We examine whether social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members shape audit outcomes. Although these social ties can facilitate information transfer and help auditors alleviate management pressure to waive correction of detected misstatements, close interpersonal relations can undermine auditors' monitoring of the financial reporting process. We measure social ties by alma mater connections, professor-student bonding, and employment affiliation, and audit quality by the propensity to render modified audit opinions, financial reporting irregularities, and firm valuation. Our evidence implies that social ties between engagement auditors and audit committee members impair audit quality. In additional results consistent with expectations, we generally find that this relation is concentrated where social ties are more salient, or firm governance is relatively poor and agency conflicts are more severe. Implying reciprocity stemming from social networks, we also report some suggestive evidence that audit fees are higher in the presence of social ties between an engagement auditor and the audit committee. Collectively, our analysis lends support to the narrative that the negative implications—namely, worse audit quality and higher audit fees—of these social ties may outweigh the benefits.

Audit practitioners, academics, and attorneys have expressed concern that disclosing critical audit matters (CAMs) will increase jurors' auditor liability judgments when auditors fail to detect misstatements. In contrast, this study provides theory and experimental evidence that CAM disclosures, under certain conditions, reduce auditor liability judgments as jurors perceive that undetected fraudulent misstatements were more foreseeable to the plaintiff (i.e., the financial statement user suing the auditor). However, we find that CAM disclosures only reduce auditor liability for undetected misstatements that, absent CAM disclosure, are relatively difficult to foresee. Finally, CAM disclosures that are unrelated to subsequent misstatements neither increase nor reduce auditor liability judgments relative to the current regime (i.e., where CAMs are not disclosed), but reduce liability judgments relative to reporting that there were no CAMs. As such, we find that, relative to stating there were no CAMs, disclosure of any CAM (i.e., related or unrelated) provides litigation protection in cases of undetected fraud. Consequently, the CAM requirement could incentivize auditors to disclose innocuous boilerplate CAMs, thereby diluting the impact of more warranted CAM disclosures. Data Availabliity: Available from authors upon request.

McVay (2006) concludes that managers opportunistically shift core expenses to special items to inflate current core earnings, resulting in a positive relation between unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items. However, she further notes that this relation disappears when contemporaneous accruals are dropped from the core earnings expectations model. McVay (2006) calls for research to improve the core earnings expectations model and to provide additional cross-sectional tests of classification shifting. Using a core earnings expectations model that is not dependent on accrual special items, we show that classification shifting is more likely in the fourth quarter than in interim quarters. We also find more evidence of classification shifting when the ability of managers to manipulate accruals appears to be constrained and in meeting a range of earnings benchmarks. Overall, our evidence provides broad support for McVay’s (2006) conclusion that managers engage in classification shifting. Our study also sheds new understanding of the conditions under which managers are more likely to employ classification shifting.

Ambiguity attitudes have been prominently used in economic models, but we still know little about their demographic correlates or their generalizability beyond the West. We analyze the ambiguity attitudes of almost 3,000 students across thirty countries. For gains, we find ambiguity aversion everywhere, while ambiguity aversion is much weaker for losses. Ambiguity attitudes change systematically with probabilities for both gains and losses. Much of the between-country variation can be explained through a fewmacroeconomic characteristics. In contrast, we find massive unexplained variation at the individual level. We also find much unexplained heterogeneity in individual responses to different decision tasks.

Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect , cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history‐dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.

We show that analysts from sell‐side firms generally recommend “glamour” (i.e., positive momentum, high growth, high volume, and relatively expensive) stocks. Naïve adherence to these recommendations can be costly, because the level of the consensus recommendation adds value only among stocks with favorable quantitative characteristics (i.e., value stocks and positive momentum stocks). In fact, among stocks with unfavorable quantitative characteristics, higher consensus recommendations are associated with worse subsequent returns. In contrast, we find that the quarterly change in consensus recommendations is a robust return predictor that appears to contain information orthogonal to a large range of other predictive variables.

We present evidence that fund managers inflate quarter‐end portfolio prices with last‐minute purchases of stocks already held. The magnitude of price inflation ranges from 0.5 percent per year for large‐cap funds to well over 2 percent for small‐cap funds. We find that the cross section of inflation matches the cross section of incentives from the flow/performance relation, that a surge of trading in the quarter's last minutes coincides with a surge in equity prices, and that the inflation is greatest for the stocks held by funds with the most incentive to inflate, controlling for the stocks' size and performance.

This article investigates whether differences in information‐based trading can explain observed differences in spreads for active and infrequently traded stocks. Using a new empirical technique, we estimate the risk of information‐based trading for a sample of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed stocks. We use the information in trade data to determine how frequently new information occurs, the composition of trading when it does, and the depth of the market for different volume‐decile stocks. Our most important empirical result is that the probability of information‐based trading is lower for high volume stocks. Using regressions, we provide evidence of the economic importance of information‐based trading on spreads.

Prior work with competitive rational expectations equilibrium models indicates that there should be a positive relation between trading volume and differences in beliefs or information among traders. We show that this result is sensitive to whether and how transaction costs are modeled. In a specialist market with endogenous transaction costs we show that trading volume can be negatively related to the degree of informational asymmetry in the market. Our analysis highlights the dependence of volume on market structure, and our results suggest that the “volume effects” of corporate or macroeconomic events reflect a decrease, rather than an increase, in heterogeneity of beliefs or asymmetry of information.