We study the connection between the global liquidity crisis and the severe credit crunch experienced by finance companies (SOFOLES) in Mexico using firm-level data between 2001 and 2011. Our results provide supporting evidence that, as a result of the liquidity shock, SOFOLES faced severely restricted access to their main funding sources (commercial bank loans, loans from other organizations, and public debt markets). After controlling for the potential endogeneity of their funding, we find that the liquidity shock explains 64 percent of SOFOLES’ credit contraction during the recent financial crisis (2008–2009). We use our estimates to disentangle supply from demand factors as determinants of the credit contraction. After controlling for the large decline in loan demand during the financial crisis, our findings suggest that supply factors (such as nonperforming loans and lower liquidity buffers) also played a significant role. Finally, we find that financial deregulation implemented in 2006 may have amplified the effects of the global liquidity shock.

We develop an analytical solution to the dynamic portfolio choice problem of an investor with power utility defined over wealth at a finite horizon, who faces a time-varying investment opportunity set, parameterized using a flexible vector autoregression. We apply this framework to study the horizon effects in the allocations of equity-only investors, who hold a mix of value and growth indices, and a more general investor, who also has access to Treasury bills and bonds. We find that the mean allocation of equity-only investors is heavily tilted towards value stocks at short-horizons, but the magnitude of this tilt declines dramatically with the investment horizon, implying that growth is less risky than value at long horizons. Investors with access to bills and bonds exhibit similar behavior, when value and growth tilts are computed relative to the total equity allocation of the portfolio. However, after accounting for the propensity of these investors to increase their total equity allocation as the horizon increases, the mean value tilt of the optimal allocation is shown to be positive and stable across time.

Value-at-risk methods which employ a linear (“delta only”) approximation to the relation between instrument values and the underlying risk factors are unlikely to be robust when applied to portfolios containing non-linear contracts such as options. The most widely used alternative to the delta-only approach involves revaluing each contract for a large number of simulated values of the underlying factors. In this paper we explore an alternative approach which uses a quadratic approximation to the relation between asset values and the risk factors. This method (i) is likely to be better adapted than the linear method to the problem of assessing risk in portfolios containing non-linear assets, (ii) is less computationally intensive than simulation using full-revaluation and (iii) in common with the delta-only method, operates at the level of portfolio characteristics (deltas and gammas) rather than individual instruments.

Journal Article International Trade Theory in Vintage Models Get access M. A. M. Smith M. A. M. Smith London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 43, Issue 1, February 1976, Pages 99–113, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296604 Published: 01 February 1976 Article history Received: 01 June 1974 Accepted: 01 April 1975 Published: 01 February 1976

Journal Article A Note on Fixed Factor Proportions and Net Saving Rates Get access M. A. M. Smith M. A. M. Smith London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 40, Issue 2, April 1973, Pages 297–298, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296656 Published: 01 April 1973

Rational models claim “trading to learn” explains widespread excessive speculative trading and challenge behavioral explanations of excessive trading. We argue rational learning models do not explain speculative trading by studying day traders in Taiwan. Consistent with previous studies of learning, unprofitable day traders are more likely than profitable traders to quit. Consistent with models of overconfidence and biased learning (but not with rational learning), the aggregate performance of day traders is negative; 74% of day trading volume is generated by traders with a history of losses; and 97% of day traders are likely to lose money in future day trading. Received: March 4, 2019; Editorial decision: May 16, 2019 by Editor: Jeffrey Pontiff.

This article examines the effect of asymmetric information on the trading of underwriting risk between insurers and reinsurers and how it is mitigated in a context of long-term relationships. It begins by explaining how information problems affect the efficiency of the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers and how long-term implicit contracts allow the inclusion of new information in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. A key feature of these relationships is the reliance on loss-contingent rebates and commissions in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. We argue that when information is revealed only over time, long-term implicit contracts between insurers and reinsurers allow the inclusion of new information into reinsurance pricing. Because of this feature, the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers is more efficient. Specifically, such arrangements lead to more reinsurance coverage, higher insurer profits, and lower expected distress in the industry. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G22, G13, L15, D81.

This paper uses firm-level panel data to investigate the proposition that reliquification is an important phase of the business cycle. It occurs late during recessions and is characterized by prolonged reductions in real investment, caused by firms needing to accumulate assets in order to improve their financial health. The paper concludes that a buildup of assets precedes an increase in investment. This effect is more important for firms without access to organized bond markets and during recession years.