For two decades, the consensus explanation of the British Industrial Revolution has placed technological change and the supply side at center stage, affording little or no role for demand or overseas trade. Recently, alternative explanations have placed an emphasis on the importance of trade with New World colonies, and the expanded supply of raw cotton it provided. We test both hypotheses using calibrated general equilibrium models of the British economy and the rest of the world for 1760 and 1850. Neither claim is supported. Trade was vital for the progress of the industrial revolution; but it was trade with the rest of the world, not the American colonies, that allowed Britain to export its rapidly expanding textile output and achieve growth through extreme specialization in response to shifting comparative advantage.

The Role of Information in Medical Markets: An Analysis of Publicly Reported Outcomes in Cardiac Surgery by David M. Cutler, Robert S. Huckman and Mary Beth Landrum. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 342-346 of American Economic Review, May 2004

Changing Labor-Market Opportunities for Women and the Quality of Teachers, 1957-2000 by Sean P. Corcoran, William N. Evans and Robert M. Schwab. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 230-235 of American Economic Review, May 2004

The authors consider an individual who lacks the information-processing capacity required for a direct comparison of all feasible allocations. Instead of finding at once a best allocation, the individual myopically adjusts his current allocation toward higher utility. The individual makes adjustment errors inversely proportional to his ability to choose. The authors compare the stationary state of this process with the standard model. They see how an imperfect ability to choose modifies both positive and normative predictions of the standard model and how the standard model can be obtained from the authors' more general one as the special case corresponding to perfect ability.

The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was enacted to monitor minority and low-income access to the mortgage market. The data collected for this purpose show that minorities are more than twice as likely to be denied a mortgage as whites. Yet variables correlated with both race and creditworthiness were omitted from these data, making any conclusion about race's role in mortgage lending impossible. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston collected additional variables important to the mortgage lending decision and found that race continued to play an important, though significantly diminished, role in the decision to grant a mortgage.

Despite the potential of algorithms to improve judgment quality, recent research suggests that individuals may be averse to algorithmic use. We experimentally examine whether and how managers’ use of an algorithm-advised performance rating is influenced by rating valence and the decision rights managers have to adjust the algorithm. We find that managers are less willing to use an algorithm to evaluate subordinate performance when it advises a low, rather than high, rating. We further show that when the algorithm-advised rating is low, allowing managers to adjust how the algorithm computes the rating, compared with adjusting the rating itself or not allowing any adjustment, increases algorithmic use. Further analyses show this effect to be consistent with managers’ increased understanding of an algorithm when involved in its computation. Our findings inform organizations’ implementation of performance evaluation algorithms by showing how rating valence and decision rights jointly influence managers’ use of the algorithms.

In a quasi-experiment with external (EA), in-house internal (IIA), and outsourced internal auditors (OIA) as participants in their natural roles, we compare auditors’ internal control evaluations in the presence of differing management reporting motives. Grounded in Organizational Identity (OID) Theory, we find EAs’ evaluations are more (less) lenient when management’s motive is less (more) self-serving. We provide evidence that management’s motives affect EAs’ evaluations because management is a conduit for EAs’ OID and because EAs adopt an affiliative protective orientation. In contrast, we find no evidence management’s motives affect IIAs’ evaluations or that management is an OID conduit for IIAs. Finally, we find that although OIAs and IIAs exhibit similar OID levels, on average, OIAs’ evaluations are more lenient than IIAs’. Our results clarify how auditors form OID, how it manifests into protective behaviors, and suggest EAs’ preference to rely on OIAs’ work over IIAs’ may inadvertently diminish audit quality.

We investigate circumstances in which referral-based hiring can exacerbate rather than mitigate agency problems. When incentive contracts cannot fully align employees’ incentives with the interests of the firm, employees may behave opportunistically. Referred job candidates likely obtain inside information from existing employees about opportunistic incentive responses, and it is this information that exacerbates agency problems. Our research setting enables us to distinguish between referred and nonreferred employees. It also features a context in which the incentive contract consists of two measures with different properties (efficiency and quality), which allow for opportunistic incentive responses, i.e., sacrificing quality for efficiency. We find that referred employees focus more on efficiency and less on quality than nonreferred employees. We further document the persistence of this behavior and the differential departure likelihood of referred and nonreferred employees. Our findings suggest that referral-based hiring can exacerbate agency problems when incentive contracts allow for opportunistic gains. Data Availability: All data are proprietary. Confidentiality agreements prevent the authors from distributing the data.

We examine how subjectivity in performance measurement and reward systems (PMRS) is used to mitigate incentive contracting risks. Drawing on data from 38 interviews with supervisory and subordinate managers in four firms, we provide a more comprehensive explanation of the role of subjectivity in risk mitigation than is evident in the prior literature. We provide empirical evidence of the importance firms place on the use of subjectivity to mitigate the risk of incentive misalignment and employee sorting errors relative to its well-documented role in mitigating employee compensation risk. We find that incentive misalignment arising from unanticipated behavioral responses to performance measures is a particularly important risk, managed through subjective performance assessments. The extent of subjectivity we observe poses a significant risk of errors and bias. We observe that both vertical and horizontal information gathering and review by calibration panels are key strategies to mitigate the downside risk of subjectivity.

Theoretical work generally predicts a negative association between disclosure and risk premium, where additional disclosure reduces estimation risk or information asymmetry. However, empirical studies frequently report mixed results. Recent theoretical studies suggest that the association between disclosure and risk premium is not necessarily always negative, and could be positive (or less negative). For example, Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) show that disclosure can be associated with higher risk premium when conditioned on a firm's growth rates. Similarly, Johnstone (2016) shows that higher signal quality can lead to higher risk premium. Motivated by these studies, we re-examine the association between disclosure and risk premium, conditional on growth. Using various proxies for risk premium, disclosure, and growth, we provide robust evidence that while the unconditional association between disclosure and risk premium is ambiguous, the conditional association is negative for lower growth firms but is less negative (or positive) for higher growth firms. Data Availability: Additional analyses are available from the authors upon request.