This paper develops a model where reductions in mortality are the main force behind economic development. The model generates a pattern of changes similar to the demographic transition, where gains in life expectancy at birth are followed by reductions in fertility and increases in the rate of human capital accumulation. The onset of the transition is characterized by a critical level of life expectancy at birth, which marks the movement of the economy from a Malthusian equilibrium to an equilibrium with investments in human capital and the possibility of long-run growth.

This paper examines the interactions between household formation, inequality, and per capita income. We develop a model in which agents decide to become skilled or unskilled and form households. We show that the equilibrium sorting of spouses by skill type (their correlation in skills) is an increasing function of the skill premium. In the absence of perfect capital markets, the economy can converge to different steady states, depending upon initial conditions. The degree of marital sorting and wage inequality is positively correlated across steady states and negatively correlated with per capita income. We use household surveys from 34 countries to construct several measures of the skill premium and of the degree of correlation of spouses' education (marital sorting). For all our measures, we find a positive and significant relationship between the two variables. We also find that sorting and per capita GDP are negatively correlated and that greater discrimination against women leads to more sorting, in line with the predictions of our model.

In the Self Sufficiency Project (SSP) welfare demonstration, members of a randomly assigned treatment group could receive a subsidy for full-time work. The subsidy was available for 3 years, but only to people who began working full time within 12 months of random assignment. A simple optimizing model suggests that the eligibility rules created an “establishment” incentive to find a job and leave welfare within a year of random assignment, and an “entitlement” incentive to choose work over welfare once eligibility was established. Building on this insight, we develop an econometric model of welfare participation that allows us to separate the two effects and estimate the impact of the earnings subsidy on welfare entry and exit rates among those who achieved eligibility. The combination of the two incentives explains the time profile of the experimental impacts, which peaked 15 months after random assignment and faded relatively quickly. Our findings suggest that about half of the peak impact of SSP was attributable to the establishment incentive. Despite the extra work effort generated by SSP, the program had no lasting impact on wages and little or no long-run effect on welfare participation.

Almost all research on the movement of stock prices on ex-dividend days has found that prices decline by less than the dividend. Though this is consistent with tax effects, several papers have argued that this phenomenon could be caused by market microstructure effects. In this paper we make use of a natural experiment that provides support for the tax explanations of ex-dividend behavior. Some closed-end funds have taxable, and some have nontaxable, dividend distributions. Both types are subject to taxes on capital gains. The implication of this for ex-dividendday price behavior is very different between these two types of funds if taxes matter. This paper demonstrates that the direction of ex-dividendday price behavior is consistent with a tax explanation and that ex-dividend-day price behavior changes, as theory would suggest, with changes in the tax law.

Privatization and increased foreign ownership transformed the Argentine banking sector during the 1990s. While both improved sector efficiency, there was concern that they might reduce access to credit outside of Buenos Aires. The results in this paper suggest that these fears were exaggerated. Provinces that privatized their banks suffered only temporary reductions in credit associated with cleaning the portfolio of the privatized banks. Typically, growth in lending by the privatized entity and by other banks restored credit to pre-privatization levels within a few years. In addition, increased foreign ownership coincided with more, not less, lending outside of Buenos Aires.

This paper examines the trade‐generation and reputation‐building incentives facing sell‐side analysts. Using a unique data set I demonstrate that optimistic analysts generate more trade for their brokerage firms, as do high reputation analysts. I also find that accurate analysts generate higher reputations. The analyst therefore faces a conflict between telling the truth to build her reputation versus misleading investors via optimistic forecasts to generate short‐term increases in trading commissions. In equilibrium I show forecast optimism can exist, even when investment‐banking affiliations are removed. The conclusions may have important policy implications given recent changes in the institutional structure of the brokerage industry.

Numerous studies have examined the impact of security issuance upon the value of pre-existing debt and equity but the focus has largely been on changes in equity value. We examine changes in senior unsecured debt risk premiums that accompany new junior debt issues. Additionally, we test several hypotheses regarding the potential impacts of junior debt issues. Extant theory suggests senior debt value may be threatened under certain conditions by the issuance of junior debt. Our results indicate that when junior debt replaces bank debt, senior default risk premiums experience abnormal declines. The result is broadly consistent with the elevation of the senior unsecured debt by way of the elimination of a separate and more senior class of debt claimants. In contrast, we also find that larger junior bond issues are associated with abnormal increases in senior risk premiums, broadly consistent with issue size being correlated with negative information about firm cash flows. We find strong evidence of interaction effects. For example, replacement of bank debt results in greater changes in default risk premiums the larger the issue size. We also find lower credit ratings magnify other effects. For example, if the junior debt issued matures before the outstanding senior unsecured bond, senior risk premiums experience abnormal increases for lower rated debt.

The Evolution of High Incomes in Northern America: Lessons from Canadian Evidence by Emmanuel Saez and Michael R. Veall. Published in volume 95, issue 3, pages 831-849 of American Economic Review, June 2005

Although a large and growing literature shows that privatization can improve the performance of non-financial enterprises, there is less evidence on how it affects the performance of the banking sector. This paper summarizes the results from the papers in the special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance on bank privatization. It concludes that although bank privatization usually improves bank efficiency, gains are greater when the government fully relinquishes control, when banks are privatized to strategic investors, when foreign banks are allowed to participate in the privatization process and when the government does not restrict competition.

We empirically examine whether firms engage in a dynamic rebalancing of their capital structures while allowing for costly adjustment. We begin by showing that the presence of adjustment costs has significant implications for corporate financial policy and the interpretation of previous empirical results. After confirming that financing behavior is consistent with the presence of adjustment costs, we find that firms actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal range. Our evidence suggests that the persistent effect of shocks on leverage observed in previous studies is more likely due to adjustment costs than indifference toward capital structure.