We analyze the location of stock trading for firms with a US cross-listing. The fraction of trading that occurs in the United States tends to be larger for companies from countries that are geographically close to the United States and feature low financial development and poor insider trading protection. For companies based in developed countries, trading volume in the United States is larger if the company is small, volatile, and technology-oriented, while this does not apply to emerging country firms. The domestic turnover rate increases in the cross-listing year and remains higher for firms based in developed markets, but not for emerging market firms. Domestic trading volume actually declines for companies from countries with poor enforcement of insider trading regulation.

ABSTRACT This paper shows that low‐risk anomalies in the capital asset pricing model and in traditional factor models arise when investors require compensation for coskewness risk. Empirically, we find that option‐implied ex ante skewness is strongly related to ex post residual coskewness, which allows us to construct coskewness factor‐mimicking portfolios. Controlling for skewness renders the alphas of betting‐against‐beta and betting‐against‐volatility insignificant. We also show that the returns of beta‐ and volatility‐sorted portfolios are driven largely by a single principal component, which in turn is explained largely by skewness.

This paper presents a framework to study how investors’ social concerns affect technology choices. Consequentialist preferences (disutility from aggregate harm) influence outcomes only if investors coordinate, unless internalized harm is independent of an investor’s mass. Non-consequentialist preferences (disutility from stockholdings) affect outcomes regardless of coordination. Both preferences have stronger impact when risk-sharing consequences of technology supply are small (e.g., highly correlated returns), and their effects cannot be inferred from cost-of-capital differences. When harm is stochastic, polluting firms may appear less risky to social investors. Depending on type and strength of social preferences, this can support or hinder the green transition.