This paper studies the extent to which qualitative features of Walrasian equilibria are refutable given a nite data set. In particular, we consider the hypothesis that the observed data are Walrasian equilibria in which each price vector is locally stable under t^atonnement. Our main result shows that a nite set of observations of prices, individual incomes and aggregate consumption vectors is rationalizable in an economy with smooth characteristics if and only if it is rationalizable in an economy in which each observed price vector is locally unique and stable under t^atonnement. Moreover, the equilibrium correspondence is locally monotone in a neighborhood of each observed equilibrium in these economies. Thus the hypotheses that equilibria are locally stable under t^atonnement, equilibrium prices are locally unique and equilibrium comparative statics are locally monotone are not refutable with a nite data set. 1
Existence of equilibrium with incomplete markets is problematic because demand functions are typically not continuous. Discontinuities occur at prices for which a marketed asset suddenly becomes redundant. The authors show that this discontinuity disappears if they allow an agent in the economy to introduce a new asset when such redundancies occur. This enables them to prove generic existence with incomplete markets using a standard path-following argument. Moreover, the authors' approach suggests a simple algorithm for computing equilibria when markets are incomplete. They demonstrate this by computing equilibrium for a numerical example.
Using Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database, we estimate a model for bank loan recoveries using variables reflecting loan and borrower characteristics, industry and macroeconomic conditions, and several recovery process variables. We find that loan characteristics are more significant determinants of recovery rates than are borrower characteristics prior to default. Industry and macroeconomic conditions are relevant, as are prepackaged bankruptcy arrangements. We examine whether a commonly used proxy for recovery rates, the 30-day post-default trading price of the loan, represents an efficient estimate of actual recoveries and find that such a proxy is biased and inefficient.
We provide evidence on the potential for bidder wealth gains in bancassurance mergers by examining a sample of such mergers in the United States and abroad. These combinations are expected to produce positive wealth gains if there are synergies between these two types of financial firms. We find positive bidder wealth effects that are significantly related to economies of scale (as measured by the size of the target relative to the bidder), potential economies of scope, and the locations of the bidders and targets. These results suggest that the bancassurance architectural structure for financial firms does offer some benefits and thus may become more prominent in future years.
The Review of Economics and Statistics199779(1), 125-135
We explore the impact of the child care tax credit in the U.S. income tax system on the labor supply decisions of married women with young children by incorporating the cost of child care into a structural labor supply model. Using data from the 1986 NLSY, we find that government subsidies to child care increase labor supply substantially. Our policy simulations show that an increase in the value of the child care tax credit (i.e., percent of expenditures subsidized) would have a much larger effect on labor supply than an increase in the annual expenditure limits of the subsidy or making the subsidy refundable.
Firms have increasingly adopted open work environments. Although openness is thought to have benefits, it could also expose firms to an unanticipated cost. An open (closed) internal reporting environment makes it more (less) likely that managers will observe a colleague's communications with senior executives. This increase in what one manager knows about another manager's communication to senior executives could facilitate employee collusion to extract resources from the firm. To test whether internal reporting openness results in more collusion, we conduct an experiment in which two managers each make separate reports to the firm about cost information they know in common but that remains unknown by the firm. Because both managers face the same truth‐inducing contract, conventional economic theory predicts that they will not collude to misreport costs regardless of reporting openness. However, using behavioral theory involving trust and reciprocity, we predict and find that managers honor their nonbinding collusive agreements and successfully collude more often in an open versus closed internal reporting environment, leading to lower firm welfare in the open environment. These results suggest that firms should consider how the cost of collusion compares to the benefits of openness.
Recent accounting research indicates that capital markets price firms' greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that disclosed emissions levels are negatively associated with firms' market values. The departure point for this study is to investigate whether investors value firms differently based on the strategies firms use to mitigate GHG emissions. These strategies include making operational changes, which reduces emissions attributable to the firm, and purchasing offsets, which reduces emissions unattributable to the firm. Using an experiment, we hold constant a firm's financial performance, investment in emissions mitigation, and net emissions, and find evidence that nonprofessional investors perceive the firm to be more valuable when it primarily uses an operational change strategy versus an offsets strategy. However, consistent with theory, this result only occurs when the firm's prior sustainability performance is below the industry average and not when it is above the industry average. This difference in firm value is consistent with the notion that nonprofessional investors believe information about a firm's emissions management strategy is material. Supplemental exploratory analyses reveal that our results are mediated by investors' perception that an operational change strategy is more socially and environmentally responsible than an offsets strategy for below industry average firms. Implications for our findings on theory and practice are discussed.