Little is known about how the demographic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we investigate how age, gender, and educational composition of executive teams affect the portfolio risk of financial institutions. Using difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements for the entire population of German bank executive officers, we demonstrate that younger executive teams increase portfolio risk, as do board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives, although this latter effect is weaker in terms of both statistical and economic significance. In contrast, when board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, portfolio risk declines.

We study the effects of regulatory interventions and capital support (bailouts) on banks’ liquidity creation. We rely on instrumental variables to deal with possible endogeneity concerns. Our key findings, which are based on a unique supervisory German dataset, are that regulatory interventions robustly trigger decreases in liquidity creation, while capital support does not affect liquidity creation. Additional results include the effects of these actions on different components of liquidity creation, lending, and risk taking. Our findings provide new and important insights into the debates about the design of regulatory interventions and bailouts.

We review research on the effects of banks on the real economy, including, but not limited to articles in this Special Issue of the Journal of Corporate Finance. We focus primarily on US and European policy interventions that provide quasi-natural experiments with relatively exogenous shocks to bank output. We concentrate on single-country settings, avoiding potentially confounding differences in language, culture, law, currency, and so on, that complicate cross-country investigations. We also largely avoid the effects of financial crises, which are not exogenous to the banking system. The evidence strongly suggests positive effects of banks on the real economy.

This paper investigates the effects of focus versus diversification on bank performance using data on Chinese banks during the 1996–2006 period. We construct a new measure, economies of diversification, and compare the results to those of the more conventional focus indices, which are based on the sum of squares of shares in different products or regions. Diversification is captured in four dimensions: loans, deposits, assets, and geography. We find that all four dimensions of diversification are associated with reduced profits and higher costs. These results are robust regardless of alternative measures of diversification and performance. Furthermore, we observe that banks with foreign ownership (both majority and minority ownership) and banks with conglomerate affiliation are associated with fewer diseconomies of diversification, suggesting that foreign ownership and conglomerate affiliation may play important mitigating roles. This analysis may provide important implications for bank managers and regulators in China as well as in other emerging economies.

The literature demonstrates numerous consequences of bank geographic deregulation, but neglects bank capital structure – critical to performance, resilience, and prudential regulation/supervision. We supply first-time evidence on geographic deregulation effects on bank capital. We also distinguish and test two novel mechanisms through which geographic deregulation may affect bank behavior. The competitive defense and competitive offense mechanisms differentiate deregulation effects in increasing external competitive pressures on banks versus expanding banks’ capacity to compete externally. We find statistically and economically significant evidence of geographic deregulation effects on two bank capital management tools – target capital ratios and speeds of adjustment to these targets – yielding higher targets and faster adjustment. Findings are robust to addressing identification concerns using dynamic panel methodology, a gravity-deregulation approach, and time-varying bank-specific instruments. The data also support both the competitive defense and competitive offense mechanisms, suggesting future research and policy applications of these mechanisms to banking and more generally.

Despite the growth of Islamic banks (IBs), little is known about their liquidity creation performance and financial stability consequences relative to conventional banks (CBs). We address these issues using data from 24 countries over 2000–2014. We find IBs create more liquidity per unit of assets than CBs, primarily on the asset side of the balance sheet. Results are economically significant, econometrically robust, hold in high- and low-income countries, and during the Global Financial Crisis and other times. In addition, CB liquidity creation results in reduced national financial stability, particularly in high-income countries, whereas IB liquidity creation does not.

We examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on bank liquidity hoarding. We create a comprehensive measure of bank liquidity hoarding that takes into account asset-, liability-, and off-balance sheet activities. Using over one million bank-quarter observations, we find that in response to EPU, banks hoard liquidity overall and through all three components. This behavior is more pronounced for banks with less liquidity, more peer-bank spillover effects, and more EPU exposure. Additional analyses of interest rate spreads on several bank products suggest that our findings reflect at least in part bank choices, rather than just the reactions of customers.

A key issue in the finance-growth nexus literature is endogeneity – economic growth may drive finance as well as finance driving growth. Some research addresses endogeneity using relatively exogenous shocks from U.S. bank geographic deregulation, often documenting favorable economic effects. We connect deregulation shocks for the first time to individual firm growth in a model that differentiates sources of external financing – short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity. Our results suggest that deregulation increases firm growth overall and this growth is fueled by all three external funding sources. However, benefits accrue only to relatively financially unconstrained firms, while relatively constrained firms lose.