We consider a setting in which a firm uses residual income to motivate a manager's investment decision. Textbooks often recommend adjusting the residual income capital charge for market risk, but not for firmspecific risk. We demonstrate two basic flaws in this recommendation. First, the capital charge should not be adjusted for market risk. Charging a market risk premium results in “double” counting because a risk-averse manager will personally consider this risk. Second, while investors can avoid firm-specific risk through diversification, a manager cannot. If the manager faces significant firm-specific risk at the time he makes his investment decision, then it is optimal to charge him less than the riskless return so as to partially offset his reluctance to undertake risky investments. On the other hand, the manager will vary his investment decisions with the pre-decision information he receives, which accentuates his compensation risk, and the firm must compensate him for bearing this additional risk. Hence, if the manager will receive relatively precise pre-decision information, then it is optimal to charge him more than the riskless return to reduce the variability of his investment decisions.

Welfare, Employment, and Income: Evidence on the Effects of Benefit Reductions from California by V. Joseph Hotz, Charles H. Mullin and John Karl Scholz. Published in volume 92, issue 2, pages 380-384 of American Economic Review, May 2002

We use estimates of the Black—Scholes sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price to test the relationship between managers' risk preferences and hedging activities. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price increases, firms tend to hedge more. However, as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases, firms tend to hedge less.

We study the effects of alternative halt and reopening procedures on prices, transaction costs, and trading activity for a sample of news‐related trading halts on Nasdaq. For intraday halts that reopen after only a five‐minute quotation period, inside quoted spreads more than double following halts and volatility increases to more than nine times normal levels. In contrast, halts that reopen the following day with a longer 90‐minute quotation period are associated with insignificant spread effects and significantly dampened volatility effects. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that increased information transmission during the halt results in reduced posthalt uncertainty.