This study examines how the market share of dark venues changes at earnings announcements. Our analysis shows a statistically significant increase in dark market share in the weeks prior to, during, and following the earnings announcement. We also predict and find evidence that increases in dark market share around earnings announcements are higher for firms with high-quality accounting information. In addition, we find a positive relation between the change in dark market share and the speed of resolution of investor disagreement—a key dimension of informational efficiency, which suggests that dark trading is associated with an improvement in market quality. How market fragmentation changes around news events, the role accounting information plays in market fragmentation, and how changes in market fragmentation relate to market quality can help provide insights to securities regulators.

Reviews several books. "Secrets of the Tax Revolt," by James Ring Adams; "Financial Statement Analysis: Theory, Application, and Interpretation," 3rd ed., by Leopold A. Bernstein; "Perspectives in Auditing," 4th ed., by D.R. Carmichael and John J. Willingham; "Tax Shelter Alternatives: Measuring the Risks," by Michael N. Fitzerald.

Using a large sample of institutional investors’ investments in private equity funds raised between 1991 and 2011, we estimate the extent to which investors’ skill affects their returns. Bootstrap analyses show that the variance of actual performance is higher than would be expected by chance, suggesting that some investors consistently outperform. Extending the Bayesian approach of Korteweg and Sorensen, we estimate that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in skill leads to an increase in annual returns of between one and two percentage points. These results are stronger in the earlier part of the sample period and for venture funds.

Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect , cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history‐dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze both theoretically and empirically the effect of selected government regulations on a high‐risk personal loan market. Unlike previous studies, which have generally relied on a loosely specified theory and then tested this theory with statewide aggregate data, our analysis is based on a more tightly specified model for individual loans which is then tested using statewide disaggregated data. The empirical results indicate that the regulatory effects are not only significant but consistent with our theoretical microeconomic model.

We examine multi-generational impacts of positive in utero health interventions using a new research design that exploits sharp increases in prenatal Medicaid eligibility that occurred in some states. Our analyses are based on U.S. Vital Statistics Natality files, which enables linkages between individuals' early life Medicaid exposure and the next generation's health at birth. We find evidence that the health benefits associated with treated generations' early life program exposure extend to later offspring. Our results suggest that the returns on early life health investments may be substantively underestimated.

The workhorse open-economy macro model suggests that capital inflows are contractionary because they appreciate the currency and reduce net exports. Emerging market policy makers, however, believe that inflows lead to credit booms and rising output; the evidence appears to go their way. To reconcile theory and reality, we extend the set of assets in the Mundell-Fleming model to include both bonds and non-bonds. At a given policy rate, inflows may decrease the rate on non-bonds, stimulating financial intermediation and, potentially, output as well. We explore the implications, and find support for the key predictions in the data.