For many years, social scientists have been interested in obtaining testable definitions of causality (Granger 1969, Sims 1972). Recent works include those of Chamberlain (1982) and Florens and Mouchart (1982). The present paper first clarifies the results of these latter papers by considering a unifying definition of noncausality. Then, log-likelihood ratio (LR) tests for noncausality are derived for qualitative panel data under the minimal assumption that one series is Markov. LR tests for the Markov property are also obtained. Both test statistics have closed forms. These tests thus provide a readily applicable procedure for testing noncausality on qualitative panel data. Finally, the tests are applied to French Business Survey data in order to test the hypothesis that price changes from period to period are strictly exogenous to disequilibria appearing within periods.

This paper develops a positive theory of credibility, ambiguity, and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information. The monetary policymaker maximizes his own (politically motivated) objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth. The relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time. His current preference trade-off is known to him but not to the public. When choosing the (state contingent) path of money growth for the present and the future, the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations. Current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker's objectives. Although expectations are rational, information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise. As a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors. The public becomes aware of changes gradually by.observing past monetary growth. Credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker. Credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker. Looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth. When the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero. The reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation. He leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention. This result provides an explanation for the Fed's preference for ambiguity, recently documented by Goodfriend (1986). The policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference. The paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation.

Reviews the book "Managing Foreign Exchange Exposure," by Donald H. Drury and Vihang R. Errunza.

[Previous studies concerning the relative accuracy of management and financial analyst earnings forecasts have produced conflicting conclusions. Resolving this conflicting evidence is important because of the role relative accuracy potentially plays in such issues as the imposition of mandatory management forecast disclosures, the information content of management versus analyst forecast releases, and the motive of management in providing earnings forecasts to the market. Using weekly consensus (mean) financial analyst earnings forecasts, we document a close association between relative forecast accuracy and the timing of the release of the forecasts. We find that management forecasts issued subsequently to, coincidentally with, and up to four weeks prior to analyst forecasts are significantly more accurate than the analysts' estimates. The consensus analyst forecasts are more accurate beginning the ninth week after the release of the management forecast. Thus, by more closely controlling for the timing of the analysts' forecasts, we are able to provide a more precise picture of the dynamic nature of relative forecast accuracy.]

Reviews the book "Electronic Spreadsheet Applications for Cost Accounting, Lotus 1-2-3/IBM PC," by Gaylord N. Smith.

Reviews the book "Internal Auditing: Directions and Opportunities," by Robert K. Mautz, Peter Tiessen and Robert H. Colson.

Previous studies concerning the relative accuracy of management and financial analyst earnings forecasts have produced conflicting conclusions. Resolving this conflicting evidence is important because of the role relative accuracy potentially plays in such issues as the imposition of mandatory management forecast disclosures, the information content of management versus analyst forecast releases, and the motive of management in providing earnings forecasts to the market. Using weekly consensus (mean) financial analyst earnings forecasts, we document a close association between relative forecast accuracy and the timing of the release of the forecasts. We find that management forecasts issued subsequently to, coincidentally with, and up to four weeks prior to analyst forecasts are significantly more accurate than the analysts' estimates. The consensus analyst forecasts are more accurate beginning the ninth week after the release of the management forecast. Thus, by more closely controlling for the timing of the analysts' forecasts, we are able to provide a more precise picture of the dynamic nature of relative forecast accuracy.

Reviews the book "Accounting With Lotus 1-2-3," by Kaz Ochi and Patricia J. Hughes.

Reviews the book "Montgomery's Auditing," 10th ed. by Philip L. Defliese, Henry R. Jaenicke, Jerry D. Sullivan and Richard A. Gnospelius.

Reviews the book "How Your Government Can Apply GAAP: An Ernst & Whinney Guide to Better Financial Reporting."