Intermediaries such as financial advisers serve as an interface between portfolio managers and investors. A large fraction of their compensation is often provided through kickbacks from the portfolio manager. We provide an explanation for the widespread use of intermediaries and kickbacks. Depending on the degree of investor sophistication, kickbacks are used either for price discrimination or aggressive marketing. We explore the effects of these arrangements on fund size, flows, performance, and investor welfare. Kickbacks allow higher management fees to be charged, thereby lowering net returns. Competition among active portfolio managers reduces kickbacks and increases the independence of advisory services.

We construct a long daily panel of short sales using proprietary NYSE order data. From 2000 to 2004, shorting accounts for more than 12.9% of NYSE volume, suggesting that shorting constraints are not widespread. As a group, these short sellers are well informed. Heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly shorted stocks by a risk‐adjusted average of 1.16% over the following 20 trading days (15.6% annualized). Institutional nonprogram short sales are the most informative; stocks heavily shorted by institutions underperform by 1.43% the next month (19.6% annualized). The results indicate that, on average, short sellers are important contributors to efficient stock prices.

We examine the evolution of insider ownership of IPO firms from 1970 to 2001 to understand how U.S. firms become widely held. A majority of these firms has insider ownership below 20% after 10 years. Stock market performance and liquidity play an extremely important role in ownership dynamics. Firms with stocks that are highly valued, are liquid, and have performed well experience large decreases in insider ownership and become widely held. Ownership also falls for low cash flow and high capital expenditures firms. Surprisingly, variables proxying for agency costs have limited success in explaining the evolution of insider ownership.

We propose regression‐based tests for mean‐variance spanning in the case where investors face market frictions such as short sales constraints and transaction costs. We test whether U.S. investors can extend their efficient set by investing in emerging markets when accounting for such frictions. For the period after the major liberalizations in the emerging markets, we find strong evidence for diversification benefits when market frictions are excluded, but this evidence disappears when investors face short sales constraints or small transaction costs. Although simulations suggest that there is a possible small‐sample bias, this bias appears to be too small to affect our conclusions.

Prior work with competitive rational expectations equilibrium models indicates that there should be a positive relation between trading volume and differences in beliefs or information among traders. We show that this result is sensitive to whether and how transaction costs are modeled. In a specialist market with endogenous transaction costs we show that trading volume can be negatively related to the degree of informational asymmetry in the market. Our analysis highlights the dependence of volume on market structure, and our results suggest that the “volume effects” of corporate or macroeconomic events reflect a decrease, rather than an increase, in heterogeneity of beliefs or asymmetry of information.

This paper presents empirical tests of market rationality using data from the point spread betting market on National Football League games. Data from this market avoid many common pitfalls of tests of rationality in conventional financial markets. The authors test for rationality with two types of tests, statistical and economic. Results of the tests reveal that the statistical tests cannot reject market rationality while the economic tests do reject market rationality.

We analyze data from a survey we administered during the COVID-19 pandemic to investigate the relationship between people’s subjective beliefs about risks and their private protective behaviors. On average, people substantially overestimate the absolute level of risk associated with economic activity, but have directionally correct signals about their relative risk based on their demographic characteristics. Subjective risk beliefs are predictive of changes in economic activities independent of government policies. Government mandates restricting economic behavior, in turn, attenuate the relationship between subjective risk beliefs and protective behaviors.

We study the sources of high end-of-life spending for cancer patients. Even among patients with similar initial prognoses, spending in the year postdiagnosis is over twice as high for those who die within the year than those who survive. Elevated spending on decedents is predominantly driven by higher inpatient spending, particularly low-intensity admissions. However, most such admissions do not result in death, making it difficult to target spending reductions. Furthermore, end-of-life spending is substantially more elevated for younger patients, compared to older patients with similar prognoses. Results highlight sources of high end-of-life spending without revealing any natural “remedies.”