The authors provide evidence that the spread between commodity spot and futures prices (the basis) reflects the macroeconomic risks common to all asset markets. The basis of many commodities is correlated with the stock index dividend yield and corporate bond quality spread. Explanatory power is related to exposure to macroeconomic fluctuations: about 40 percent of the variation in the basis of a portfolio of commodities with high business cycle sensitivity is explained by the stock and bond yields. Further diagnostics indicate that these associations are largely due to the presence of risk premiums, rather than spot price forecasts, in the basis.

The authors derive low frequency, say weekly, models implied by high frequency, say daily, ARMA models with symmetric GARCH errors. They show that low frequency models exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity of the GARCH form as well. The parameters in the conditional variance equation of the low frequency model depend upon mean, variance, and kurtosis parameters of the corresponding high frequency model. Moreover, strongly consistent estimators of the parameters in the high frequency model can be derived from low frequency data. The common assumption in applications that rescaled innovations are independent is disputable, since it depends upon the available data frequency. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

In most times and places, women on average marry older men. We propose a partial explanation for this difference and for why it is diminishing. In a society in which the economic roles of males are more varied than the roles of females, the relative desirability of females as marriage partners may become evident at an earlier age than is the case for males. We study an equilibrium model in which the males who regard their prospects as unusually good choose to wait until their economic success is revealed before choosing a bride. In equilibrium, the most desirable young females choose successful older males. Young males who believe that time will not treat them kindly will offer to marry at a young age. Although they are aware that young males available for marriage are no bargain, the less desirable young females will be offered no better option than the lottery presented by marrying a young male. We show the existence of equilibrium for models of this type and explore the properties of equilibrium.

Abstract Positive theory hypothesizes that accounting-based debt covenants are important factors in accounting choices. According to Watts and Zimmerman's (1990) survey, this hypothesis has generally been supported by earlier studies. That is, the closer the firm is to violating accounting covenants, the more likely managers would choose income-increasing methods. Recently, research attention has shifted to the event of covenant violation itself. For example, Beneish and Press (1993) estimate debtors' costs of violations. Further, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) and Sweeney (1992) examine debtors' manipulative behavior before covenant violations. These latter studies find that violations of accounting covenants are costly to debtors, who generally try to manipulate accounting numbers to avoid or defer technical defaults. The present study also focuses on the event of violation, but from the perspective of creditors. It explains two aspects of creditors' decision process following covenant violations. First, we find that creditors react to actual violations in two distinct ways: they could either waive the violations or could demand certain conditions such as early payment, increase of interest rate, reduction of borrowing base, and so forth. Second, we also model creditors' decisions either to waive or to call the debt using the option-pricing framework. We hypothesize that the determinants of waiver decisions include `the firm's bankruptcy probability and leverage ratio. Moreover, maturity, size, and security of the debt issue involved should also be important factors in the waiver decisions. Empirically, we find that creditors are more likely to grant a waiver to the firm with a lower estimated probability of bankruptcy and a lower leverage ratio. Further, debt issues that are secured or smaller in size are more likely to have violations waived than unsecured or larger issues. The maturity variable, however, is not found a significant determinant of the waiver decisions. Using the factors identified in this study, managers can assess the probability of receiving a waiver and prepare necessary strategies to ensure the firm's survival. Auditors also can use those factors to assess the possibility of the client's receiving a waiver of covenant violation as part of their evaluation of the firm's ability to continue as a going concern. Moreover, since debtors prefer waivers to nonwaivers, the prospect of receiving a waiver is likely to influence managerial behavior, including the choice of accounting alternatives. Managers expecting a nonwaiver from creditors would have more incentive to select accounting methods to avoid covenant violations.

The steady state and transitional dynamics of two-sector models of endogenous growth are analyzed in this paper. We describe necessary conditions for endogenous growth. The conditions allow us to reduce the dynamics of the solution to a system with one state-like and two control-like variables. We analyze the determinants of the long run growth rate. We use the Time-Elimination Method to analyze the transitional dynamics of the models. We find that there are transitions in real time if the point-in-time production possibility frontier is strictly concave, which occurs, for example, if the two production functions are different or if there are decreasing point-in-time returns in any of the sectors. We also show that if the models have a transition in real time, the models are globally saddle path stable. We find that the wealth or consumption smoothing effect tends to dominate the substitution or real wage effect so that the transition from relatively low levels of physical capital is carried over through high work effort rather than high savings. We develop some empirical implications. We show that the models predict conditional convergence in that, in a cross section, the growth rate is predicted to be negatively related to initial income but only after some measure of human capital is held constant. Thus, the models are consistent with existing empirical cross country evidence.

This paper presents a strategic model of temporarily high leverage. When the repayment of senior claims depends in part upon further investment, shareholders may be able to alter credibly their incentives to invest through an exchange of junior debt for equity and thereby force concessions from senior creditors. We focus on the conflict between shareholders and risk-averse workers and show that this strategic use of debt leads to an inefficient allocation of risk. We characterize conditions under which firms will undergo leveraged recapitalizations, their choice of debt instruments, and the dynamics of their capital structure.

This article focuses on the use of incentive regulation in the telephone industry in the United States. We first characterize some of the difficulties that have led regulators to move away from traditional rate-ofreturn (cost-based) regulation and toward systems of regulation that provide incentives for increasingly efficient production, allowing firms to share in the social gains from efficiency with increased profits. We then discuss the basic structure of incentive regulation as it has most commonly been adopted in the telephone industry in the United States. The first is price-cap (PC) regulation, which typically allows the firm to