This paper explores the implications for risk‐taking behavior and the equilibrium distribution of income of assuming that the desire for status positions is a powerful motive and that it raises the marginal utility of consumption. In contrast to previous analyses, we consider the case in which status positions are sold in a hedonic market. We show that such a complete hedonic market in status positions can be perfectly replicated by a simpler arrangement with a “status good” and a social norm that assigns higher status to those that consume more of this good. The main result is that for a wide range of initial conditions the equilibrium distribution over income, status, and consumption is the same, that this allocation requires inequality of income and consumption, and that this allocation coincides with the optimum of a utilitarian planner.

ABSTRACT We develop and test a theory explaining the equilibrium matching of issuers and underwriters. We assume that issuers and underwriters associate by mutual choice, and that underwriter ability and issuer quality are complementary. Our model implies that matching is positive assortative, and that matches are based on firms' and underwriters' relative characteristics at the time of issuance. The model predicts that the market share of top underwriters and their average issue quality varies inversely with issuance volume. Various cross‐sectional patterns in underwriting spreads are consistent with equilibrium matching. We find strong empirical confirmation of our theory.

The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates to Economic News: Evidence and Implications for Macroeconomic Models by Refet S. Gürkaynak, Brian Sack and Eric Swanson. Published in volume 95, issue 1, pages 425-436 of American Economic Review, March 2005

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

This note corrects an error in an example in Meetings with Costly Participation (AER 90(4), 927-943). It characterizes the set of equilibria for the example under the assumptions in the paper, shows that in all the equilibria an interval of moderate po- sitions is devoid of participants, and provides assumptions under which the result as originally stated is correct.

Parental Child Care in Single-Parent, Cohabiting, and Married-Couple Families: Time-Diary Evidence from the United Kingdom by Charlene M. Kalenkoski, David C. Ribar and Leslie S. Stratton. Published in volume 95, issue 2, pages 194-198 of American Economic Review, May 2005