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Purchase, Pooling, and Equity Analysts' Valuation Judgments

The Accounting Review 2000 75(3), 257-281
We provide evidence that analysts' stock-price judgments depend on (1) the method of accounting for a business combination and (2) the number of years that have elapsed since the business combination. Consistent with business-press reports of managers' concerns, analysts' stock-price judgments are lowest when a company applies the purchase method of accounting and ratably amortizes the acquisition premium. The number of years since the business combination affects analysts' price estimates only when the company applies the purchase method and ratably amortizes goodwill—analysts' price estimates are lower when the business-combination transaction is further in the past. However, this joint effect of accounting method and timing is mitigated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's proposed income-statement format requiring companies to report separate line items for after-tax income before goodwill charges and net-of-tax goodwill charges. When a company uses the purchase method of accounting and writes off the acquisition premium as in-process research and development, analysts' stockprice judgments are not statistically different from their judgments when a company applies pooling-of-interest accounting.

Capital-skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis

Econometrica 2000 68(5), 1029-1053
The supply and price of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor have changed dramatically over the postwar period. The relative quantity of skilled labor has increased substantially, and the skill premium, which is the wage of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor, has grown significantly since 1980. Many studies have found that accounting for the increase in the skill premium on the basis of observable variables is difficult and have concluded implicitly that latent skill-biased technological change must be the main factor responsible. This paper examines that view systematically. We develop a framework that provides a simple, explicit economic mechanism for understanding skill-biased technological change in terms of observable variables, and we use the framework to evaluate the fraction of variation in the skill premium that can be accounted for by changes in observed factor quantities. We find that with capital-skill complementarity, changes in observed inputs alone can account for most of the variations in the skill premium over the last 30 years.

A Model of Bimetallism

Journal of Political Economy 2000 108(6), 1210-1234
Bimetallism has been the subject of considerable debate: Was it a viable monetary system? Was it desirable? In our model, the amounts of each metal are split between coined metal, satisfying a cash‐in‐advance constraint, and uncoined metal, yielding utility. The ratio of the monies in the cash‐in‐advance constraint is endogenous. Bimetallism is feasible: we find a continuum of steady states indexed by the constant exchange rate of the monies. Bimetallism is not desirable: among steady states, welfare under monometallism is higher than under any bimetallic equilibrium. Long‐run trends in gold and silver production placed limits on the maintenance of bimetallism at any given ratio, but its sudden collapse in 1873 remains a puzzle.

Understanding Black–White Wage Differentials: 1960–1990

American Economic Review 2000 90(2), 344-349
Understanding Black-White Wage Differentials, 1960-1990 Author(s): James J. Heckman, Thomas M. Lyons, Petra E. Todd Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, (May, 2000), pp. 344 -349 Published by: American Economic Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/117248 Accessed: 16/08/2008 00:56

ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition

American Economic Review 2000 90(1), 166-193
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets.

Hedging Pressure Effects in Futures Markets

Journal of Finance 2000 55(3), 1437-1456
We present a simple model implying that futures risk premia depend on both own‐market and cross‐market hedging pressures. Empirical evidence from 20 futures markets, divided into four groups (financial, agricultural, mineral, and currency) indicates that, after controlling for systematic risk, both the futures own hedging pressure and cross‐hedging pressures from within the group significantly affect futures returns. These effects remain significant after controlling for a measure of price pressure. Finally, we show that hedging pressure also contains explanatory power for returns on the underlying asset, as predicted by the model.

Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?

American Economic Review 2000 90(1), 147-165
In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path.

A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles

Journal of Finance 2000 55(6), 2499-2536
This paper explains why some firms prefer to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. When institutional investors are relatively less taxed than individual investors, dividends induce “ownership clientele” effects. Firms paying dividends attract relatively more institutions, which have a relative advantage in detecting high firm quality and in ensuring firms are well managed. The theory is consistent with some documented regularities, specifically both the presence and stickiness of dividends, and offers novel empirical implications, e.g., a prediction that it is the tax difference between institutions and retail investors that determines dividend payments, not the absolute tax payments.