Knowledge that Transforms

In recent years, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, former U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, and many journalists have argued that workers are more anxious about losing their jobs than they were in the past. I use the 1977‐96 General Social Survey to document trends in workers' beliefs about their own job security. During the 1990s, workers have been more pessimistic about losing their jobs in the next 12 months than workers were during the 1980s. Workers have also been more concerned about suffering future job loss that would have resulted in a decline in earnings or a spell of unemployment.

This article compares immigrant and native‐born male occupational distributions in Canada in the 1980s. Three questions are addressed: (1) How do immigrant and native‐born occupational distributions differ? (2) Are immigrants more occupationally mobile? and (3) How do immigrant occupations and mobility relate to characteristics used in immigrant selection? Results indicate that immigrants are more skilled, but this declines across successive cohorts. Immigrants are more occupationally mobile even long after arrival, indicating immigration may contribute to a more flexible labor force. Immigrants who are not assessed on their skills or are not fluent at arrival are less occupationally mobile.

Jobs with performance-related pay (PRP) attract workers of higher ability and induce workers to provide greater effort. The authors construct an integrated model of effort and sorting that clarifies the distinction between observable and unobservable ability and the relationship between earnings and productivity. Predictions are tested against data from the British Household Panel Survey. The PRP raises wages by 9 percent for men and 6 percent for women. Theoretical calculations show that these estimated earnings differentials represent average productivity differentials net of monitoring costs at the marginal firm using PRP but not of the disutility of additional effort expended by workers. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.

In 1987, the Journal of Labor Economics published an issue on the economics of personnel. Since then, personnel economics, defined as the application of labor economics principles to business issues, has become a major part of labor economics, now accounting for a substantial proportion of papers in this and other journals. Much of the work in personnel economics has been theoretical, in large part because the data needed to test these theories have not been available. In recent years, a number of firm‐based data sets have surfaced that allow personnel economics to be tested. Using two such data sets, I give support to the implications of theories that relate to life‐cycle incentives, tournaments, piecework incentives, pay compression, and peer pressure. I conclude that personnel economics is real. It is far more than a set of clever theories. It has relevance to the real world. Additionally, firm‐based data make asking and answering new kinds of questions feasible. The value of research in this area is high because so little is known compared with other fields in labor economics. Questions about the importance of a worker's relative position in a firm, about intrafirm mobility, about the effect of the firm's business environment on worker welfare, and about the significance of first impressions can be answered using the new data. Finally, I argue that the importance of personnel economics in undergraduate as well as business school curricula will continue to grow.

We examine the effects of minimum wage legislation in Canada over the period 1975–93. For teenagers we find that a 10% increase in the minimum wage is associated with roughly a 2.5% decrease in employment. We also find that this result is driven by low frequency variation in the data. At high frequencies the elasticity is positive and insignificant. The difference in the elasticity across the bandwidth has implications for the interpretation of employment dynamics as a result of minimum wage policy and experimental design in minimum wage studies. It also provides a simple reconciliation of the “new minimum wage research,” which reports very small negative, or positive, elasticities.

The model of job search involves both employer matches and career matches. Workers may change employers without changing careers but cannot search over possible lines of work while working for one employer. The optimal policy implies a two‐stage search strategy in which workers search over types of work first. The patterns of job changes observed in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth support this two‐stage search policy. Among male workers who are changing jobs, those who have previously changed employers while working in their current career are much less likely to change careers during the current job change.

We use a unique new data set that combines data on individual workers and their employers to estimate marginal productivity differentials among different types of workers. We then compare these to estimated relative wages, leading to new evidence on productivity‐based and nonproductivity‐based explanations of the determination of wages. Among our findings are (1) the higher pay of prime‐aged workers (aged 35–54) and older workers (aged 55+) is reflected in higher point estimates of their relative marginal products, and (2) for the most part, the lower relative earnings of women are not reflected in lower relative marginal products.

This article adds to the empirical literature on tournament theory as a theory of executive compensation. I test several propositions of tournament models on a rich data set containing information about 2,600 executives in 210 Danish firms during a 4‐year period. I ask, Are pay differentials between job levels consistent with relative compensation? Is pay dispersion between levels higher in noisy environments? Is the dispersion affected by the number of tournament participants? Is average pay lower in firms with more compressed pay structures? Does wider pay dispersion enhance firm performance? Most of the predictions gain support in the data.

This article investigates if the location choices made by immigrants when they arrive in the United States are influenced by the interstate dispersion in welfare benefits. Income-maximizing behavior implies that foreign-born welfare recipients, unlike their native-born counterparts, may be clustered in the states that offer the highest benefits. The empirical analysis indicates that immigrant welfare recipients are indeed more heavily clustered in high-benefit states than the immigrants who do not receive welfare, or than natives. As a result, the welfare participation rate of immigrants is much more sensitive to changes in welfare benefits than that of natives. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.

Estimates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics indicate that African-American men are one-third as likely to be self-employed as white men. The large discrepancy is due to a black transition rate into self-employment that is approximately one-half the white rate and a black transition rate out of self-employment that is twice the white rate. Using a new variation of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique, the author finds that racial differences in asset levels and probabilities of having self-employed fathers explain a large part of the gap in the entry rate, but almost none of the gap in the exit rate. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.