Journal Article Spatial Competition and the Core Get access Jonathan H. Hamilton, Jonathan H. Hamilton University of Florida Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar W. Bentley MacLeod, W. Bentley MacLeod Universite de Montreal Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jacques-François Thisse Jacques-François Thisse CORE and Virginia Polytechnic Institute Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 106, Issue 3, August 1991, Pages 925–937, https://doi.org/10.2307/2937934 Published: 01 August 1991

ABSTRACT We study the price elasticity of demand for the common stock of an individual corporation. Despite the prevelance of assumptions that demand is perfectly elastic, there is little if any direct evidence in the literature to either support or reject that contention. Consistent with the notion of finite price elasticities, we find that the announcement of primary stock offerings by regulated firms depresses their stock prices and little if any evidence that this decline is the result of adverse information about future cash flows. Attempts to relate offer announcement effects directly to possible determinants of price elasticities, however, are inconclusive.

ABSTRACT This paper examines why, in contrast to the predictions of finance theory, firms do not call convertible debt when the conversion price exceeds the call price. The empirical results suggest that the principal reason is because some firms enjoy an advantage of paying less in after‐tax interest than they would pay in dividends were the bond converted. This cash flow incentive is the inverse of an investor's incentive to convert voluntarily if the converted dividends are greater than the bond's coupon. Because of taxation, however, the decisions by investors and firms are not symmetric, and there exist bonds which the firm may not call and an investor will not convert. The results also find that voluntary conversion is significantly related to both the conversion price and the differential between the coupon and the dividends on the converted stock.

The authors study the price elasticity of demand for the common stock of an individual corporation. Despite the prevalance of assumptions that demand is perfectly elastic, there is little, if any, direct evidence in the literature to either support or reject that contention. Consistent with the notion of finite price elasticities, the authors find that the announcement of primary stock offerings by regulated firms depresses their stock prices and little, if any, evidence that this decline is the result of adverse information about future cash flows. Attempts to relate offer announcement effects directly to possible determinants of price elasticities, however, are inconclusive.

The authors investigate the importance of bid-ask spread-induced biases on event date returns as exemplified by seasoned equity offerings by NYSE listed firms. They document significant negative return biases on the offering day, which explain a large portion of the negative event date returns documented in the literature. Buy-sell order flow imbalance is prominent around the offering and induces a relatively large spread bias. If order imbalances are suspected, the researcher can use returns calculated from the midpoint of the closing bid and ask quotes instead of returns calculated from closing transaction prices to avoid this return bias.

The authors provide evidence that taxes affect equity valuation by studying British investment trusts having otherwise identical classes of cash- and stock-dividend-paying shares outstanding. The authors study 1969-82, a period in which there were two dramatic changes in tax policy. They find that stock-dividend shares, which are convertible into cash-dividend shares, sell at premiums when the tax system favors capital gains and at discounts when the tax advantage of capital gains is reduced. After the 1975 elimination of the tax advantage to stock-dividend shares, the authors observe that investors convert virtually all stock-dividend shares into cash-dividend shares.