The article reviews the book "Introduction to Nonprofit Organization Accounting," 3rd edition, by Emerson O. Henke.

Arthur S. De Vany, Wendy L. Gramm, Thomas R. Saving, Charles W. Smithson, Production in a Service Industry Using Customer Inputs: A Stochastic Model, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 149-153

In this paper, we ask whether the Bundesbank, prior to the European Central Bank taking responsibility for monetary policy in 1999, reacted systematically to stock price movements. In contrast to the results for the US, our empirical findings show a generally weak relationship between German stock returns and short-term interest rates at the daily and the monthly frequency. The results are extremely robust to alternative model specifications. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a systematic reaction of the Bundesbank to German stock prices. However, we do find that, as in the US, the Bundesbank may have reacted to the stock market crash of 1987 by loosening monetary policy.

This article comments on inventory pricing and changes in price levels. Ideally, the measurement of accounting profit involves the matching precisely of the identified costs of specific units of product with the sales revenues derived there from. Secondly, where conditions are such that precise matching of identified costs with revenues is impracticable, identified cost matching may be simulated by the adoption of an assumed flow of costs. Also, a flow assumption can be realistic, in that it reflects the dominant characteristics of the actual flow of goods; thus it may reflect an actual dominance of first-in, first-out, average, or last-in, first-out movement. A flow assumption can be artificial, on the other hand, in that it premises a flow of costs that is clearly in contrast with actual physical movement. However, the periodic income of a business enterprise is computed by deducting from the revenues of the period the costs which are properly associated with those revenues. In the case of certain costs, for example sales commissions, the relationship to the revenues of a period is quite direct and the matching process is accomplished with a minimum of uncertainty.

This article discusses the information on the paragraph no. 5. The Paragraph No. 5 under "Expense" in the 1948 Revision of Accounting Concepts and Standards Underlying Corporate Financial Statements of the U.S. reads that An assignment of all or a portion of the cost of an asset to expense, made in good faith after considered judgment and after competent review, in accordance with the accounting concepts and standards of the time, is not subject to reversal in a later period. Errors of a mechanical and non-judgment nature should be corrected in the period of their discovery. The Committee on Concepts and Standards is in agreement with the apparent basic purpose of this statement to reduce the possibility of manipulation of the net income calculation through reversals, revisions and reaccounting of past depredation charges and other amortizations. At the same time it recognizes that a position unalterably opposed to the correction of errors of judgment is both arbitrary and difficult to defend.

Theory suggests that changes in corporate tax rates can alter the dispersion of after-tax project payoffs, thereby altering the exposure of firm-level risk transmitted to executives through compensation. Using state tax changes, we observe firms shifting away from option-based compensation following state corporate tax rate increases. This result is concentrated in compensation contracts that lack relative performance evaluation (RPE) features, which filter common shocks to performance and influence the type of risk executives are incentivized to take. We also find that firms are more likely to initiate RPE shortly after a state tax rate increase and that firms that adjusted compensation through reductions in equity risk incentives or used RPE were less likely to experience a subsequent increase in systematic risk following a state tax rate increase. Overall, our findings provide novel insight into how taxes can influence CEO compensation design and the transmission of firm-level risk to executives. Data Availability: Data are obtained from public sources identified in the paper.