This paper examines the association between consolidation and changes in levels of bank branching as measured by changes in the number of bank branches per capita. Using a specially-constructed data set, we address this issue as well as how this relationship varies with the type of consolidation and initial regulatory, competitive, and market conditions. We find that merges where merging institutions have branch networks which overlap within a ZIP code (within-ZIP merger) are strongly associated with a reduction in offices per capita in that ZIP code. This result is robust across time and holds in both rural and urban areas. The findings also suggest that, contrary to popularly held views, consolidation is not unambiguously negatively associated with changes in the number of banking offices per capita. Neither within-market-but-not-within-ZIP mergers nor out-of-market mergers consistently show such a relationship. We also find that the relationships between within-ZIP and within-market-but-not-within-ZIP mergers and changes in the number of bank offices per capita are more negative in low-income neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods. However, because most states now have unrestricted branching and because savings associations are less prevalent and financially healthier than in the past, these findings may not be indicative of future branching patterns.

We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership has risen from 13 percent for the universe of exchange‐listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership.

We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership has risen from 13 percent for the universe of exchange‐listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership.

A surprisingly large amount of otherregarding behavior is the common finding of experiments on bargaining, public goods, and trust. Elizabeth Hoffman et al. ( hereafter, HMS ) ( 1996 ) have provided an insightful analysis of why experimental results deviate from game theoretic predictions in dictator games. The authors conclude that individuals’ dispositional knowledge about social norms and reciprocity is activated by decreasing social distance even though the dictator game explicitly excludes reciprocal sanctioning possibilities by experimental design. We challenge this conclusion. While HMS (p. 654) define social distance to be ‘‘the degree of reciprocity that subjects believe exist within a social interaction,’’ we argue that social distance influences otherregardedness independent of any norms of social exchange. When social distance decreases, the ‘‘other’’ is no longer some unknown individual from some anonymous crowd but becomes an ‘‘identifiable victim’’ (Thomas C. Schelling 1968). In order to discriminate between reciprocity-based and identifiabilitybased other-regardedness, we also used the dictator game and varied the degree of social distance. An anonymous treatment is com-

This paper examines the relationship between population and economic growth. It analyzes the implications of the effects of higher population density on per capita incomes and other variables in different countries and other geographic regions. Several statistical models that interpolate population to cities investment in human capital and economic growth were utilized to help analyze population growth. Generally economists along with others have believed that higher population lowers per capita incomes by diminishing returns. On the contrary there are few proofs demonstrating that higher population in more developed economies reduce per capita incomes. Population may reduce productivity secondary to traditional diminishing returns from more intensive use of land and other natural resources. However large populations encourage greater specialization and increased investments in knowledge. Therefore the net relation between greater population and per capita incomes relies on whether the inducements to human capital and expansion of knowledge are stronger than diminishing returns to natural resources.

Scale economies and agglomeration externalities are alleged to be important determinants of economic growth. To assess these effects, we outline and estimate a microfoundations model based on a dynamic cost function specification. This model provides for the separate identification of the impacts of externalities and cyclical utilization on short- and long-run scale economies and input substitution patterns. We find that scale economies are prevalent in U.S. manufacturing, cost savings and scale effects often attributed to internal inputs may be due to external factors, and supply-side agglomeration effects are greater than demand-side, especially in the long run. (JEL O47, E23)

The practices of preferencing and internalization have been alleged to support collusion, cause worse execution, and lead to wider spreads in dealership style markets relative to auction style markets. For a sample of London Stock Exchange stocks, we find that preferenced trades pay higher spreads, however they do not generate higher dealer profits. Internalized trades pay lower, not higher, spreads. We do not find a relation between the extent of preferencing or internalization and spreads across stocks. These results do not lend support to the “collusion” hypothesis but are consistent with a “costly search and trading relationships” hypothesis.

Accounting researchers (and potentially others) generally select rather simple, lower-order, time-series models to develop proxies for earnings persistence. However, measures of persistence produced by such models are not related to characteristics of the firm's economic environment that are expected to influence earnings persistence. Using a sample of 162 calendar year-end New York Stock Exchange firms, we document the cross-sectional relations between a set of relatively constant, firm-specific, economic characteristics that are theoretical determinants of persistence and measures of earnings persistence derived from both lower-order and higher-order Autoregressive, Integrated, Moving-Average (ARIMA) models. When lower-order ARIMA models are used to generate measures of earnings persistence, the cross-sectional regression models measuring the association between persistence and economic determinants of persistence yield very low adjusted R2s. In sharp contrast, when differenced, higher-order ARIMA models are used to measure earnings persistence, adjusted R2s are in the 10–12 percent range. Moreover, independent variables such as capital intensity, barriers-to-entry, and product-type are all significant in the directions suggested by economic theory. Our results are consistent with Lipe and Kormendi (1994) who argue that higher-order ARIMA models do a better job of capturing the valuerelevance of current period earnings than lower-order models.

New Evidence on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities by Olivia S. Mitchell, James M. Poterba, Mark J. Warshawsky and Jeffrey R. Brown. Published in volume 89, issue 5, pages 1299-1318 of American Economic Review, December 1999

This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the persistent use of alphabetical name ordering on academic papers in economics. In a context in which market participants are interested in evaluating the relative individual contribution of authors, it is an equilibrium for papers to use alphabetical ordering. Moreover, it is never an equilibrium for authors always to be listed in order of relative contribution. In fact, we show via an example that the alphabetical name ordering norm may be the unique equilibrium, althoug multiple equilibria are also possible. Finally, we charaterize the welfare properties of the noncooperative equilibrium and show it to produce research of lower quality than is optimal and than would be achieved if coauthors were forced to use name ordering to signal relative contribution.