We examine the behavior of money, inflation, and output under fiat and commodity standards to better understand how changes in monetary policy affect economic activity. Using long‐term historical data for 15 countries, we find that, under fiat standards, the growth rates of various monetary aggregates are more highly correlated with inflation and with each other than under commodity standards. Money growth, inflation, and output growth are also higher. In contrast, we do not find that money growth is more highly correlated with output growth under one standard than under the other.

[This paper investigates the association between aspects of investors' disagreement around earnings announcements and investors' trading decisions. Theory suggests that trading volume arises because of investor disagreement, but disagreement is a multi-faceted construct. We find that three distinctly different aspects of disagreement each play an incremental role in explaining trading volume around earnings announcements, even after controlling for the magnitude of the contemporaneous price change. These aspects of disagreement are: dispersion in prior beliefs, change in dispersion, and belief jumbling. Dispersion in prior beliefs is the level of variation in expectations before the earnings announcement, change in dispersion is the difference in the level of dispersion in beliefs after vs. before the earnings announcement, and belief jumbling occurs when investors' beliefs change positions relative to each other around the earnings announcement. Our results indicate that each of these three aspects of disagreement is associated with investors' real economic (i.e., trading) decisions around earnings announcements.]

This paper investigates the association between aspects of investors' disagreement around earnings announcements and investors' trading decisions. Theory suggests that trading volume arises because of investor disagreement, but disagreement is a multi-faceted construct. We find that three distinctly different aspects of disagreement each play an incremental role in explaining trading volume around earnings announcements, even after controlling for the magnitude of the contemporaneous price change. These aspects of disagreement are: dispersion in prior beliefs, change in dispersion, and belief jumbling . Dispersion in prior beliefs is the level of variation in expectations before the earnings announcement, change in dispersion is the difference in the level of dispersion in beliefs after vs. before the earnings announcement, and belief jumbling occurs when investors' beliefs change positions relative to each other around the earnings announcement. Our results indicate that each of these three aspects of disagreement is associated with investors' real economic (i.e., trading) decisions around earnings announcements.

We construct a computational model of Tiebout competition and show that political institutions differ in their ability to sort citizens effectively. In particular, we find that certain types of institutions--those that become more "politically unstable" as citizen heterogeneity increases--perform relatively poorly given a single jurisdiction, yet these same institutions perform relatively well when there are multiple jurisdictions. We provide an explanation for this phenomenon which draws upon simulated annealing, a discrete nonlinear search algorithm.

In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes. The benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system. Our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.

This paper provides a global asset pricing perspective on the debate over the relation between predetermined attributes of common stocks, such as ratios of price-to-book-value, cash-flow, earnings, and other variables to the future returns. Some argue that such variables may be used to find securities that are systematically undervalued by the market, while others argue that the measures are proxies for exposure to underlying economic risk factors. It is not possible to distinguish between these views without explicitly modelling the relation between such attributes and risk factors. We present an empirical framework for attacking the problem at a global level, assuming integrated markets. Our perspective pulls together the traditional academic and practitioner viewpoints on lagged attributes. We present new evidence on the relative importance of risk and mispricing effects, using monthly data for 21 national equity markets. We find that the cross-sectional explanatory power of the lagged attributes is related to both risk and mispricing in the two-factor model, but the risk effects explain more of the variance than mispricing.

The development of asset pricing models that rely on instrumental variables together with the increased availability of easily accessible economic time-series have renewed interest in predicting security returns. Evaluating the significance of these new research findings, however, is no easy task. Because these asset pricing theory tests are not independent, classical methods of assessing goodness-of-fit are inappropriate. This study investigates the distribution of the maximal R-square when k of m regressors are used to predict security returns. The authors provide a simple procedure that adjusts critical R-square values to account for selecting variables by searching among potential regressors.

January 1997, Version 1.01 Prepared for the American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings , May 1997. See also "The Productivity of Nations"

The authors report the results of voluntary contributions experiments where subjects are randomly assigned different rates of return from their private consumption. These random assignments are changed round to round, enabling the measurement of individual player contribution rates as a function of that player's investment cost. The authors directly test these response functions for the presence of warm-glow and/or altruism effects. They find significant evidence for heterogeneous warm-glow effects that are, on average, low in magnitude. The authors statistically reject the presence of an altruism effect.

In the context of entry‐level labor markets, we consider the potential transactions that have to be evaluated before equilibrium transactions can be identified. These potential transactions involve offers that are rejected. After an initial phase in which many offers can be proffered in parallel, subsequent potential transactions must be processed serially, since a new offer cannot be made until an outstanding offer is rejected. In many, perhaps most, decentralized labor markets, this means that transactions have to be finalized before there is time for the market to clear, that is, before all the potential transactions that would need to be evaluated in order to reach a stable outcome can in fact be evaluated. This has implications for the strategic behavior of firms and workers. In particular, in deciding to whom to offer a position, a firm may have strong incentives to consider not only its preferences over workers but also the likelihood that its offer will be accepted, since if its offer is rejected it may find that many other potential employees have become unavailable in the interim. The analysis is carried out in connection with the decentralized