Insider transactions are not random across growth and value stocks. We find that insider buying climbs as stocks change from growth to value categories. Insider buying also is greater after low stock returns, and lower after high stock returns. These findings are consistent with a version of overreaction which says that prices of value stocks tend to lie below fundamental values, and prices of growth stocks tend to lie above fundamental values.

Insider transactions are not random across growth and value stocks. We find that insider buying climbs as stocks change from growth to value categories. Insider buying also is greater after low stock returns, and lower after high stock returns. These findings are consistent with a version of overreaction which says that prices of value stocks tend to lie below fundamental values, and prices of growth stocks tend to lie above fundamental values.

Unlike Dutch auction repurchases and tender offers, open-market repurchase programs do not precommit firms to acquire a specified number of shares. In a sample of 450 programs from 1981 to 1990, firms on average acquire 74 to 82 percent of the shares announced as repurchase targets within three years of the repurchase announcement. We find that share repurchases are negatively related to prior stock price performance, suggesting that firms increase their purchasing depending on its degree of perceived undervaluation. In addition, repurchases are positively related to levels of cash flow, which is consistent with liquidity arguments.

We model growth and technology transfer in a world where technologies are specific to particular combinations of inputs. Unlike the usual specification, our model does not imply that an improvement in one technique for producing a given good improves all other techniques for producing that good. Technology improvements diffuse slowly across countries, although knowledge spreads instantaneously and there are no technology adoption costs. However, even with “Ak” production, our model implies conditional convergence. This model, with appropriate technology and technology diffusion, has more realistic predictions for convergence and growth than either the standard neoclassical model or simple endogenous-growth models.

This paper analyzes the savings and longevity impacts of mortality‐contingent claims, defined here as income measures, such as annuities and life insurance, under which earned income is contingent on the length of one's life. The postwar increase in mandatory annuity and life insurance programs, as well as the rapid increase in the life expectancy of older ages, motivates a better understanding of the incentive effects that mortality‐contingent claims have on longevity‐related behavior. We claim that these incentives in often alter the standard conclusions obtained about old‐age support when mortality is treated exogenously. In particular, we argue that annuities involve moral hazard effects that increase longevity and, among other things, introduce a positive interaction between public programs for health care and income support for the elderly‐programs that have grown enormously in developed countries

There is little argument that early investment in computing and communications (CC guidance for future research policy can come from an examination of history. Whereas a vigorous industry has been visible for decades, many outside observers who question the need for federal C&C research support are often ignorant of the continuing exploitation by industry of science and technologies developed decades ago via past support and how such support has complemented industrial activities. This paper outlines how the organization of federal funding for C&C R&D has helped to make such funding so fertile, noting dimensions that may be of enduring value even as circumstances change. It focuses on the High Performance Computing and Communications Initiative of the 1980's and early 1990's, which evolved from earlier funding programs and influences current programs and prospects.' By design (and reflecting space limitations), the paper emphasizes positive aspects that may be relevant for the future.

This paper presents a simple R&D-driven endogenous growth model to shed light on some puzzling economic trends. The model can account for why patent statistics have been roughly constant even though R&D employment has risen sharply over the last 30 years. The model also illuminates why steadily increasing R&D effort has not lead to any upward trend in economic growth rates, as is predicted by earlier R&D-driven endogenous growth models with the “scale effect ” property.