Oversight responsibilities for many audit committees (ACs) are evolving to include some of the hottest topics in the boardroom: enterprise risk management, cybersecurity, and environmental, social, and governance reporting. However, certain ACs avoid overseeing these evolving areas, creating significant variation across boards in the assignment of responsibilities. In this study, we seek to understand how ACs respond when environmental changes create new evolving risks that may extend the boundary of their traditional domain. To do so, we interview a diverse set of 29 AC members from U.S. publicly traded companies. We analyze our data through the theoretical lens of collaborative boundary work to identify how ACs respond by extending, blurring, or maintaining their perceived oversight boundaries, the related implications of these decisions, and their key tactics employed to manage AC workload. Our findings should be of interest to boards, investors, and regulators tasked with monitoring AC effectiveness.

The concept of materiality has acquired great significance in sustainability reporting. Through the theoretical bricolage of boundary objects and boundary work and drawing upon 91 interviews, we trace materiality’s evolving role across four interconnected episodes. Our findings show that materiality begins as a multivisionary object that draws the attention of largely unconnected groups. As different actors become more aware of each other, materiality becomes a meeting point object, and then a discursive and bridge-like object for them to talk about their relationships. However, the subsequent escalation of competitive boundary work turns materiality into a divisive institutional object that inhibits cooperation. Moving beyond a view of materiality as a way to distinguish significant information within corporate reports, our analysis fleshes out the visionary and relational roles that materiality has performed in sustainability reporting for a broad range of field-level actors to see themselves and their relationships to others in new lights.

We investigate (1) how well a machine learning algorithm can predict one-year ahead effective tax rates (ETRs) and (2) which items in the financial statements and notes are most useful for these predictions. We compare our machine-generated ETR predictions with those from ETRs implied by analysts’ earnings forecasts and find the algorithm’s predictions are less biased, more precise, and explain more of the variance in future ETRs. We then use Explainable AI (based on Shapley values) to measure the usefulness of each disclosure item in the algorithm’s predictions. We find that while some tax-related items are useful, others offer minimal value. Using the machine learning algorithm’s use of information as a benchmark, we then further use Shapley values to examine which information is underweighted or overweighted by analysts. Overall, our results help inform standard setters on the relevance of certain tax disclosures in achieving the objective of predicting future ETRs.

Cross-border alliances expose firms to heightened risks, posing different governance and control challenges than domestic alliances. We examine the impact of differences in alliance partner countries' institutional environments. Analysis of survey data supports our contention that cross-border alliances involve a greater reliance on formal controls, particularly when firms collaborate with partners in countries with a weaker institutional environment. These relations exist regardless of governance structure (i.e., equity or non-equity alliance) that prior research considers a critical choice for addressing cross-border alliance risks. Additional analyses show that four subdimensions of institutional characteristics (voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) and one subdimension of formal controls (behavior controls) are the main drivers in the association between institutional distance and reliance on formal controls. These findings demonstrate the distinct impact of institutional environment as a country-level determinant of alliance control choices. Data Availability: Due to confidentiality agreements with respondents, the data cannot be released publicly.

This study examines whether material corporate events that occur during the year-end closing process constrain management's and the auditor's resources and inhibit them from providing high-quality financial reports. For a sample of U.S. company financial reports issued during 2000–2013, we identify material corporate events using Type II subsequent event footnote disclosures (i.e., material events that occur in year t+1, but prior to the issuance of the year t financial statements, yet do not affect amounts recognized in year t). We find that Type II subsequent events are associated with lower financial reporting quality, as measured by the need to subsequently restate the year t financial statements. The increased restatement likelihood only occurs when managers are resource-constrained. Auditors can mitigate the increased restatement risk, but only when they allocate more resources to the engagement. Our results underscore the importance of resource management in the financial reporting and audit processes.

We examine whether social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members shape audit outcomes. Although these social ties can facilitate information transfer and help auditors alleviate management pressure to waive correction of detected misstatements, close interpersonal relations can undermine auditors' monitoring of the financial reporting process. We measure social ties by alma mater connections, professor-student bonding, and employment affiliation, and audit quality by the propensity to render modified audit opinions, financial reporting irregularities, and firm valuation. Our evidence implies that social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members impair audit quality. In additional results consistent with expectations, we generally find that this relation is concentrated where social ties are more salient, or firm governance is relatively poor and agency conflicts are more severe. Implying reciprocity stemming from social networks, we also report some suggestive evidence that audit fees are higher in the presence of social ties between an engagement auditor and the audit committee. Collectively, our analysis lends support to the narrative that the negative implications—namely, worse audit quality and higher audit fees—of these social ties may outweigh the benefits.

Audit practitioners, academics, and attorneys have expressed concern that disclosing critical audit matters (CAMs) will increase jurors' auditor liability judgments when auditors fail to detect misstatements. In contrast, this study provides theory and experimental evidence that CAM disclosures, under certain conditions, reduce auditor liability judgments as jurors perceive that undetected fraudulent misstatements were more foreseeable to the plaintiff (i.e., the financial statement user suing the auditor). However, we find that CAM disclosures only reduce auditor liability for undetected misstatements that, absent CAM disclosure, are relatively difficult to foresee. Finally, CAM disclosures that are unrelated to subsequent misstatements neither increase nor reduce auditor liability judgments relative to the current regime (i.e., where CAMs are not disclosed), but reduce liability judgments relative to reporting that there were no CAMs. As such, we find that, relative to stating there were no CAMs, disclosure of any CAM (i.e., related or unrelated) provides litigation protection in cases of undetected fraud. Consequently, the CAM requirement could incentivize auditors to disclose innocuous boilerplate CAMs, thereby diluting the impact of more warranted CAM disclosures. Data Availabliity: Available from authors upon request.

McVay (2006) concludes that managers opportunistically shift core expenses to special items to inflate current core earnings, resulting in a positive relation between unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items. However, she further notes that this relation disappears when contemporaneous accruals are dropped from the core earnings expectations model. McVay (2006) calls for research to improve the core earnings expectations model and to provide additional cross-sectional tests of classification shifting. Using a core earnings expectations model that is not dependent on accrual special items, we show that classification shifting is more likely in the fourth quarter than in interim quarters. We also find more evidence of classification shifting when the ability of managers to manipulate accruals appears to be constrained and in meeting a range of earnings benchmarks. Overall, our evidence provides broad support for McVay’s (2006) conclusion that managers engage in classification shifting. Our study also sheds new understanding of the conditions under which managers are more likely to employ classification shifting.

Ambiguity attitudes have been prominently used in economic models, but we still know little about their demographic correlates or their generalizability beyond the West. We analyze the ambiguity attitudes of almost 3,000 students across thirty countries. For gains, we find ambiguity aversion everywhere, while ambiguity aversion is much weaker for losses. Ambiguity attitudes change systematically with probabilities for both gains and losses. Much of the between-country variation can be explained through a fewmacroeconomic characteristics. In contrast, we find massive unexplained variation at the individual level. We also find much unexplained heterogeneity in individual responses to different decision tasks.

Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect , cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history‐dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.