This paper examines the role of local attitudes toward gambling on corporate innovative activity. Using a county’s Catholics-to-Protestants ratio as a proxy for local gambling preferences, we find that firms located in gambling-prone areas tend to undertake riskier projects, spend more on innovation, and experience greater innovative output. We contrast the local gambling effect with chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence, another behavioral effect reported to influence innovation. We find that local gambling preferences are a stronger determinant of innovative activity, with CEO overconfidence being more relevant to innovation in areas where gambling attitudes are strong.

We test the biasedness of unsolicited ratings relative to solicited ratings using the ex post firm performance measured by the long-run stock performance of firms following rating announcements and changes. We find that the announcements of new unsolicited ratings are followed by negative long-run stock performance, while those of new solicited ratings are followed by insignificant long-run stock performance. These results are inconsistent with the conservatism hypothesis that suggests that unsolicited ratings are downward biased. We further demonstrate that firms with solicited upgraded (downgraded) ratings experience subsequent positive (negative) abnormal stock performance, while those with unsolicited rating changes have zero abnormal stock performance. The differential stock performance following rating changes between solicited and unsolicited ratings reflect the differential information carried by each type of rating rather than the biasedness in ratings. Specifically, while solicited ratings are based on both public and private information, unsolicited ratings are mainly based on public information. Overall, we find no evidence for a downward bias in unsolicited ratings.

The experience from the global financial crisis has raised serious concerns about the accuracy of standard risk measures as tools for the quantification of extreme downward risks. A key reason for this is that risk measures are subject to a model risk due, e.g. to specification and estimation uncertainty. While regulators have proposed that financial institutions assess the model risk, there is no accepted approach for computing such a risk. We propose a remedy for this by a general framework for the computation of risk measures robust to model risk by empirically adjusting the imperfect risk forecasts by outcomes from backtesting frameworks, considering the desirable quality of VaR models such as the frequency, independence and magnitude of violations. We also provide a fair comparison between the main risk models using the same metric that corresponds to model risk required corrections.

ABSTRACT This paper examines how the external information environment in which foreign subsidiaries operate affects the investment decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs). We hypothesize and find that the investment decisions of foreign subsidiaries in country-industries with more transparent information environments are more responsive to local growth opportunities than are those of foreign subsidiaries in country-industries with less transparent information environments. Further, this effect is larger when (1) there are greater cross-border frictions between the parent and subsidiary, and (2) the parents are relatively more involved in their subsidiaries' investment decision-making process. Our results suggest that the external information environment helps mitigate the agency problems that arise when firms expand their operations across borders. This paper contributes to the literature by showing that the external information environment helps MNCs mitigate information frictions within the firm. JEL Classifications: D83; G31; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

We examine the evolution of real per capita GDP around 100 systemic banking crises. Part of the costs of these crises owes to the protracted nature of recovery. On average, it takes about 8 years to reach the pre-crisis level of income; the median is about 6.5 years. Five to six years after the onset of crisis, only Germany and the United States (out of 12 systemic cases) have reached their 2007-2008 peaks in real income. Forty-five percent of the episodes recorded double dips. Post-war business cycles are not the relevant comparator for the recent crises in advanced economies.

The traditional economic analysis of is based on Gary Becker's study of taste by employers, employees, and consumers. More recent work by Kenneth Arrow (1972, 1973) has attempted to interpret intergroup wage differences in an alternative framework as a rational reaction to uncertainty in labor markets. His model of statistical discrimination demonstrates that when the screening process used to determine a worker's qualifications is costly, and prior expectations of productivity differ across race or sex groups, then wage differentials may arise between workers of identical productivity. By implicitly assuming a perfect screening process, Arrow ignores a potentially important source of wage differentials, namely the fact that the screening process might be a more reliable predictor of productivity for one group than for another.' Our paper generalizes the Arrow model in two ways. First, in contrast to Arrow, we assume that all groups have identical distributions of productivity. Secondly, the screening process used by the firm to determine an applicant's productivity is biased in the sense that: a) members of various groups may pass the test in different proportions despite their identical productivity distributions; and b) the predictive power of the test might vary across groups. Our objective is to analyze the effects of these types of biases in the screening process on the wage differentials between different population groups.

ABSTRACT This paper complements the ongoing empirical discussion surrounding participative budgeting by comparing its economic merits relative to a top-down budgeting alternative. In both budgeting regimes, private information is communicated vertically between a principal and a manager. We show that top-down budgeting incurs fewer agency costs than bottom-up budgeting whenever the level of information asymmetry is relatively low. Although the choice between top-down and bottom-up budgeting ultimately determines who receives private information within the firm, we find that both the principal and manager's preferences over the allocation of private information remain qualitatively similar across the two budgeting paradigms. Specifically, while the principal always prefers either minimal or maximal private information, the manager prefers an interim or maximal level of private information regardless of who is privately informed. Last, we use our model to address empirical inconsistencies relating the firm's choice of budgeting process, the resulting budgetary slack, and performance.

ABSTRACT Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we capture neural activity in the ventral striatum—a key area in the human brain's reward processing circuit—of 35 adult investors learning the earnings per share disclosed by 60 publicly traded companies. Before imaging, investors forecasted each company's earnings and took either a long or a short position in its stock. Consistent with prospect theory, we find strong neurobiological evidence of an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative earnings surprises. Moreover, investors' personality traits and investment positions, as well as firms' earnings predictability, modulate the brain's reaction to earnings news. We also find a strong association between the magnitude of the brain's reaction and risk-adjusted stock returns and abnormal share trading around earnings announcements for our sample firms; these findings evince the brain's reaction to earnings news as an alternative, biological measure of the information content of earnings. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors.

ABSTRACT We study the performance of nearly 1,400 U.S. buyout and venture capital funds using a new data set from Burgiss. We find better buyout fund performance than previously documented—performance has consistently exceeded that of public markets. Outperformance versus the S&P 500 averages 20% to 27% over a fund's life and more than 3% annually. Venture capital funds outperformed public equities in the 1990s, but underperformed in the 2000s. Our conclusions are robust to various indices and risk controls. Performance in Cambridge Associates and Preqin is qualitatively similar to that in Burgiss, but is lower in Venture Economics.

ABSTRACT Does the placement of a line item in the income statement matter to investors? The passage of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 145 (Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] 2002) affords a quasi-experimental setting to answer this question, because pre-SFAS No. 145, gains/losses from early debt extinguishments were reported below the line, while post-SFAS No. 145, they were reported above the line. After controlling for other identified changes that occur during our sample period, we find that, pre-SFAS No. 145, the market does not respond to these gains/losses, whereas post-SFAS No. 145, it does. This suggests that the market response to gains/losses is associated with their placement in the income statement. Our findings contribute to the literature on the importance of income statement presentation by demonstrating that a line-item position in the income statement has important valuation implications. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; M41.