Ad valorem and specific taxes compared, 276. — Incidence of ad valorem taxes: constant cost, 276; increasing cost, 279; decreasing cost, 280. — Effect on monopoly price, 282. — Conclusions, 282.

I. Introductory: definitions, 583. — Issue of discrimination versus uniformity only resolvable by precise distinction between joint and overhead cost, 585. II. Joint and overhead cost distinguished, 586; — joint cost, overhead cost, and monopoly all influence pattern of discrimination, 589; — true instances of joint supply, 592. — III. With overhead cost alone discrimination should be adjusted to the degree of utilization, 594; — the case of a single road with a given investment, 595; — proper and improper rate policy, 597; — marginal cost a useful tool for determining proper degree of discrimination, 599. — IV. Problems presented by discontinuity in expansion, 602; — different degrees of discontinuity, 604. — V. Qualifications of the proper rate policy for: different divisions, 609; — competing routes, 611. — VI. Complications presented by time jointness, 613; — unlikely that discrimination should ever give way wholly to uniformity, 614; — stability, 616.

Introductory survey, 553.— Development of the gold industry, 557.— Capital imports and their timing, 560.— The expansion of purchasing power, 567.— Price movements: foods, 570; house rents, 572; imports, 574; exports, 574; complications, 576.— Money incomes, 578.— Immigration, 582.— The balance of payments, 583.— Trade statistics, 585.— Other items in the balance, 587.— The terms of trade, 588.— Comparative advantages and disadvantages: exports, 590; imports, 592; production, 593.— Conclusion, 596.

This study investigates whether fee dependence within the audit firms’ offices jeopardises auditor independence. Fee dependence is examined at both the national audit firm level as well as the local office level and in a setting where public disclosure of fees is mandatory. We focus our tests on audit fee dependence and at the same time we control for the effects of non-audit service fee dependence post the 1989 mergers. We operationalise the exercise of independent judgement in auditing by the propensity to issue qualified audit opinions. If fee dependence affects auditors’ independent judgement, then auditors are less likely to qualify the accounts. The study's results show that the level of auditor fee dependence does not affect auditor propensity to issue unqualified audit opinions. The findings remain robust to a number of sensitivity tests including the analyses controlling for the effects of non-audit service fee dependence and other settings in which there is heightened pressure on auditors to confront the effects of fee dependence on exercising independent audit judgement.

This paper examines the change in the average level of moral development over a 7.5‐year period of promotion, attrition, and survival in five Big 6 firms. The study improves upon previous cross‐sectional studies that found decreases in the average level of moral development at the senior manager and partner levels, which has been referred to as the “inverted‐U” phenomenon. Problems with these studies that limit the generalizability of their findings include their cross‐sectional nature and samples that usually come from one or two firms. Over a 7.5‐year period, we found that the participating Big 6 firms retained auditors with higher average levels of moral development (measured using the defining issues test), while those with lower average levels left the firms. The average level of moral development for new partners was at least as high as the group from which they came. This research suggests that the concern about Big 6 firms retaining a higher proportion of auditors with lower moral development may be an artifact of research design.

This study extends prior research on the average level of moral development in public accounting by examining five large accounting firms and three staff levels. The research is important because it highlights the need to include auditors from several firms in research designs, provides evidence of differences in moral development among public accounting firms, and profiles the professions' average level of moral development for three levels. The data are from 494 managers and seniors (204 females and 290 males) from five Big Six firms. Using the Defining Issues Test (Rest 1979a) to measure moral development, several results were noted. First, the results indicate a difference in the average level of moral development among firms, suggesting that use of subjects from only one firm inhibits the generalizability of findings regarding moral development. Second, female managers are at a significantly higher average level of moral development than male managers. In fact, the average scores for male managers fell between those expected for senior high school and college students. The data suggest that a greater percentage of high‐moral‐development males and low‐moral‐development females are leaving public accounting than their respective opposites. These results indicate that the profession has retained, through advancement, males who are potentially less sensitive to the ethical implications of various issues. The analysis also indicates that Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development is not biased towards the thought processes of males because female auditors did not score lower on the Defining Issues Test.

This study investigates variations in covenants across different classes of preferred stock and describes the role of accounting numbers in such covenants. The findings indicate that covenants in contracts that protect the priority of the claims of preferred stockholders are more prevalent in very debt‐like preferred stock issues when there are greater anticipated conflicts over claim priority with common stockholders. When the preferred stock issues take on common equity‐like interests, there is less opportunity for common stockholders to gain from diluting the priority of the claims of the preferred stockholders. Consequently, the contracts are not configured to the same extent of restrictions on wealth transfers. Audited accounting numbers are utilized extensively in these covenants, and the contracts adjust these numbers to limit management's discretion in their choice of accounting policies for relaxing the covenants. Résumé. Les auteurs analysent les différences observées dans les clauses restrictives associées à diverses catégories d'actions privilégiées et décrivent le rôle des données comptables chiffrées dans ces clauses. Les conclusions de l'étude révèlent que les clauses restrictives des contrats qui assurent la priorité des créances des actionnaires privilégiés sont plus répandues dans les émissions d'actions privilégiées s'apparentant très étroitement à des titres d'emprunt lorsque les conflits prévus avec les actionnaires ordinaires en ce qui a trait à la priorité des créances sont plus importants. Lorsque les actions privilégiées émises s'apparentent davantage à des actions ordinaires, les actionnaires ordinaires sont moins susceptibles de tirer profit d'une dilution de la priorité des créances des actionnaires privilégiés. Par conséquent, les contrats ne sont pas structurés de façon à contenir des restrictions de même portée sur les transferts de richesse. Les données comptables vérifiées sont abondamment utilisées dans ce genre de clauses restrictives, et les contrats prévoient l'ajustement des données chiffrées de façon à limiter la discrétion dont jouit la direction dans le choix des conventions comptables susceptibles d'assouplir le caractère restrictif des clauses.

This paper considers the problem of determining the number of factors in a multivariate nonparametric relationship. The definition of factors given is broad enough to encompass a number of potential applications in econometrics, including inferring the rank of demand, consistent tests for lack of identification in linear instrumental variable models, and testing arbitrage pricing theory. The paper gives both series and kernel methods for testing hypotheses concerning, and consistent estimation of, the number of factors. The methods are compared in a small simulation study and in an application to determining the rank of demand systems.

[It is shown that if an iterative price mechanism depends only upon a finite amount of information from the market as given by the aggregate excess demand function, then this mechanism cannot always be effective. That is, there are pure exchange economies where this mechanism will not find a price equilibrium. This statement already holds in the case of two commodities. The approach used to reach this conclusion extends to other iterative systems used to determine the zeros of a function.]