The cost of expanding public sector health programs depends critically on the extent to which public eligibility will cover just the uninsured, or will crowd out existing private insurance coverage. We estimate the extent of crowd-out arising from the expansions of Medicaid to pregnant women and children over the 1987–1992 period. We estimate that approximately 50 percent of the increase in Medicaid coverage was associated with a reduction in private insurance coverage. This occurred largely because employees took up employer-based insurance less frequently. There is also some evidence that employers contributed less for insurance and that workers dropped coverage of dependents.

Our purpose in this note is to revisit the popular monopolistic-competition model of Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz ( 1977) and to stress the fact that the variant of this model used in the recent macroeconomic literature is significantly different from the original. In particular, by taking n as the number of active monopolists, the recent discussion of Dixit and Stiglitz (1993) and Xiaokai Yang and Ben J. Heijdra (1993) about the the advantages of neglecting terms of the order 1/n in the computed elasticities, is significantly affected by the choice of the variant of the model. The basic presented in Section I, has been used from the start by Dixit and Stiglitz to study optimum product diversity. It is a simple general equilibrium model with n monopolistic goods and a numeraire good, which can be interpreted as labor (or leisure) time or as the aggregation of all the other goods in the economy. The variant of the analyzed in Section II, was independently developed by several authors for different simple applications in macroeconomics.1 It is an model, that includes an additional good, interpreted as labor time but not taken as the numeraire. More importantly, the enlarged model does not lead to a general equilibrium analysis until the wage rate, taken as given in a first step, is adjusted competitively or strategically. It is for the basic model that Yang and Heijdra (1993) (YH) give an alternative computation method taking into account the priceindex effect of individual pricing decisions. This effect had been neglected in the original paper of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) (DS), who were only concerned with the large n case (ensured by low fixed costs and imperfect substitution between the monopolistic goods). Limiting their model to the special case of a unitary elasticity of substitution between the monopolistic goods and the numeraire good, YH obtain an explicit solution. But YH's solution is still an approximation, because it neglects the indirect effects that feedback has on pricing decisions. We will show that, in the enlarged taking into account this income-feedback effect allows for an explicit solution and simplifies calculations. But in the variant, some meaningful cases are incompatible with free entry and thus prohibit the use of DS's approximation. However, as we conclude in Section III, this is not to say that their approximation should never be used. On the contrary, the approximation hypothesis is a very useful part of Dixit and Stiglitz's contribution.

Since the mid-to-late 1970's, wage inequality between low- and highly educated workers has widened markedly. The wage premium to a college education compared with a high-school education has increased by some 20 percentage points (see George J. Borjas and Valerie A. Ramey [1994] for recent estimates). Part of the explanation seems to lie with a slowdown in the growth of supply of highly educated workers in the 1980's. Another part seems to lie with a demand shift toward educated workers. Two hypotheses have been advanced to account for the alleged demand shift. The first holds that technological change has been biased in favor of high-education workers. The second holds that growing international trade with low-wage countries has shifted labor-market demand in the United States away from low-educated workers, as the United States increasingly imports goods produced by such workers from low-wage countries.

At least since Keynes (1935), many economists have had the intuition that the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth declines as wealth increases. Nonetheless, standard perfect-certainty and certainty equivalent versions of intertemporal optimizing models of consumption imply a marginal propensity to consume that is unrelated to the level of household wealth. We show that adding income uncertainty to the standard optimization problem induces a concave consumption function in which, as Keynes suggested, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth or transitory income declines with the level of wealth.

Data on New Zealand manufacturing plants are used to examine the impact of trade liberalization on plant exit. Recent theories suggest that the prospect of a declining market might cause firms to adopt strategic behavior that causes low cost plants to exit first. This hypothesis is generally unsupported. Surviving plants were larger, lower cost, and were owned by specialized firms with few plants. Plant costs were more important than firm size for explaining the plant-closing behavior of single-plant firms. Diversified, multiplant firms were more likely to close plants and were influenced by plant size but not plant costs.

The paper suggests a new test for rent-sharing in the U. S. labor market. Using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector, it shows that a rise in a sector's profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long-run level of wages in that sector. The paper controls for workers' characteristics, for industry fixed effects, and for unionism. Lester's range of wages is estimated, for rentsharing reasons alone, at approximately 24 percent of the mean wage.

We simultaneously address three basic issues regarding the corporation: the optimal scope of operation, the optimal financial structure, and the relationship between these two. The starting point is that financial structure serves as a bonding device on the managers' self‐interest behavior. The effectiveness of this bonding depends on the distribution of the firm's future cash flow, which in turn depends on the firm's scope. Our theory also links the firm's investment decisions to its operation scope. As empirical implications, the theory reconciles the failure of the 1960s U.S. conglomerates with the success of the Japanese Keiretsu .

We simultaneously address three basic issues regarding the corporation: the optimal scope of operation, the optimal financial structure, and the relationship between these two. The starting point is that financial structure serves as a bonding device on the managers' self-interest behavior. The effectiveness of this bonding depends on the distribution of the firm's future cash flow, which in turn depends on the firm's scope. Our theory also links the firm's investment decisions to its operation scope. As empirical implications, the theory reconciles the failure of the 1960s U.S. conglomerates with the success of the Japanese Keiretsu.