, suggesting a decline in earnings quality. We document that these changes are primarily attributable to an increase in the incidence of large special items. We then examine the extent to which this increase in special items is due to either more frequent real economic events related to special item recognition or to the adoption of new accounting standards. Our evidence suggests that changes in the frequency of economic events associated with special items have played a more important and sustained role relative to the role played by adoption of individual accounting standards. Finally, we find that the changing incidence of these economic events is at least in part related to the well-documented increase in competition in the U.S. economy over the last four decades.