Many experiments have found that participants take more investment risk if they see returns less frequently, see portfolio-level returns (rather than each individual asset's returns), or see long-horizon (rather than one-year) historical return distributions. In contrast, we find that such information aggregation treatments do not affect total equity investment when we make the investment environment more realistic than in prior experiments. Previously documented aggregation effects are not robust to changes in the risky asset's return distribution or the introduction of a multi-day delay between portfolio choice and return realizations.

Using bond downgrades as external shocks to life insurers’ asset risk, we document several findings of the impact of organizational structure and risk factors on investment risk taking. First, we find that mutual insurers and widely-held stock insurers are more likely to sell downgraded bonds than are closely-held stock insurers. Second, we find evidence that insurers are less likely to sell downgraded bonds that remain in the same rating class than bonds downgraded to a lower rating class. The result implies that insurers sell downgraded bonds mainly because of additional capital charge is imposed, not because of downgrade itself. In other words, risk factors in risk-based capital regulation do matter on life insurers’ investment risk taking. Finally, we find that life insurers might be reluctant to sell downgraded bonds at fire-sale prices during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

We investigate the information content of stock correlation based network measures for systemic risk rankings, such as SIFIRank (based on Google’s PageRank). Using European banking data, we show that SIFIRank is empirically equivalent to a ranking based on average pairwise stock correlations as developed in this paper. The correlation based network measures complement currently available alternative systemic risk ranking methods based on book or market values. A further analytical investigation shows that the value-added appears to be mainly attributable to pairwise cross-sectional heterogeneity rather than to more subtle network relations and feedback loops.

ABSTRACT Concern about effective auditing of fair value measurements (FVMs) has risen in recent decades. Building on prior interview-based and experimental research, we provide an engagement-level analysis of challenging FVMs, using quantitative and qualitative data on audit phases from risk assessment to booking adjustments. Challenging FVMs have high estimation uncertainty, high subjectivity, significant/complex assumptions, and multiple valuation techniques. Estimation uncertainty is associated with higher inherent risk assessments, which are, in turn, predictive of client problems identified during the engagement. The use of a valuation specialist by auditors, associated with higher inherent risk and client specialist use, is a key decision: procedures performed by specialists have the highest yield in identifying problems. Auditor-client discussion of an adjustment increases with problem identification and auditors' expressions of residual concern about uncertainty post-testing. However, booked audit adjustments are infrequent; the only factors explaining income-decreasing adjustments are better evidential support and breadth of problems identified.

ABSTRACT The PCAOB recently considered implementing mandatory audit firm rotation in hopes of better aligning auditors' interests with investors' interests, suggesting that the PCAOB views long auditor tenure as problematic. However, the accounting profession argues that long tenure actually improves audit quality. This study provides insight into investors' views by evaluating the market's reaction to events related to the potential adoption of rotation that occurred between 2011 and 2013. The results provide some evidence that the market reacts negatively (positively) to events that increased (decreased) the likelihood of rotation, although these results are sensitive to the market index used to calculate abnormal returns. More importantly, particularly given the lack of a U.S.-specific control group, cross-sectional tests provide strong evidence that the market reaction is more negative (positive) on dates that increased (decreased) the likelihood of rotation given longer auditor tenure. Moreover, we also find that the market reaction is more negative (positive) on dates that increased (decreased) the likelihood of rotation given a Big 4 auditor. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

The accepted manuscript version (last revised 5 Jan 2018 (v8)) has 118 pages, 3 tables, 11 figures, and includes supplementary appendix. This version corrects some typos in Example 2 of the published version. This supplement contains 11 appendices with additional results and some omitted proofs. Appendices F-J include additional results for Sections 2-7, respectively. Appendix K gathers auxiliary results on algebra of covering entropies. Appendices L and M contain the proofs of Sections 4 and 5 omitted from the main text. Appendix N contains the proofs of Sections 6 omitted from the main text, together with the proofs of the additional results for Section 6 in Appendix I. Appendix O reports the results of a simulation experiment.

We attempted to replicate 67 macroeconomic papers using author-provided data and code files by following a preanalysis plan. Excluding 6 papers that used confidential data, we obtained data and code replication files for 29 of 35 papers (83 percent) that were required to provide such files as a condition of publication, compared to 11 of 26 papers (42 percent) that were not required to provide such files. Also excluding the 2 papers that used software we did not possess, we replicated 29 of 59 papers (49 percent) with assistance from the authors. We conclude with recommendations on improving replication of economics research.

This paper studies a quantitative general equilibrium model of housing. The model has two key elements not previously considered in existing quantitative macro studies of housing finance: aggregate business cycle risk and a realistic wealth distribution driven in the model by bequest heterogeneity in preferences. These features of the model play a crucial role in the following results. First, a relaxation of financing constraints leads to a large boom in house prices. Second, the boom in house prices is entirely the result of a decline in the housing risk premium. Third, low interest rates cannot explain high home values.

This paper estimates the impact of globalization on markups, and the effect of changing markups on US welfare, in a monopolistic competition model. We work with symmetric translog preferences, which allow for endogenous markups and firm entry and exit, thereby changing product variety. We find that between 1992 and 2005, US import shares rose and US firms exited, leading to an implied fall in markups, while variety went up because of imports. US welfare rose by nearly 1 percent as a result of these changes, with product variety contributing one-half of that total and declining markups the other half.