This paper reports a wandering weekday effect: the pattern of day seasonality in stock market returns is not fixed, as assumed in the Monday or weekend effects, but changes over time. Analysing daily closing prices in eleven major stock markets during 1993–2007, our results show that the wandering weekday is not conditional on average returns in the previous week (the “twist” in the Monday effect). Nor does it diminish through the period of analysis. The results have important implications for market efficiency, and help to reconcile mixed findings in previous studies, including the reported disappearance of the weekday effect in recent years.

The study of the investment-cash flow (ICF) sensitivity constitutes one of the largest literatures in corporate finance, yet little is known about changes in the ICF relationship over time, and the literature has largely ignored how rising R&D investment and developments in equity markets have impacted ICF sensitivity estimates. We show that for the time period 1970–2006, the ICF sensitivity: (i) largely disappears for physical investment, (ii) remains comparatively strong for R&D, and (iii) declines, but does not disappear, for total investment. We argue that these findings can largely be explained by the changing composition of investment and the rising importance of public equity as a source of funds, particularly for firms with persistent negative cash flows.

Models of financial distress rely primarily on accounting-based information (e.g. [Altman, E., 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 23, 589–609; Ohlson, J., 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research 19, 109–131]) or market-based information (e.g. [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance 29, 449–470]). In this paper, we provide evidence on the relative performance of these two classes of models. Using a sample of 2860 quarterly CDS spreads we find that a model of distress using accounting metrics performs comparably to market-based structural models of default. Moreover, a model using both sources of information performs better than either of the two models. Overall, our results suggest that both sources of information (accounting- and market-based) are complementary in pricing distress.

Building on the important study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine [2006. Bank supervision and corruption in lending. Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2131-2163], we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus/registries on corruption in bank lending. Using the unique World Bank data set (WBES) covering more than 4,000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus/registries, assembled by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [2007. Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299–329], and bank regulation data collected by Barth, Caprio, and Levine [2006. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern. Cambridge University Press, New York] to measure bank competition and information sharing, we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption, and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption. We also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks, legal environment, and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption.

The typical Mincerian wage equation examines wages in relation to the education, potential experience, and other personal characteristics of job incumbents. These characteristics serve as proxies for the job holder’s skill level, but do not indicate what specific skills are being rewarded. A number of recent papers make use of data on occupational skill requirements, which have proven useful for understanding shifts in labor demand (see, for example, David Autor, Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane 2003; Maarten Goos and Alan Manning 2007) as well as for understanding the relationship between wages and specific job skills (see, for example, Beth Ingram and George Neumann 2006; Autor and Michael Handel 2008). To the extent that the labor market does a good job of matching individuals to jobs for which they are well suited, such analyses can shed new light on how workers’ job skills are valued in the labor market. Studies that focus on job skills generally begin with data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) or another household survey that contains information on the detailed occupation in which people work. Information on required job skills is attached to the survey records according to reported occupation. There is considerable evidence, however, of significant errors in the coding of occupation in household survey data. Wesley Mellow and Hal Sider (1983) find disagreements between the occupation recorded in CPS data compared to that based on information supplied by individuals’ employers for 19 percent of jobs at the major occupation level and 42 percent at the detailed occupation level. Nancy Mathiowetz (1992) reports similar findings for the employees of a large manufacturing firm. Comparisons of aggregate data on the number of jobs in each of 19 broad occupations from the New Evidence on the Returns to Job Skills

We develop a theory of resource management where the degree to which countries escape the tragedy of the commons is endogenously determined and explicitly linked to changes in world prices and other possible effects of market integration. We show how changes in world prices can move some countries from de facto open access situations to ones where management replicates that of an unconstrained social planner. Not all countries can follow this path of institutional reform and we identify key country characteristics (mortality rates, resource growth rates, technology) to divide the world's set of resource rich countries into Hardin, Ostrom and Clark economies. Hardin economies are not able to manage their renewable resources at any world price, have zero rents and suffer from the tragedy of the commons. Ostrom economies exhibit de facto open access and zero rents for low resource prices, but can maintain a limited form of resource management at higher prices. Clark economies can implement fully efficient management and do so when resource prices are sufficiently high. The model shows heterogeneity in the success of resource management is to be expected, and neutral technological progress works to undermine the efficacy of property rights institutions.

This paper provides evidence on the risk factors that are priced in bank equities. Alternative empirical models with precedent in the nonfinancial asset pricing literature are tested, including the single-factor CAPM, three-factor Fama–French model, and ICAPM. Our empirical results indicate that an unconditional two-factor ICAPM model that includes the stock market excess return and shocks to the slope of the yield curve is useful in explaining the cross-section of bank stock returns. However, we find no evidence that firm specific factors such as size and book-to-market ratios are priced in bank stock returns. These results have a number of important implications for the estimation of the banks’ cost of capital as well as regulatory initiatives to utilize market discipline to evaluate bank risk under Basel II.

This paper examines the potential impacts of artificial smoothing (abnormal accruals) and real smoothing (derivatives) on firm value. We find that the value of the firm decreases with the magnitude of abnormal accruals and increases with the level of derivative use. Moreover, the accrual discount is more pronounced in firms with weak investor protection and the hedging premium is greater for poorly governed firms. These results suggest that although managers can engage in real smoothing to improve the informativeness of firms’ earnings and thus reduce agency costs, they might use artificial techniques to cosmetically improve the income stream in order to expropriate minority shareholders. In further support of agency theories, we report that poor corporate governance motivates the use of abnormal accruals and discourages derivative use.

Larger offices of Big 4 auditors are predicted to have higher quality audits for SEC registrants due to greater in-house experience in administering such audits. We test this prediction by examining a sample of 6,568 U.S. firm-year observations for the period 2003–2005 and audited by 285 unique Big 4 offices. Results are consistent with larger offices providing higher quality audits. Specifically, larger offices are more likely to issue going-concern audit reports, and clients in larger offices evidence less aggressive earnings management behavior. These findings are robust to extensive controls for client risk factors and to controls for other auditor characteristics. While the evidence suggests audit quality is higher on average in larger Big 4 offices, we make no claims that audit quality is unacceptably low in smaller offices.