Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems. Firms owned/run by founding family members are characterized by a unique agency conflict between dominant and small shareholders. Using multiple measures to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence, we find that family firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid the non-tax cost of a potential price discount, which can arise from minority shareholders’ concern with family rent-seeking masked by tax avoidance activities [Desai and Dharmapala, 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 145–179]. Our result is also consistent with family owners being more concerned with the potential penalty and reputation damage from an IRS audit than non-family firms. We obtain similar inferences when using a small sample of tax shelter cases.

We investigate whether judges’ political ideology affects corporate tax behaviors. We find that firms engaging in less aggressive tax planning when Circuit Court judges are more liberal. Cross-sectionally, the deterrent effect of liberal judge ideology is more pronounced for firms that engage in judiciary-sensitive tax strategies, face higher enforcement risk from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), or have larger reputational costs from tax disputes. Our findings further suggest that liberal judge ideology reduces firms’ R&D investments and market value by constraining tax planning. Overall, our evidence highlights the importance of judge ideology for firm behavior in the context of corporate tax planning.

Although the differential persistence of accruals and operating cash flows is a firm-specific phenomenon, research seeking to exploit the differential persistence of these earnings components typically employs cross-sectional forecasting models. We find that a model based on firm-specific estimates of the differential persistence of accruals and operating cash flows is incrementally useful for out-of-sample forecasting relative to state-of-the-art cross-sectional models. In doing so, we show that firm-specific estimates of differential persistence are particularly useful when forecasting earnings for more stable firms (e.g., more profitable, lower growth, and less levered firms). We also demonstrate that a trading strategy exploiting investors' fixation on earnings and based on firm-specific estimates of differential persistence earns statistically and economically significant excess returns that are incremental to those generated by trading strategies based on the size of accruals. These results suggest that firm-specific estimates of differential persistence are incrementally informative for forecasting and valuation.

We examine whether employee perceptions of managers and firms fall following tax avoidance news. Using S&P 500 firms and generalized difference-in-differences specifications, we find that tax avoidance news negatively affects employee perceptions of managers and firms. In cross-sectional tests, we find that (1) firms and managers in consumer-facing industries suffer larger employee-related perception changes from tax avoidance news compared to other firms, and (2) well-performing firms and their managers face smaller perception changes than other firms and managers. Overall, our results are consistent with tax avoidance news negatively affecting employee perceptions of managers and firms.

Based on Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia's (2007) derivation of the cost of equity capital in terms of expected cash flows, we generate a testable hypothesis that relates tax avoidance to a firm's cost of equity capital. Using three broad measures of tax avoidance—book-tax differences, permanent book-tax differences, and long-run cash effective tax rates—to test our hypothesis, we find that the cost of equity is lower for tax-avoiding firms. This effect is stronger for firms with better outside monitoring, firms that likely realize higher marginal benefits from tax savings, and firms with higher information quality. Overall, our results suggest that equity investors generally require a lower expected rate of return due to the positive cash flow effects of corporate tax avoidance.