This paper suggests a new procedure for evaluating the fit of a dynamic structural economic model. The procedure begins by augmenting the variables in the model with just enough stochastic error so that the model can exactly match the second moments of the actual data. Measures of fit for the model can then be constructed on the basis of the size of this error. The procedure is applied to a standard real business cycle model. Over the business cycle frequencies, the model must be augmented with a substantial error to match data for the postwar U.S. economy. Lower bounds on the variance of the error range from 40 percent to 60 percent of the variance in the actual data.

In this paper, we use the relative moments in bank loans and commercial paper to provide evidence on the existence of a loan-supply channel of monetary-policy transmission. We find that tighter monetary policy leads to a shift in firms' mix of external financing: commercial paper issuance rises while bank loans fall. This suggests that contractionary policy can indeed reduce loan supply. Furthermore, such shifts in loan supply seem to affect investment, even controlling for interest rates and output.

Neil Bania, Randall W. Eberts, Michael S. Fogarty, Universities and the Startup of New Companies: Can We Generalize from Route 128 and Silicon Valley?, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Nov., 1993), pp. 761-766

The Energy Modeling Forum working group 12 specified 13 standardized scenarios reflecting a range of carbon emission-control levels, as well as sensitivities on key standardized inputs. These scenarios were ultimately implemented by 14 modeling teams employing a wide variety of technoeconomic models, although not every model could implement every scenario. In addition to these model comparisons, ten study groups were formed to analyze issues not being addressed by the 14 models and 13 scenarios. These groups used additional models and methods to analyze issues not addressed in the 13 original scenarios.

We estimate a dynamic two-country model in which economic fluctuations are driven by a worldwide supply shock, country-specific supply shocks, and relative fiscal, money, and preference shocks. Identification is achieved using only long-run restrictions, based on a theoretical model. The main results, are: (i) supply shocks, particularly country-specific ones, are very important in generating international business cycles, (ii) although the post-1973 flexible-exchange-rate period has been inherently more volatile, there are no differences in transmission properties of economic disturbances across exchange-rate regimes for the endogenous variables we focus on.

This paper provides experimental evidence on forward induction as a refinement criterion. In the basic extensive form, one of the two players chooses to play a battle-of-the-sexes game or to receive a certain payoff. According to forward induction, choosing to play the game is a signal about intended action. Though the presence of the outside option changes play, we find only limited support for the forward-induction hypothesis. The effects of the outside option also reflect the creation of a focal point through the asymmetry created by offering the outside option to one of the two players.

We explain the use of legally unenforceable, discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible. A discretionary contract allows a contracting party to choose whether or not to honor the contract. It is shown that such a contract liquefies reputational capital by permitting it to be depreciated in exchange for the preservation of financial capital and information reusability in financially impaired states. In addition, discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation. This explains discretion among highly confident letters, holding-company relationships, mutual-fund contracts, bank loan commitments, and other financial and nonfinancial contracts.

Forward and spot exchange rates between major currencies imply large standard deviations of both predictable returns from currency speculation and of the equilibrium price measure (the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution). Representative agent theory with time-additive preferences cannot account for either of these properties. The authors show that the theory does considerably better along these dimensions when the representative agent's preferences exhibit habit persistence but that the theory fails to reproduce some of the other properties of the data–in particular, the strong autocorrelation of forward premiums.

ABSTRACT This study tests the tax‐induced trading hypothesis as an explanation of the turn‐of‐the‐year anomaly using Canadian and U.S. intraday data. Since the Canadian tax year‐end precedes the calendar year‐end by five business days, tax effects may be isolated. We find the anomaly is related to the degree of seller‐and buyer‐initiated trading and depends upon the incidence of the taxation year‐end. Seller‐initiated transactions (at bid prices) dominate until the tax year‐end after which buyer‐initiated trades (at ask prices) dominate. The anomaly is a function of bid‐ask prices.

This study tests the tax-induced trading hypothesis as an explanation of the turn-of-the-year anomaly using Canadian and U.S. intraday data. Since the Canadian tax year-end precedes the calendar year-end by five business days, tax effects may be isolated. We find the anomaly is related to the degree of seller-and buyer-initiated trading and depends upon the incidence of the taxation year-end. Seller-initiated transactions (at bid prices) dominate until the tax year-end after which buyer-initiated trades (at ask prices) dominate. The anomaly is a function of bid-ask prices.