Using within-loan estimations to remove the impact of demand-side factors, we find that the capital levels of banks participating in the same syndicated loan are positively associated with the banks’ contributions to the loan. Consistent with the argument that higher capital reduces the cost of uninsured debt, the positive effect of bank capital on lending is stronger among banks that rely more on wholesale funding. Furthermore, we find that banks increase their contributions to syndicated loans after receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funding. Taken together, we provide new evidence on the importance and causal effect of bank capital on lending.

We propose a new, price-based measure of information risk called abnormal idiosyncratic volatility (AIV) that captures information asymmetry faced by uninformed investors. AIV is the idiosyncratic volatility prior to information events in excess of normal levels. Using earnings announcements as information events, we show that AIV is positively associated with informed return run-ups, abnormal insider trading, short selling, and institutional trading during pre-earnings-announcement periods. We find that stocks with high AIV earn economically and statistically larger future returns than stocks with low AIV. Taken together, our findings support the notion that information risk is priced.

This study examines the role of investor sentiment in the pricing dynamics between the spot and futures markets. The empirical evidence suggests that investor sentiment has a positive impact on price volatility and the bid–ask spread on both the spot and futures markets, which induces higher arbitrage risk and trading costs during high sentiment periods. Consequently, during high sentiment periods, informed traders become less willing to leverage their information advantages on the futures market, which diminishes the futures markets’ leading informational role and contributions to price discovery. Our findings provide support for the theory of limits to arbitrage.

This study examines the properties of innovation disclosures contained in new product announcements, a form of voluntary, nonfinancial disclosure. We analyze these properties using a novel, text-based measure of the extent of product innovation disclosed in new product announcements. We find that stock prices react more positively to announcements with more extensive innovation disclosure. In our main analyses, we first find that a higher level of innovation disclosure predicts a greater increase in future sales. We further find that this predictive ability falls when managers have stronger incentives to maximize their wealth and when the corporate governance structure and customers’ bargaining power weaken. Our research enhances the understanding of the properties of managerial voluntary, nonfinancial disclosures and contributes a text-based measure of innovation that captures managerial assessment of the extent of product innovation. This new measure is more generalizable and incrementally informative for firm value and future performance than conventional innovation measures that depend on the existence of patents or research and development expenses.

We propose a Cramér–von Mises–type test for testing whether the mean potential outcome given a specific treatment level has a weakly monotonic relationship with the continuous treatment under unconfoundedness. To flexibly control for a possibly high-dimensional set of covariates, our test is based on a double debiased machine learning method. We show that our test controls asymptotic size and is consistent against any fixed alternative. We apply our test to evaluate the Job Corps program and reject a weakly negative relationship between the treatment (hours in academic and vocational training) and labor market performance among relatively low treatment values.

We examine how option compensation affects banks' risky mortgage origination and sale decisions before the financial crisis in 2008. We find that, in the period immediately before the financial crisis, option compensation has little impact on the riskiness of mortgages originated and is negatively associated with mortgage lenders' propensity to sell risky mortgages. The results are consistent with banks' incentives to maximize revenues from origination and servicing fees while managing risk exposure by adjusting the sale of risky mortgages. For identification, we use bank-year fixed effects and matched loan applications to control for both supply- and demand-side factors of mortgage lending. We find similar results when using the variation in option compensation generated by the implementation of FAS 123R.

We examine how management stock options affect corporate risk taking. We exploit exogenous variation in stock option grants generated by FAS 123R and use loan spreads to infer risk taking. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the spreads of loans taken by firms that did not expense options before FAS 123R (treated firms) significantly decrease after FAS 123R relative to firms that either did not issue stock options or voluntarily expensed stock options before 123R (control firms). We also find that the effect is stronger for firms with high agency conflicts associated with risk-shifting. Furthermore, loans taken by the treated firms are less likely to contain collateral requirements and are less likely to have covenants restricting capital investment post FAS 123R.

We examine the causal effect of limits to arbitrage on 11 well‐known asset pricing anomalies using the pilot program of Regulation SHO, which relaxed short‐sale constraints for a quasi‐random set of pilot stocks, as a natural experiment. We find that the anomalies became weaker on portfolios constructed with pilot stocks during the pilot period. The pilot program reduced the combined anomaly long–short portfolio returns by 72 basis points per month, a difference that survives risk adjustment with standard factor models. The effect comes only from the short legs of the anomaly portfolios.

Credit ratings group firms by risk, yet yields are shown to overlap between firms of adjacent ratings. We model this by considering the residual risk arising from differences in the parameters of each firm's value process for firms with the same rating. To do so, our framework simultaneously incorporates jump default with Markov-governed likelihoods and continuous defaults in a default-barrier framework. We provide closed-form approximations for expected default time and tail probabilities, and empirically fit the S-shaped yield curve, intra-rating spread, and inter-rating overlap. Results are robust to time period, rating system, sub-rating, and common characteristics such as liquidity.

The persistently large number of uninsured, roughly 40 million per year since 1993, continues to elicit bipartisan policy interest. Coverage-expansion proposals without mandates, by far the most common since the defeat of the Clinton plan, must address risk-pooling realities in private markets. Insurers have strong financial incentives to segment risks and minimize pooling of heterogeneous risks, and narrow risk-pooling will diminish the adequacy of premium subsidies based on income alone, at least for higher-risk individuals. The current debate over flat tax credits and the non-group market is a case in point (Blumberg, 2001; Center for Studying Health System Change, 2002; Jack Hadley and James D. Reschovsky, 2002). We, along with nine other teams, were asked to develop a proposal that would expand coverage in a large and creative way (see Holahan et al., 2001). The proposal we developed would subsidize low-income individuals and families but also addresses the issue of inefficient and inequitable risk-pooling.