Acquiring‐firm shareholders lost 12 cents around acquisition announcements per dollar spent on acquisitions for a total loss of $240 billion from 1998 through 2001, whereas they lost $7 billion in all of the 1980s, or 1.6 cents per dollar spent. The 1998 to 2001 aggregate dollar loss of acquiring‐firm shareholders is so large because of a small number of acquisitions with negative synergy gains by firms with extremely high valuations. Without these acquisitions, the wealth of acquiring‐firm shareholders would have increased. Firms that make these acquisitions with large dollar losses perform poorly afterward.

Motivated by extant finance theory predicting that insider trading crowds out private information acquisition by outsiders, we use data for 100 countries for the years 1987–2000 to study whether analyst following in a country increases following restriction of insider trading activities. We document that analyst following increases after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. This increase is concentrated in emerging market countries, but is smaller if the country has previously liberalized its capital market. We also find that analyst following responds less intensely to initial enforcement when a country has a preexisting portfolio of strong investor protections.

This paper analyzes the process of private negotiations between financial institutions and the companies they attempt to influence. It relies on a private database consisting of the correspondence between TIAA‐CREF and 45 firms it contacted about governance issues between 1992 and 1996. This correspondence indicates that TIAA‐CREF is able to reach agreements with targeted companies more than 95 percent of the time. In more than 70 percent of the cases, this agreement is reached without shareholders voting on the proposal. We verify independently that at least 87 percent of the targets subsequently took actions to comply with these agreements.

Much of the research on corporate restructuring has examined the causes and aftermath of extreme changes in corporate governance such as takeovers and bankruptcy. In contrast, we study restructurings initiated in response to product market pressures by “normal” corporate governance mechanisms. Such “voluntary” restructurings, motivated by the discipline of the product market and internal corporate controls, will play a relatively more important role in the 1990s due to a weakening in the discipline of the takeover market. Our data suggest that the firms retrenched quickly and, on average, increased their focus. There is no evidence of abnormally high levels of forced turnover in top managers. There is, however, a significant and rapid cut of 5% in the labor force. Further, the cost of goods sold to sales and labor costs to sales ratios both decline rapidly, more than 5% in the first two years after the negative earnings. The firms cut research and development, increased investment, and also reduced their debt/asset level by over 8% in the first year after the negative earnings. We also document the reasons management and analysis reported for the negative earnings. Overwhelmingly the firms blame bad economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, foreign competition.

This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts on closed end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment toward closed end funds and other securities. The theory implies that discounts on various funds must move together, that new funds get started when seasoned funds sell at a premium or a small discount, and that discounts on the funds fluctuate together with prices of securities affected by the same investor sentiment. The evidence supports these predictions. In particular, we find that discounts on closed end funds narrow when small stocks do well, as would be expected if closed end funds were subject to the same sentiment as small stocks, whim tern. also to be held by individual investors. The evidence thus suggests that investor sentiment affects security returns.

This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts of closed‐end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment. The theory implies that discounts on various funds move together, that new funds get started when seasoned funds sell at a premium or a small discount, and that discounts are correlated with prices of other securities affected by the same investor sentiment. The evidence supports these predictions. In particular, we find that both closed‐end funds and small stocks tend to be held by individual investors, and that the discounts on closed‐end funds narrow when small stocks do well.

This study examines the impact on shareholder wealth of changes in interstate banking laws. The research demonstrates that changes in state statutes which allow interstate banking have a positive impact on the stock prices of regional banking organizations and a negative impact on the stock prices of money center banks. Interstate banking statutes initially exclude those states in which the money center banks are headquartered. The findings provide evidence that, by excluding money center banks from expansion across state lines, the competition from the regional banks may have an adverse competitive effect on the money center banks.

This study examines the impact on shareholder wealth of changes in interstate banking laws. The research demonstrates that changes in state statutes which allow interstate banking have a positive impact on the stock prices of regional banking organizations and a negative impact on the stock prices of money center banks. Interstate banking statutes initially exclude those states in which the money center banks are headquartered. The findings provide evidence that, by excluding money center banks from expansion across state lines, the competition from the regional banks may have an adverse competitive effect on the money center banks.

This paper examines the effects of globalization on the distribution of worker-specific labor taxes using a unique set of tax calculators. We find a differential effect of higher trade and factor mobility on relative tax burdens in 1980–1993 versus 1994–2007 in the OECD. Prior to 1994, greater openness meant that higher income earners were taxed progressively more. However, after 1994, we document a globalization-induced rise in the labor income tax burden of the middle class, while the top 1 percent of workers and employees faced a reduction in their tax burden of 0.59–1.45 percentage points.