Reviews the book "Information Systems: Theory and Practice," by John G. Burch, Felix R. Strater and Gary Grudnitski.

Reviews the book "International Accounting," by Frederick D.S. Choi and Gerhard G. Mueller.

Reviews the book "New Directions in Federal Tax Policy for the 1980s," edited by Charls E. Walker and Mark A. Bloomfield.

Reviews the book "Modern Auditing," 2nd ed., by Walter G. Kell and Richard F. Ziegler.

ABSTRACT: This paper uses discriminant analysis as a foundation for an admissions policy for accounting majors. The discriminant model is capable of correctly classifying students into Accept/Reject groups with a statistical accuracy of 78 percent using only three characteristics--grade-point average at 45 semester hours, grade in college mathematics, and grade in English composition. The model, more importantly, correctly classifies 90 percent of those students who, according to the model's criterion, should be rejected. Alternatively, the model is capable of identifying the same percent of those students who perform exceedingly well in accounting. This technique, together with a review and appeal procedure, provides a method of restricting enrollment while still meeting today's demand for quality accounting students.

[This paper uses discriminant analysis as a foundation for an admissions policy for accounting majors. The discriminant model is capable of correctly classifying students into Accept/Reject groups with a statistical accuracy of 78 percent using only three characteristics-grade-point average at 45 semester hours, grade in college mathematics, and grade in English composition. The model, more importantly, correctly classifies 90 percent of those students who, according to the model's criterion, should be rejected. Alternatively, the model is capable of identifying the same percent of those students who perform exceedingly well in accounting. This technique, together with a review and appeal procedure, provides a method of restricting enrollment while still meeting today's demand for quality accounting students.]

This paper investigates oil depletion and trade when monopolistic oil producers also exercise monopoly power in the capital market. A two-period model views collusively organized oil producers with an initial trade surplus and a subsequent deficit. When monopoly power in the capital market is applied to the disadvantage of borrowers, less oil is initially made available to oil importers than if the interest rate had been competitively determined. This depletion bias, however, is reversed if, because of incentives for capital accumulation, it is to the advantage of the oil producers to subsidize lending to the oil importers. In either case the bias in oil depletion due to monopolistic recycling of oil revenue is greater, the more vulnerable are oil importers' incomes to a curtailment of oil supplies.