We explore the relationship between outcomes in a coordination game and a pre-play asset market where asset values are determined by outcomes in the subsequent coordination game. Across two experiments, we vary the payoffs from the market relative to the game, the degree of interdependence in the game, and whether traders' asset payoffs are dependent on outcomes in their own or another game. Markets lead to significantly lower efficiency across treatments, even when they produce no distortion of incentives in the game. Market prices forecast game outcomes. Our experiments shed light on how financial markets may influence affiliated economic outcomes.

Stop the Clock Policies and Career Success in Academia by Colleen Flaherty Manchester, Lisa M. Leslie and Amit Kramer. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 219-23 of American Economic Review, May 2010

Estimating Average Treatment Effects with Continuous and Discrete Covariates: The Case of Swan-Ganz Catheterization by Qi Li, Jeffrey S. Racine and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 357-62 of American Economic Review, May 2008

Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.

In 2003 there were 8,665 transplants of deceased donor kidneys for the approximately 60,000 patients waiting for such transplants in the United States. While waiting, 3,436 patients died. There were also 6,464 kidney transplants from living donors (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients web site). Live donation is an option for kidneys, since healthy people have two and can remain healthy with one. While it is illegal to buy or sell organs, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor–patient pairs such that each (living) donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of blood type or immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. So far these have been rare: as of December 2004, only five exchanges had been performed in the 14 transplant centers in New England. One reason there have been so few kidney exchanges is that there have not been databases of incompatible patient–donor pairs. Incompatible donors were simply sent home. (Databases are now being assembled not only in New England, but also in Ohio and Baltimore.) Lainie Friedman Ross et al. (1997) discussed the possibility of exchange between incompatible patient–donor pairs. Not only have a few such two-way exchanges been performed, but two three-way exchanges (in which the donor kidney from one pair is transplanted into the patient in a second pair, whose donor kidney goes to a third pair, whose donor kidney goes to the first pair) have been performed at Johns Hopkins. There have also been a number of “list exchanges” in which an incompatible patient– donor pair makes a donation to someone on the waiting list for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving high priority for a cadaver kidney when one becomes available.

Social Capital and Contributions in a Public-Goods Experiment by Lisa R. Anderson, Jennifer M. Mellor and Jeffrey Milyo. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 373-376 of American Economic Review, May 2004

The Role of the Family in Immigrants' Labor-Market Activity: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations: Comment by Francine D. Blau, Lawrence M. Kahn, Joan Y. Moriarty and Andre Portela Souza. Published in volume 93, issue 1, pages 429-447 of American Economic Review, March 2003

New Evidence on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities by Olivia S. Mitchell, James M. Poterba, Mark J. Warshawsky and Jeffrey R. Brown. Published in volume 89, issue 5, pages 1299-1318 of American Economic Review, December 1999

The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply by Colin M. Campbell, John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. Published in volume 89, issue 1, pages 325-334 of American Economic Review, March 1999

We analyze entry, pricing, and product design in a model with differentiated products. Market equilibrium can be “separating,” with multiple sellers and a sorting of heterogeneous consumers across goods, or “exclusionary,” with one seller serving all customer types. Entry into an initially monopolized market can occur because of cost reductions or product improvements, but entry need not lower the incumbent’s price, improve efficiency, or raise consumer welfare. Postentry design incentives favor a softening of price competition and stronger market segmentation, whereas exclusionary design changes typically raise consumer welfare. Potential, as distinct from actual, entry always benefits consumers.