Oversight responsibilities for many audit committees (ACs) are evolving to include some of the hottest topics in the boardroom: enterprise risk management, cybersecurity, and environmental, social, and governance reporting. However, certain ACs avoid overseeing these evolving areas, creating significant variation across boards in the assignment of responsibilities. In this study, we seek to understand how ACs respond when environmental changes create new evolving risks that may extend the boundary of their traditional domain. To do so, we interview a diverse set of 29 AC members from U.S. publicly traded companies. We analyze our data through the theoretical lens of collaborative boundary work to identify how ACs respond by extending, blurring, or maintaining their perceived oversight boundaries, the related implications of these decisions, and their key tactics employed to manage AC workload. Our findings should be of interest to boards, investors, and regulators tasked with monitoring AC effectiveness.

Creativity drives profit in an idea economy, and many companies organize teams to facilitate creativity. This paper investigates the strategic deployment of individuals to boost a team’s creativity. More individualistic team members tend to generate highly original ideas yet are less likely to share these ideas. We theorize that adding a connector—an individual strongly predisposed to form and foster relationships—to a team will enable more idea sharing among individualistic team members, thus increasing the likelihood that the team’s creative potential will be realized. We leverage a new conceptualization of the “connector” construct to identify connectors and then use an experiment to study the impact of their presence or absence on team creative performance. Our results support these predictions and suggest that connectors improve team creativity by enabling others to share in the creative process and not because connectors themselves exhibit greater creative performance than their average peer. Data Availability: The data reported in the paper are available from the authors.

There is limited evidence about when, why, and which individuals incur costs to acquire nonpublic information about a firm, largely due to the difficulty of observing private information acquisition. To overcome this difficulty, we obtain data on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We predict and find that perceived information asymmetry between managers and outsiders resulting from both proprietary and agency costs triggers FOIA search. We categorize organizations making FOIA requests using their business descriptions and find that many, including law and intellectual property firms, are not expressly interested in obtaining information for near-term equity trading. Instead, their search activity relates to determinants beyond financial characteristics, including patent litigation and executive turnover. Taken together, we provide evidence on private information search by a relatively unexamined set of organizations and shed new light on the function of the SEC’s Office of FOIA Services.

We investigate whether firms manage stock prices in anticipation of share issuance. Warrant exercise results in share issuance and warrant expiration dates are fixed years in advance, which precludes market timing. We predict firms manage stock prices to prevent (induce) warrant exercise when exercise is dilutive (anti-dilutive) to existing shareholders. To test our prediction, we examine stock returns around warrant expiration dates. We find that the difference between out-of-the-money (OTM) and in-the-money (ITM) firms' return patterns (i.e., post-expiration minus pre-expiration returns) is positive, and OTM (ITM) firms' return pattern is positive (negative). Return patterns of three sets of pseudo warrant firms differ from patterns of warrant firms. Return patterns are stronger when more feasible price changes are required to affect warrant expiration status, and firm-issued news items is a mechanism for price management. Thus, our findings provide evidence that firms engage in stock price management in anticipation of share issuance.

Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment by Glenn W. Harrison, Eric Johnson, Melayne M. McInnes and E. Elisabet Rutström. Published in volume 95, issue 3, pages 897-901 of American Economic Review, June 2005

In 2011, Colombia instituted a tax on repayment of bank loans, which increased the cost of short‐term bank credit more than long‐term credit. Firms responded by cutting short‐term loans for liquidity management purposes and increasing the use of cash and trade credit. In industries in which trade credit is more accessible (based on U.S. Compustat firms), we find substitution into accounts payable and little effect on cash and investment. Where trade credit is less available, firms increase cash and cut investment. Thus, trade credit provides an alternative source of liquidity that can insulate some firms from bank liquidity shocks.

Even though stock returns are not highly autocorrelated, there is a spurious regression bias in predictive regressions for stock returns related to the classic studies of Yule (1926) and Granger and Newbold (1974) . Data mining for predictor variables interacts with spurious regression bias. The two effects reinforce each other, because more highly persistent series are more likely to be found significant in the search for predictor variables. Our simulations suggest that many of the regressions in the literature, based on individual predictor variables, may be spurious.

We investigate changes in the quality and cost of audit services surrounding PCAOB Rule 3211, which requires disclosure of audit partner names in Form AP. To isolate changes due to Rule 3211 from other confounding factors, we use difference-in-differences analyses with separate control groups, including a group of companies that disclosed partner identities prior to Rule 3211. Our study also incorporates several measures from prior literature to proxy for various dimensions of audit quality. Evidence from the difference-in-differences analyses reveals that any immediate impact of Rule 3211 on audit quality or fees is limited to specific dimensions of audit quality, specific control groups, and/or specific company characteristics. We reach this conclusion after considering alternative research designs and evaluating confidence intervals for statistically insignificant coefficients. We caution that our findings only provide initial evidence and further research is necessary to evaluate other potential impacts of Rule 3211.

In recent years, many companies have emphasized adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in their quarterly press releases. While managers use different names to describe these nonstandard earnings metrics, the financial press frequently refers to them as “pro forma” earnings. Managers and other advocates of pro forma reporting argue that these disclosures provide a clearer picture of companies' core earnings. On the other hand, regulators, policymakers, and the financial press often allege that managers' pro forma earnings disclosures are opportunistic attempts to mislead investors. Recent evidence suggests that while many pro forma earnings disclosures are altruistically motivated, some may represent managers' attempts to portray overly optimistic financial performance. If this is the case, then less wealthy, less sophisticated, individual investors are arguably the most at risk of being misled. Consequently, this study investigates who trades on pro forma earnings information. Our intraday investigation of transactions around earnings announcements containing pro forma earnings information reveals that less sophisticated investors' announcement-period abnormal trading is significantly positively associated with the magnitude and direction of the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings. In contrast, we find no association between sophisticated investors' trading and manager-reported pro forma information. Overall, our analyses and numerous robustness tests suggest that the segment of the market that relies on pro forma earnings information is populated predominantly by less sophisticated individual investors. This evidence is particularly relevant to standard-setters and regulators given that Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and subsequent SEC regulations are specifically designed to protect ordinary investors from misleading pro forma information.