Event studies often include cross-sectional regressions of announcement effects on exogenous variables. If the event is voluntary and investors are rational, then standard OLS and GLS estimators are inconsistent. Consistent ML estimators are constructed for a cross-sectional model of horizontal mergers relating announcement effects to exogenous characteristics of firms and industries. The OLS and ML estimates differ dramatically for bidders but not for targets. The evidence suggests that managers of bidders, but not targets, have valuable private information about the potential synergies from proposed mergers.

Using firm-level data from 52 countries we investigate how a country’s institutions and business environment affect firm’s organizational choices and what impact the organizational form has on access to finance and growth. We find that businesses are more likely to choose the corporate form in countries with developed financial sectors and efficient legal systems, strong shareholder and creditor rights, low regulatory burdens and corporate taxes and efficient bankruptcy processes. Corporations report fewer financing, legal and regulatory obstacles than unincorporated firms and this advantage is greater in countries with more developed institutions and favourable business environments. We do find some evidence of higher growth of incorporated businesses in countries with good financial and legal institutions.

In a recent article, MacMinn [5] argues that the presence of forward markets eliminates the incentives of the firm's manager to choose production levels that maximize firm value. In this comment, we show that his results do not depend on the presence of forward markets. The critical assumptions are that the manager is endowed with money rather than stock in the firm and that there is no competitive labor market for managers. In addition, his results require time‐inconsistent behavior on the part of the firm's manager.

We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of the acquisition. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions tend to retain more acquired plants. Retained plants increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. These results suggest that acquirers restructure targets in ways that exploit their comparative advantage.

This study uses a new data set to assess whether capital structure theory is portable across countries with different institutional structures. We analyze capital structure choices of firms in 10 developing countries, and provide evidence that these decisions are affected by the same variables as in developed countries. However, there are persistent differences across countries, indicating that specific country factors are at work. Our findings suggest that although some of the insights from modern finance theory are portable across countries, much remains to be done to understand the impact of different institutional features on capital structure choices.

We document that public firms participate more than private firms as buyers and sellers of assets in merger waves and their participation is affected more by credit spreads and aggregate market valuation. Public firm acquisitions realize higher gains in productivity, particularly for on‐the‐wave acquisitions and when the acquirer's stock is liquid and highly valued. Our results are not driven solely by public firms' better access to capital. Using productivity data from early in the firm's life, we find that better private firms subsequently select to become public. Initial size and productivity predict asset purchases and sales 10 and more years later.