This study investigates how Schwartz’s cultural dimensions of embeddedness and mastery affect the corporate cost of debt through bankruptcy risk and sensitivity to agency activity channels. Using data from 33 countries, we find a strong and robust negative relation between embeddedness and the cost of debt. The estimated relation between mastery and the corporate cost of debt is negative and significant in most of the tests. Further analyses reveal that the development of financial intermediation and the enforcement of insider trading law moderate the relation between culture and the cost of debt. Confirming our hypotheses, we document that embeddedness is negatively related to bankruptcy risk and sensitivity to agency activity. We find that mastery is positively related to bankruptcy risk across countries as well, but this relation is weaker. We also show that mastery is positively related to sensitivity to agency activity among countries with highly leveraged firms.

I have benefited from comments and criticisms of an earlier draft by Irma Adelman, Peter Balacs, Ronald Dore, Edgar Edwards, Unni Eradi, Michael Faber, Anne Gordon, Keith Griffin, Jill Rubery, Seev Hirsch, Ernest Stern, Frances Stewart, Hugh Stretton, B. R. Virmani, Gordon Winston and Howard Wriggins. To these, and to a research seminar at Queen Elizabeth House, I am very grateful. I am also grateful to the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank and its Director, Mr. Andrew Kamarck, for having provided the facilities and stimulating atmosphere for the early stages of a considerably larger paper, commissioned by Mr. Ernest Stern, of which this paper forms a part. I am grateful to Mr. Stern and the World Bank for permitting me to use the material here.

JHE CLIOMETRIC revolution in ecoknomic history wedded neoclassical economics and quantitative methods in order to describe and explain the performance of economies in the past.' Economic history gained in rigor and scientific pretension, but at the expense of exploring a much more fundamental set of questions about the evolving structure of economies that underlies performance.2 Cliometricians have turned their backs on a long tradition stretching back from Joseph Schumpeter to Karl Marx to Adam Smith. These scholars regarded economic history as essential because it added a dimension to economics. Its purpose was to analyze the parameters held constant by the economist. If economics is a theory of choice subject to specified constraints, a task of economic history was to theorize about those evolving constraints. The failure of economic historians to provide their colleagues with a historical dimension to their perspective has reduced the effectiveness of economists in dealing with contemporary problems. Failure of economists to appreciate the transitory character of the assumed constraints and to understand the source and direction of these changing constraints is a fundamental handicap to further development of economic theory. The challenge to the economic historian which has equally compelling implications for the economic theorist is to explain the transformation of the structure of the American Economy in the past century.3 In the rest of this essay I shall explore this issue in order to specify some of the dimensions of the economic historian's task.

Abstract We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision, or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share maximizers. They can propose any policy that is resource-feasible and incentive-compatible. They can also offer special favors to subsets of the electorate. We prove two main results. First, the unique symmetric equilibrium is such that policies are surplus-maximizing and hence first-best Pareto-efficient. Second, there is a surplus-maximizing policy that wins a majority against any welfare-maximizing policy. Thus, in our model, policies that trade off equity and efficiency considerations are politically infeasible.

ABSTRACT Despite debate on the desirability of rules‐based standards, no studies provide evidence on why accounting standards take on rules‐based characteristics. We identify and test five theories from prior research (litigation risk, constraining opportunism, complexity, transaction frequency, and age) that could explain why some U.S. accounting standards contain rules‐based characteristics. Litigation risk and complexity are most consistently related to cross‐sectional and time‐series variation in rules‐based characteristics. We find more limited evidence that frequent transactions, age, and desires by regulators to constrain opportunistic reporting are related to rules‐based standards. We note, however, that our findings are necessarily descriptive because standards arise endogenously from market and political forces, limiting causal interpretation. Further, it is difficult to perfectly separate rules‐based characteristics of the standard from both the complexity of the standard and the characteristics of the underlying transaction, including the complexity of the transaction.

We examine the relation between political uncertainty and cash holdings for firms in China. We document that, during the first year of a new city government official's appointment, a firm, on average, holds less cash, which is consistent with the grabbing hand hypothesis of politician. Our results are robust to alternative measures of cash holdings, instrumental variable estimation, sub-samples without firms in four major cities, a matched sample approach, and placebo tests. In addition, our additional analyses suggest that a firm holds significantly less cash if: (a) the newly appointed official is from a different city relative to that from the same city, (b) it faces high political extraction risk, and (c) it has strong twin agency conflicts. Lastly, our extended results suggest that the market value of cash holdings is significantly negative during periods of political uncertainty and firms hide their cash by moving it to related firms via related party transactions.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the approaches accounting researchers adopt to draw causal inferences using observational (or nonexperimental) data. The vast majority of accounting research papers draw causal inferences notwithstanding the well‐known difficulties in doing so. While some recent papers seek to use quasi‐experimental methods to improve causal inferences, these methods also make strong assumptions that are not always fully appreciated. We believe that accounting research would benefit from more in‐depth descriptive research, including a greater focus on the study of causal mechanisms (or causal pathways) and increased emphasis on the structural modeling of the phenomena of interest. We argue these changes offer a practical path forward for rigorous accounting research.

ABSTRACT Crowdsourcing—when a task normally performed by employees is outsourced to a large network of people via an open call—is making inroads into the investment research industry. We shed light on this new phenomenon by examining the value of crowdsourced earnings forecasts. Our sample includes 51,012 forecasts provided by Estimize, an open platform that solicits and reports forecasts from over 3,000 contributors. We find that Estimize forecasts are incrementally useful in forecasting earnings and measuring the market's expectations of earnings. Our results are stronger when the number of Estimize contributors is larger, consistent with the benefits of crowdsourcing increasing with the size of the crowd. Finally, Estimize consensus revisions generate significant two‐day size‐adjusted returns. The combined evidence suggests that crowdsourced forecasts are a useful supplementary source of information in capital markets.

We model an anxious agent as one who is more risk averse with respect to imminent risks than with respect to distant risks. Based on a utility function that captures individual subjects’ behavior in experiments, we provide a tractable theory relaxing the restriction of constant risk aversion across horizons and show that it generates rich implications. We first apply the model to insurance markets and explain the high premia for short-horizon insurance. Then, we show that costly delegated portfolio management, investment advice, and withdrawal fees emerge as endogenous features and strategies to cope with dynamic inconsistency in intratemporal risk-return trade-offs.

The paper presents a new theory of trade credit in which firms buy inputs on credit from suppliers to restore the benefits of secured bank financing impaired by contract incompleteness. In a setting where investment is endogenous and unobservable to financiers, we show that a bank-secured credit contract is time-inconsistent. Upon being granted credit, the entrepreneur has an incentive to alter the original input combination, jeopardizing the bank’s revenues. Anticipating the entrepreneur’s opportunism, the bank offers an unsecured credit contract, reducing the surplus from the venture. One way for the entrepreneur to commit to the contract terms is to purchase inputs on credit from the supplier. The supplier observes the input investment and acts as a guarantor that inputs will be purchased as contracted, thus facilitating access to secured bank financing. The commitment role of trade credit still holds in a multi-period extension that investigates the impact of bank relationship lending on secured debt and trade credit. Our model provides novel testable predictions on optimal financial contracts in both one-period and repeated lending relationships.