McCallum, Bennett T., The Role of Speculation in the Canadian Forward Exchange Market: Some Estimates Assuming Rational Expectations, this REVIEW 59 (May 1977) 145-151. Officer, Lawrence H., and Thomas D. Willet, The Covered Arbitrage Schedule: A Critical Study of Recent Developments, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 2 (May 1970) 247-257. Stoll, Hans B., An Empirical Study of the Forward Exchange Market under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rate Systems, Canadian Journal of Economics 1 (Feb. 1968), 55-78.

this paper is to analyze theoretically the effect of taxation on human capital accumulation in a model which explicitly allows for uncertainty

I. Introduction, 523.—II. A defined benefit plan with level wages, 525.—III. Life cycle wage growth, 530.—IV. Implications for labor market adjustments, 534.—V. Concluding remarks, 538.

The stability analysis of a short-run market system under ran-dom disturbances was initiated by Turnovsky [1968]. Later on, Re-vankar [1971] observed that the selection of a Liapunov function is

The theory of inequality and intergenerational mobility presented in this essay assumes that each family maximizes a utility function spanning several generations. Utility depends on the consumption of parents and on the quantity and quality of their children. The income of children is raised when they receive more human and nonhuman capital from their parents. Their income is also raised by their "endowment" of genetically determined race, ability, and other characteristics, family reputation and "connections," and knowledge, skills, and goals provided by their family environment. The fortunes of children are linked to their parents not only through investments but also through these endowments acquired from parents (and other family members). The equilibrium income of children is determined by their market and endowed luck, the own income and endowment of parents, and the two parameters, the degree of inheritability and the propensity to invest in children. If these parameters are both less than unity, the distribution of income between families approaches a stationary distribution. The stationary coefficient of variation is greater, the larger the degree of in-heritability and the smaller the propensity to invest in children. Intergenerational mobility measures the effect of a family on the well-being of its children. We show that the family is more important when the degree of inheritability and the propensity to invest are larger. If both these parameters are less than unity, an increase in family income in one generation has negligible effects on the incomes of much later descendants. However, the incomes of children, grandchildren, and other early descendants could significantly increase; indeed, if the sum of these parameters exceeds unity, the changes in income rise for several generations before falling, and the maximum increase in income could exceed the initial increase.

The theory of inequality and intergenerational mobility presented in this essay assumes that each family maximizes a utility function spanning several generations. Utility depends on the consumption of parents and on the quantity and quality of their children. The income of children is raised when they receive more human and nonhuman capital from their parents. Their income is also raised by their "endowment" of genetically determined race, ability, and other characteristics, family reputation and "connections," and knowledge, skills, and goals provided by their family environment. The fortunes of children are linked to their parents not only through investments but also through these endowments acquired from parents (and other family members). The equilibrium income of children is determined by their market and endowed luck, the own income and endowment of parents, and the two parameters, the degree of inheritability and the propensity to invest in children. If these parameters are both less than unity, the distribution of income between families approaches a stationary distribution. The stationary coefficient of variation is greater, the larger the degree of in-heritability and the smaller the propensity to invest in children. Intergenerational mobility measures the effect of a family on the well-being of its children. We show that the family is more important when the degree of inheritability and the propensity to invest are larger. If both these parameters are less than unity, an increase in family income in one generation has negligible effects on the incomes of much later descendants. However, the incomes of children, grandchildren, and other early descendants could significantly increase; indeed, if the sum of these parameters exceeds unity, the changes in income rise for several generations before falling, and the maximum increase in income could exceed the initial increase.

This paper investigates the extent and patterns of compliance with the federal minimum wage. Using a profit-maximizing model of compliance, predictions about compliance with weak or random government enforcement are made. Such enforcement is not random, however, and our measures of compliance suggest that government enforcement, while not inducing anything near complete compliance, does have an impact. Overall compliance in 1973 is estimated to be about 65 percent, while it is about 10 percentage points lower after the new minimum was established in 1975. Compliance appears highest among regional/racial/sex (but not age) groups where market incentives for violation are strongest.

This paper investigates the extent and patterns of compliance with the federal minimum wage. Using a profit-maximizing model of compliance, predictions about compliance with weak or random government enforcement are made. Such enforcement is not random, however, and our measures of compliance suggest that government enforcement, while not inducing anything near complete compliance, does have an impact. Overall compliance in 1973 is estimated to be about 65 percent, while it is about 10 percentage points lower after the new minimum was established in 1975. Compliance appears highest among regional/racial/sex (but not age) groups where market incentives for violation are strongest.