We examine whether and how managers use loan loss provisions to smooth income and to signal their private information about their banks' future prospects. Our paper highlights that the use of the loan loss provision to accomplish more than one objective gives rise to situation‐specific costs and benefits of manipulating the provision up or down. We hypothesize that relatively undervalued banks have greater incentives to signal their future prospects than fairly valued banks and that banks' incentives to smooth intensify as premanaged earnings deviate from norms. On the basis of these conjectures, we categorize sample banks into subgroups that are predicted to use loan loss provisions consistent with their situation‐specific incentives. This allows us to refine the research methods used in prior research to examine heterogeneous incentives. While we find evidence consistent with the use of loan loss provisions to smooth earnings, particularly when premanaged earnings are extreme, our evidence on signaling is less consistent. In particular, our signaling results depend on the introduction of an interaction term that has not been used in prior research. We also document that the intensity of smoothing (signaling) is not uniform across the sample. In addition to being a function of the incentive to smooth (signal), it also is a function of the incentive to signal (smooth).

support, and Kent Smetters and Julie Collins for comments. A central point in the recent debate about Social Security in the United States has been the extent to which the federal government should take significant positions in the equity market. But, as this paper shows, the government already has a much more significant, if implicit position in the U.S. equity market through its claim to future tax revenues. Using estimates of the sensitivity of federal tax revenues to stock market returns, I calculate the implicit equity position of the federal government, defined as the equity position that would be as sensitive to the stock market as the present value of federal revenues. Although standard errors are large, point estimates indicate that the implicit federal equity position exceeds the size of the stock market itself, a result that is consistent with the fact that revenues from all sources, not just taxes on corporate source income, are responsive to stock market returns.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee in Boston, MA, April 25, 2003

The Employment Consequences of Wrongful-Discharge Laws: Large, Small, or None at All? by David H. Autor, John J. Donohue and Stewart J. Schwab. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 440-446 of American Economic Review, May 2004

One of the most influential tests of the expectations hypothesis is Mankiw and Miron [Q. J. Econ. 101 (1986) 211], who found that the spread between the long-term and short-term rates provided predictive power for the short-term rate before the Fed's founding but not after. They suggested that the failure of the expectations hypothesis after the Fed's founding was due to the Fed's practice of smoothing short-term interest rates. We show that their finding that the expectations hypothesis fares better prior to the Fed's founding is due to the fact that the test they employ tends to generate results that are more favorable to the expectations hypothesis during periods when there is extreme volatility in the short-term rate.

The number of US community banks is falling rapidly. Is this reduction being driven in part by banks’ desire to geographically diversify to reduce their vulnerability to local economic shocks? A comparison of the performance of banks in counties that suffered economic shocks in the 1990s with similar banks in counties that did not suffer economic shocks shows that banks withstand local economic shocks quite well. This result suggests that the geographic concentration risk that community banks must bear to focus on relationship lending is small and is not an important factor contributing to the decline of community banks.