We analyze the flow of money between mutual fund categories, finding strong evidence of seasonality in investor risk aversion. Aggregate investor flow data reveal an investor preference for safe mutual funds in autumn and risky funds in spring. During September alone, outflows from equity funds average $13 billion, controlling for previously documented flow determinants (e.g., capital-gains overhang). This movement of large amounts of money between fund categories is correlated with seasonality in investor risk aversion, consistent with investors preferring safer (riskier) investments in autumn (spring). We find consistent evidence in Canada and also in Australia, where seasons are offset by 6 months.

In this study, we employ the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data collected in 2002, 2005, and 2009 for 21499 firms from 27 Eastern European and Central Asian countries to examine firm-level growth constraints faced by privatized firms versus those faced by the originally (de novo) private firms. We find that the de novo firms experience significantly higher financial, corruption, and legal obstacles than the privatized firms. We further document that, even though faced with more obstacles in the business environment, the de novo firms outperform the privatized firms. One explanation is that the profit motive of the de novo firms is organic, whereas the profit motive of the privatized firms is acquired. The organic profit motive may be powerful enough for the de novo firms to overcome more difficulties in the business environment and excel. Our study is the first in the privatization literature to go beyond performance comparisons and examine firm-level growth constraints.

We develop a theory of endogenous uncertainty and business cycles in which short-lived shocks can generate long-lasting recessions. In the model, higher uncertainty about fundamentals discourages investment. Since agents learn from the actions of others, information flows slowly in times of low activity and uncertainty remains high, further discouraging investment. The economy displays uncertainty traps: self-reinforcing episodes of high uncertainty and low activity. Although the economy recovers quickly after small shocks, large temporary shocks may have long-lasting effects on the level of activity. The economy is subject to an information externality but uncertainty traps may remain in the efficient allocation. Embedding the mechanism in a standard business cycle framework, we find that endogenous uncertainty increases the persistence of large recessions and improves the performance of the model in accounting for the Great Recession.

Researchers have made progress in understanding the role of repugnance in transactions involving the human body. Yet, often, the focus remains on exchange between individuals and how they mentally cope (or not) with repugnance. But these exchanges also entail a “vertical” dimension in which organizational and state actors both directly manage repugnance and also limit the repugnance management tools available to the marketplace. Analyzing repugnance and its management as an organizational and regulatory problem, in addition to an individual one, suggests that a single, harmonized system of exchange in bodily goods is unlikely to emerge with the passage of time.

We analyze Medicare's influence on private insurers' payments for physicians' services. Using a large administrative change in reimbursements for surgical versus medical care, we find that private prices follow Medicare's lead. A $1.00 increase in Medicare's fees increases corresponding private prices by $1.16. A second set of Medicare fee changes, which generates area-specific payment shocks, has a similar effect on private reimbursements. Medicare's influence is strongest in areas with concentrated insurers and competitive physician markets, consistent with insurer-doctor bargaining. By echoing Medicare's pricing changes, these payment spillovers amplify Medicare's impact on specialty choice and other welfare-relevant aspects of physician practices.

This study shows that the recent trajectory of a firm's profits predicts future profitability and stock returns. The predictive information contained in the trend of profitability is not subsumed by the level of profitability, earnings momentum, or other well-known determinants of stock returns. The profit trend also predicts the earnings surprise one quarter later, and analyst forecast errors over the following 12 months, suggesting that sophisticated investors underreact to the information in the profit trend. On the other hand, we find no evidence of investor overreaction, and our results cannot be explained by well-known risk factors.

We study a disclosure decision for a firm's manager with many sources of private information. The presence of multiple numerical signals provides the manager with an opportunity to hide information via aggregation, presenting net amounts in order to show information in its best light. We show that this ability to aggregate fundamentally changes the nature of voluntary disclosure, due to the market's inability to verify that a report is free of strategic aggregation. We find that, in equilibrium, the manager fully discloses if and only if the manager's private information makes the firm look sufficiently weak. By separating bad news from good news, a disaggregate report informs the market of as much offsetting news as possible, revealing how close the news is to a neutral benchmark. The result is, therefore, pooling at the top and separation at the bottom, the opposite of what transpires with a single news source.

Manmade climate change (CC) has catastrophic consequences. The United States has already experienced wholesale population realignment due to climate as households have relocated to the Sunbelt and West. The irony is that people are moving toward the heat and major storms associated with CC. As CC intensifies, with high rates of internal US factor mobility, firms and households will likely again relocate to areas with higher utility and profits, reducing CC costs. Yet current research typically focuses on CC costs in a given location without considering this realignment. We propose several avenues to overcome such shortcomings in US CC modeling.

Research documents significant management bias and opportunism around the discretionary inputs of audited complex estimates, including fair value measurements (FVMs), which raises questions about auditors' ability to test these estimates. We examine how the degree of quantification in client evidence and client control environment risk influence auditors' planned substantive testing of management's discretionary inputs to FVMs. We find that auditors allocate a lower proportion of effort to testing the subjective inputs to the fair value estimate when the degree of quantification in the client evidence and level of client risk are both high. Further, this tendency persists even after auditors receive a regulatory practice alert reminding them to focus more audit effort on testing fair value (FV) inputs that are susceptible to management bias, and despite the auditors increasing their overall audit effort. Qualitative analyses of the procedures auditors selected indicate that inapt attention to the degree of quantification in evidence is a potential root cause of the difficulty auditors encounter when testing complex estimates. Our results imply that in situations where both quantified and non-quantified data are important to the audit, there is the potential for management to manipulate the evidence they provide to auditors to distract auditors from testing the discretionary inputs to complex estimates that are susceptible to management opportunism. Data Availability: Contact authors for data availability.