Two fundamentally different subcontracting systems arise as distinct solutions to the quality control problem facing an input buyer. The "American" system involves competitive bidding on each contract, large orders, and inspections. The "Japanese" system involves repeat purchases from a supplier who earns a premium, small orders, and no inspections. Both systems may coexist as local solutions, but the global optimum is determined by the ratio of set-up to inspection costs. This suggests that the adoption of flexible manufacturing equipment and rising product complexity may be responsible for the shift from the American to the Japanese system observed in many industries.

Recent theoretical models of entry predict that, in the presence of sunk costs, current market participation is affected by prior experience. This paper quantifies the effect of prior exporting experience on the decisions of Colombian manufacturing plants to participate in foreign markets. It develops a dynamic discrete-choice model of exporting behavior that separates the roles of profit heterogeneity and sunk entry costs in explaining plants' exporting status. Sunk costs are found to be significant, and prior export experience is shown to increase the probability of exporting by as much as 60 percentage points.

When a series of individuals with private information announce public predictions, initial conformity can create an "information cascade" in which later predictions match the early announcements. This paper reports an experiment in which private signals are draws from an unobserved urn. Subjects make predictions in sequence and are paid if they correctly guess which of two urns was used for the draws. If initial decisions coincide, then it is rational for subsequent decision makers to follow the established pattern, regardless of their private information. Rational cascades formed in most periods in which such an imbalance occurred.

We examine the social costs of asymmetric-information-induced bank panics in an environment without government deposit insurance. Our case study is the Chicago bank panic of June 1932. We compare the ex ante characteristics of panic failures and panic survivors. Despite temporary confusion about bank asset quality on the part of depositors during the panic, which was associated with widespread depositor runs and bank stock price declines, the panic did not produce significant social costs in terms of failures among solvent banks.

Explaining cross-country differences in growth rates requires not only an understanding of the link between growth and public policies, but also an understanding of why countries choose different public policies. This paper shows that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-country differences in public policies and other economic indicators. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, economic growth is associated with low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure. Africa's high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of most of these characteristics.

We use store-level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at five multistore supermarket chains. We show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process, requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources. The menu costs average $105,887/year per store, comprising 0.70 percent of revenues, 35.2 percent of net margins, and $0.52/price change. These menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes. Specifically, (1) a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs (due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item) changes prices two and one-half times less frequently than the other four chains; (2) within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law. “In principle, fixed costs of changing prices can be observed and measured. In practice, such costs take disparate forms in different firms, and we have no data on their magnitude. So the theory can be tested at best indirectly, at worst not at all” [Alan Blinder 1991, p. 90].

The authors report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where they allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large–unlike in models with risk-neutral, competitive dealers. However, when the authors allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.

We report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where we allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large—unlike in models with risk‐neutral, competitive dealers. However, when we allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.

We report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where we allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large—unlike in models with risk-neutral, competitive dealers. However, when we allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.

This paper attempts to estimate both the direct and indirect costs of regulation for major sectors of the UK financial services industry. We also compare UK direct costs with those for the US and France and this provides a benchmark for assessing the effect of regulation on the competitive position of the UK financial services industry. We believe that this is the first attempt to compare regulatory costs in the UK with those of its major competitors. For indirect costs, in the absence of an international benchmark we compare our results with the predictions made at the time of the introduction of the Financial Services Act, by Lomax (Lomax, D., 1987. London Markets After the Financial Services Act, Butterworths, London) and Goodhart (Goodhart, C., 1988. The costs of regulation. In: Seldon, A. (Ed.), Financial Regulation or Over-regulation. Institute of Economic Affairs, London, p. 31). They estimated that indirect costs would be £4 for every £1 of direct costs and that annual aggregate costs would be £100 million. Our results suggest that, so far as direct costs are concerned, the costs of regulation for the securities and derivatives trading and broking sector are substantially lower for the UK than for the US and France. In contrast, for the investment management and unit trust industry UK costs are significantly higher than those for the other two countries. For the life insurance industry, UK costs are similar to those in France but markedly lower than those for the US. We also find for the securities industry around £4.1 of indirect costs per £1 of direct costs. For the investment management industry the corresponding figure is £3.2. However there is substantial variation across firms and, although our sample is too small to be definitive, the ratio appears to be related to firm size. Although these results are broadly in line with the predictions of Lomax and Goodhart it should be borne in mind that both numerator and denominator are substantially higher in real terms than those used by Lomax and Goodhart.