Economic theory tells us that market and credit risks are intrinsically related to each other and not separable. We describe the two main approaches to pricing credit risky instruments: the structural approach and the reduced form approach. It is argued that the standard approaches to credit risk management – CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+ and KMV – are of limited value when applied to portfolios of interest rate sensitive instruments and in measuring market and credit risk. Empirically returns on high yield bonds have a higher correlation with equity index returns and a lower correlation with Treasury bond index returns than do low yield bonds. Also, macro economic variables appear to influence the aggregate rate of business failures. The CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+ and KMV methodologies cannot reproduce these empirical observations given their constant interest rate assumption. However, we can incorporate these empirical observations into the reduced form of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995b). Drawing the analogy. Risk 5, 63–70 model. Here default probabilities are correlated due to their dependence on common economic factors. Default risk and recovery rate uncertainty may not be the sole determinants of the credit spread. We show how to incorporate a convenience yield as one of the determinants of the credit spread. For credit risk management, the time horizon is typically one year or longer. This has two important implications, since the standard approximations do not apply over a one year horizon. First, we must use pricing models for risk management. Some practitioners have taken a different approach than academics in the pricing of credit risky bonds. In the event of default, a bond holder is legally entitled to accrued interest plus principal. We discuss the implications of this fact for pricing. Second, it is necessary to keep track of two probability measures: the martingale probability for pricing and the natural probability for value-at-risk. We discuss the benefits of keeping track of these two measures.

Market power exercised by firms has become central to macroeconomics. Recent theoretical work highlights the importance of the relation between market power and inflation. We examine this relation for individual firms in eleven U.S. industries. Our econometric framework exploits restrictions from dynamic theory and information from financial markets to generate quantitative evidence on the responsiveness of market power to inflation. We find that inflation usually has a positive effect on market power. This relation is heterogeneous across the eleven industries, and statistically significant positive relations are concentrated in industries with little market power.

We examine a sample of firms that reset the exercise prices on their executive options. These repricings follow a period of about one year of poor firm-specific performance in which the average firm loses one-fourth of its value. No other offsetting changes to option terms or compensation are made, and many firms reprice more than once. Without repricing, a majority of the options would have been at-the-money within two years. We find that when faced with circumstances in which repricing might be chosen, firms with greater agency problems, smaller size, and insider- dominated boards are more likely to reprice.

We investigate how banking market competition, informational opacity, and sensitivity to shocks have changed over the last three decades by examining the persistence of firm-level rents. We develop propagation mechanisms with testable implications to isolate the sources of persistence. Our analysis suggests that different processes underlie persistence at the high and low ends of the performance distribution. Our tests suggest that impediments to competition and informational opacity continue to be strong determinants of persistence; that the reduction in geographic regulatory restrictions had little effect on competitiveness; and that persistence remains sensitive to regional/macroeconomic shocks. The findings also suggest reasons for the recent record profitability of the industry.

This paper attempts to bring theoretical and empirical research on capital gains realization behavior closer together by considering whether investors who appear to engage more in strategic tax avoidance activity also respond differently to tax rates. We find that such investors exhibit significantly smaller responses to permanent tax rate changes than other investors. Put another way, a larger part of their response to capital gains tax rates reflects timing, consistent with their closer adherence to tax avoidance strategies emphasizing arbitrage based on tax rate differentials. This finding holds for two alternative specifications of realization behavior, one of which suggests larger permanent responses to capital gains tax rates than those of previous panel studies.

Output Fluctuations in the United States: What Has Changed since the Early 1980's? by Margaret M. McConnell and Gabriel Perez-Quiros. Published in volume 90, issue 5, pages 1464-1476 of American Economic Review, December 2000

While recent research has emphasized the desirability of studying effects of changes in marginal tax rates on taxable income, broadly defined, there has been comparatively little analysis of effects of marginal tax rate changes on entrepreneurial entry. This margin is likely to be important both because of the likely greater elasticity of entrepreneurial decisions with respect to tax changes (relative to decisions about hours worked) and because of recent research linking entrepreneurship, mobility, and household wealth accumulation. Previous work focuses on how marginal tax rates affect work incentives, incentives to take compensation in taxable forms, and reporting incentives. In addition, both the level and the progressivity of tax rates can affect decisions about risky activities. The tax system offers insurance for taking risk since taxes depend on outcomes; however, asymmetric taxes on different outcomes, such as progressive rates, may discourage risk taking. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for 1978-1993, we incorporate both of these effects of the tax system in empirical estimations of the probability that people enter self employment. While the level of the marginal tax rate does not affect entry into self employment in a consistent manner across specifications, we find robust results that

The Phillips Curve, the Persistence of Inflation, and the Lucas Critique: Evidence from Exchange-Rate Regimes: Comment by Clemens J. M. Kool and Alex Lammertsma. Published in volume 90, issue 1, pages 312-315 of American Economic Review, March 2000

This paper presents new information on the fraction of adjusted gross income, and of wages and salaries, that is reported by taxpayers in the top one half of one percent of the income distribution. This corresponds to roughly five hundred thousand households in the late 1990s. This paper relies on data from the Treasury's Individual Income Tax Model for the period 1960-1995. The definition of adjusted gross income is standardized, so that changes in the tax law do not affect the measured concentration of AGI. The results suggest that the share of AGI reported by the highest income households increased significantly between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, with most of the increase taking place in the years immediately following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. While we find some evidence of transitory changes in the concentration of income around major tax changes, which may be the result of income retiming by high income taxpayers, re-timing does not seem to explain most of the changes since 1986.

This paper examines policies and procedures put in place by corporations to regulate trading in the stock by the firm's own insiders. Over 92% of our sample companies have their own policies restricting trading by insiders, and 78% have explicit blackout periods during which the company prohibits trading by its insiders. Our data indicate that blackout periods successfully suppress trading, both purchases and sales, by insiders, and that the blackout period is associated with a bid–ask spread that's narrower by about two basis points. Consistent with this effect on the spread, allowed insider trades are modestly more profitable than insider trades made during prohibited blackout periods.