Disclosure theory predicts that the likelihood of voluntary disclosures increases with the noise level in mandatory disclosures. We test this prediction by exploiting a unique setting where firms simultaneously provide two forecasts of the same metric—annual effective tax rates (ETRs). We find that managers are more likely to issue voluntary ETR forecasts when mandatory ETR forecasts contain more noise due to tax complexity, suggesting that managers resort to voluntary disclosure when mandatory disclosure constrains their ability to convey private information. Using analysts’ ETR forecast revisions to assess the informativeness of the two ETR forecasts, we find that both forecasts are incrementally informative. In addition, analysts weight voluntary ETR forecasts more heavily, especially when voluntary ETR forecasts are non-GAAP based and when discrete items are present. Overall, we provide evidence on the relation between and the informativeness of voluntary and mandatory disclosures by examining two competing forecasts issued simultaneously.

We exploit an exogenous shock to analyst coverage as a result of brokerage house mergers and closures to examine whether financial analysts influence the tax‐planning activities of the firms they cover. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that, on average, firms affected by broker mergers and/or closures experience a reduction in their GAAP (cash) effective tax rates (ETR) of 2.5 percent (2.6 percent), relative to control firms, translating into average tax expense (cash tax) savings of $34 ($35) million. The treatment effect is more pronounced among firms with lower pre‐event analyst coverage. To explore how analysts affect tax planning, we further document that the treatment effect is greater among firms that lose an analyst who provided an implied ETR forecast in the past, suggesting that analysts influence tax planning via their tax‐specific research efforts. In addition, we find that after merger/closure, weakly governed firms increase their use of aggressive tax strategies, and financially distressed firms experience a larger reduction of cash effective tax rates, relative to control firms. Overall, we provide evidence that a shock to analyst coverage sufficiently changes the cost‐benefit trade‐off of tax planning.

In this study, we examine the effect of increased tax transparency on the tax planning behavior of European banks. In 2014, the European Union introduced public country‐by‐country reporting requirements to the banking industry. Treating this new requirement as an exogenous shock, we find limited evidence consistent with a decline in income shifting by the banks' financial affiliates in the post‐adoption period (starting from 2015). We do not, however, find robust evidence of a significant change in the consolidated book effective tax rates among the affected banks. Our findings suggest that increased transparency from public country‐by‐country reporting can deter tax‐motivated income shifting but that it did not appear to materially influence the banks' overall tax avoidance. Our findings have policy implications for the ongoing debate between the European Parliament, the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development, and accounting standard‐setting bodies on whether to require multinationals to publish country‐by‐country reports.

We analyze survey responses from nearly 600 corporate tax executives to investigate firms' incentives and disincentives for tax planning. While many researchers hypothesize that reputational concerns affect the degree to which managers engage in tax planning, this hypothesis is difficult to test with archival data. Our survey allows us to investigate reputational influences and, indeed, we find that reputational concerns are important—69 percent of executives rate reputation as important and the factor ranks second in order of importance among all factors explaining why firms do not adopt a potential tax planning strategy. We also find that financial accounting incentives play a role. For example, 84 percent of publicly traded firms respond that top management at their company cares at least as much about the GAAP ETR as they do about cash taxes paid and 57 percent of public firms say that increasing earnings per share is an important outcome from a tax planning strategy. JEL Classifications: D83; G31, M41. Data Availability: Survey responses are confidential. Other data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

We study whether, and more importantly, through what mechanisms, quasi-indexers affect portfolio firms’ tax planning by employing the discontinuity in quasi-indexer ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 index cutoff. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that higher quasi-indexer ownership leads to greater tax saving. With respect to the mechanisms, we find that the greater tax saving is a result of a focus on improved overall firm performance, not a specific focus on improved tax planning. We further find that the documented tax saving effect is partially due to quasi-indexers’ influences on executive equity incentives, corporate governance, and information environment.

This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. AAER content analysis reinforces this conclusion.

We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management in U.S. corporations. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives' horizon incentives and using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives' horizon and influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal governance and to various approaches used to address potential endogeneity, including a difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate executives' contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker when the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher, and is stronger in the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how the members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality.

We investigate the association between financial constraints and cash savings generated through tax planning. We predict that an increase in financial constraints leads firms to increase internally generated funds via tax planning. We measure financial constraints based on changes in firm-specific and macroeconomic measures. We find that firms facing increases in financial constraints exhibit increases in cash tax planning. Our results indicate that among profitable firms, firm-years with the largest increases in firm-specific constraints are associated with declines in firms' cash effective tax rates ranging from 3.00 to 5.14 percent, which equate to between 2.87 and 4.82 percent of operating cash flows. We also find that (1) the impact of financial constraints on tax planning is greatest among firms with low cash reserves, and (2) constrained firms achieve a substantial portion of their current tax savings via deferral-based tax planning strategies, despite the lack of a financial statement benefit. JEL Classifications: E69; H25; H60. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.

We investigate why temporary book-tax differences appear to serve as a useful signal of earnings persistence (Hanlon 2005). We first test and show that temporary book-tax differences provide incremental information over the magnitude of accruals for the persistence of earnings and accruals. We then opine that there are multiple potential sources of large positive book-tax differences. We predict and find that firms with large positive book-tax differences likely arising from upward earnings management (tax avoidance) exhibit lower (higher) earnings and accruals persistence than do other firms with large positive book-tax differences. Finally, we find significant variation in current-period earnings and accruals response coefficients and insignificant hedge returns in period t+1, consistent with investors being able to look through to the source of large positive book-tax differences (earnings management and tax avoidance), allowing them to correctly price the persistence of accruals for these subsamples. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the study.

We examine the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trading under the assumption that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism. We document that insider purchase profitability, but not sales profitability, is significantly higher on average in more tax aggressive firms. We also find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms with more effective monitoring and is accentuated for firms with a more opaque information environment. In addition, we provide empirical evidence that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sales volume in the fiscal year prior to a stock price crash. Finally, we find that the association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability weakens after the introduction of FIN 48, consistent with the increased transparency of tax positions under the new disclosure requirement reducing insiders' information advantage and hence their ability to profit from insider trading. To the extent that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism, our results are consistent with managers exploiting the opacity arising from tax aggressive activities to extract rent from shareholders, particularly those shareholders who sold their shares to the managers. Our findings are particularly important in light of the number of studies relying on the agency view of tax avoidance to develop arguments or to draw inferences.