This paper examines the effect of incentive fees on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Funds with incentive fees exhibit positive stock selection ability, but a beta less than one results in funds not earning positive fees. From an investor's perspective, positive alphas plus lower expense ratios make incentive‐fee funds attractive. However, incentive‐fee funds take on more risk than non‐incentive‐fee funds, and they increase risk after a period of poor performance. Incentive fees are useful marketing tools, since more new cash flows go into incentive‐fee funds than into non‐incentive‐fee funds, ceteris paribus.

On October 23, 2000, the SEC implemented Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), which prohibits firms from privately disclosing value-relevant information to select securities markets professionals without simultaneously disclosing the same information to the public. We examine whether Regulation FD's prohibition of selective disclosure impairs the flow of financial information to the capital markets prior to earnings announcements. After implementation of FD, we find (1) improved informational efficiency of stock prices prior to earnings announcements, as evidenced by smaller deviations between pre-and post-announcement stock prices; (2) no reliable evidence of change in analysts' earnings forecast errors or dispersion; and (3) a substantial increase in the volume of firms' voluntary, forward-looking, earnings-related disclosures. Overall, we find no evidence Regulation FD impaired the information available to investors prior to earnings announcements, and some of our evidence is consistent with improvement.

Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings by Owen R. Phillips, Dale J. Menkhaus and Kalyn T. Coatney. Published in volume 93, issue 3, pages 965-979 of American Economic Review, June 2003

We examine the expiration of the IPO quiet period, which occurs after the 25th calendar day following the offering. For IPOs during 1996 to 2000, we find that analyst coverage is initiated immediately for 76 percent of these firms, almost always with a favorable rating. Initiated firms experience a five‐day abnormal return of 4.1 percent versus 0.1 percent for firms with no coverage. The abnormal returns are concentrated in the days just before the quiet period expires. Abnormal returns are much larger when coverage is initiated by multiple analysts. It does not matter whether a recommendation comes from the lead underwriter or not.

Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise: Reply by David L. Carr, James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskus. Published in volume 93, issue 3, pages 995-1001 of American Economic Review, June 2003